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In common-value auctions and contests economic agents often have varying levels of information regarding the value of the good to be allocated. Using theoretical and experimental analysis, I examine the effect of such information asymmetry on behavior. Chapter II considers a model in which players compete in two sequential contests. The winner of the first contest (the incumbent) privately observes the value of the prize, which provides private information if the prizes are related. Relative to the case where the prizes are independent, the incumbent is strictly better off, and the other contestants (the challengers) are strictly worse off. This increases the incentive to win the first contest such that the sum of expected effort over both contests increases relative to the case of independent prizes. Chapter III experimentally considers the role of asymmetric information in first-price, sealed-bid, common-value auctions. Bidders who observe a private signal tend to overbid relative to Nash equilibrium predictions. Uninformed bidders, however, tend to underbid relative to the Nash equilibrium. Chapter IV examines asymmetric information in one-shot common-value all-pay auctions and lottery contests from both experimental and theoretical perspectives As predicted by theory, asymmetric information yields information rents for the informed bidder in both all-pay auctions and lottery contests.

The thesis consists of three separate chapters all of which investigate Theoretical Models of Sports Leagues and Other Contests. Chapter One outlines a new approach for modelling sports leagues, which complements traditional analyses of clubs' off-field talent recruitments with a subsequent analysis of players' on-field efforts. Most notably, the approach reveals a new theoretical basis for the hypothesis that sports fans prefer outcome uncertainty. Chapter Two provides a new theoretical model of the soft budget constraint phenomenon, in which governments provide bailouts for loss-making clubs in European soccer leagues. Most notably, the model indicates that governments provide an inefficiently high level of bailout funding to clubs. However, the model reveals that some positive level of bailout funding may be optimal. Chapter Three analyses a generic contest model with the possibility of a draw; an outcome in which no contestant is the winner. Most notably, our analysis reveals that introducing the possibility of a draw reduces homogeneous contestants' efforts. However, with heterogeneous contestants, introducing the possibility of a draw may induce greater effort from the strongest contestant.

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This dissertation adds to the current understanding of contests. Contests are a class of games in which players compete for a prize be expending resources. Some portion of the resources expended cannot be recuperated, even in the event of a loss. Each chapter extends standard models to incorporate realistic features such as nonprobabilistic uncertainty, budgets, dynamics, or intermediate outcomes. Chapter 1 introduces ambiguity aversion to the all-pay auction and war of attrition. Increasing ambiguity causes low types to bid lower and high types to bid higher, in the all-pay auction. In the war of attrition, ambiguity can uniformly decrease the bids. A revenue ranking for the all-pay auction, war of attrition, and standard sealed bid auctions is provided. These results are consistent with much of the experimental literature. Chapter 2 continues the discussion of ambiguity aversion. The main result is a characterization of the set of increasing equilibria in games like the all-pay auction and war of attrition. Unlike with subjective expected utility, even when beliefs are independent of type, an increasing equilibrium may not exist. Sufficient conditions are provided for such an equilibrium to exist. Chapter 3 models endogenous budgets in sequential elimination contests. Contestants depend on a strategic group of players to provide resources that will be spent in the contest. We analyze the effect of timing and spending rules on aggregate spending. When budgets are not replenished between stages, spending is higher. When unspent resources are refunded, total spending is higher than when all spending is a sunk costs. Chapter 4 introduces an all-pay auction game with an intermediate outcome between winning and losing. When bids are sufficiently different, the player with the highest bid wins a prize, and the other player receives nothing . When bids are close, the outcome is called a tie, and each player receives an intermediate prize. Ties are common in sports, political competition, and war. Equilibrium is characterized for a set of parameters where the tying region is relatively large.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Bowling Green State University, 2009. / Document formatted into pages; contains viii, 257 p. : col. ill. Includes bibliographical references.

Inducement prize contests, where a monetary prize is offered for a specified technological achievement, are increasingly popular means of incentivising research and innovation. Such prizes are often modelled by the rent-seeking Tullock contest, or an all-pay auction. However, the direct application of such models can overlook some particular features of technological competition. This thesis addresses three such features. The first model notes that preliminary prizes are often part of contest designs. A two-round Tullock model is used to investigate a potential motivation for offering such prizes when contestants have different productivities. A designer can identify and purchase the rights to the more productive technology where the award of the preliminary prize is conditional on the winner licensing his technology to other contestants. In this way, endowing a preliminary round results in the potential for increased second round productivity, but at the cost of a reduced second round prize. Such a structure is optimal when the productivities are sufficiently different. In the second model, it is noted that expenditures in inducement prize contests are often too large to be explained by the cash prize alone. There usually exists a final consumer application of the research. This chapter examines how different types of prizes arise by considering the informational content of winning and the effect this has on quality differentiation in when there is an established quality leader. A purely informational 2 prize influences investment decisions and also the qualities offered in the market. The main result is that some prizes may aim to select the highest quality firm as often as possible, whereas other prizes may aim to reward the entrant only if a significant improvement in quality is made. In the third model, prizes are not the only instruments available to contest designers. In particular, subsidy of spending may be possible. This chapter uses an intuitive interpretation of the Tullock contest to offer a matching-funds instrument to a budget constrained principal. It is shown that symmetric prize/subsidy contest designs may be optimal even in the context of contestant asymmetry, in contrast to most existing contest design models. It is also shown that if only one subsidy is offered, it is always to the weaker contestant. The role of contest accuracy in these findings is also considered.

Thesis (Ed.D.)--Georgia Southern University, 2007. / "A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Georgia Southern University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Education." Curriculum Studies, under the direction of William M. Reynolds. ETD. Electronic version approved: December 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 208-228) and appendices.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1973. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

abstract: The purpose of this study was to investigate the attitudes of high band directors in the United States toward solo and ensemble activities. Independent variables such as teaching experience, level of education, MENC region in which directors taught, personal solo and ensemble activity experience, teaching assignment, and director-centered external factors (supplemental contracts, teaching evaluations, program awards) were used to investigate potential differences in attitudinal responses. Subjects were high school band directors (N = 557) chosen through a stratified random sample by state. Participation in the study included completing an online researcher-designed questionnaire that gathered demographic information as well as information regarding directors' attitudes towards benefits from student participation in solo and ensemble activities, the importance of such activities to directors, and attitudes towards student participation in local, regional, and state solo and ensemble festivals and contests. One-way analyses of variance and two-way multivariate analyses of variance were conducted to investigate potential differences in responses according to various independent variables. Significant differences were found in responses to statements of the importance of solo and ensemble to directors and of solo and ensemble festivals and contests according to region, solo and ensemble experience, and director-centered external factors. No significant differences were found for statements of director's attitudes toward benefits of student participation in solo and ensemble activities according to any independent variables. Results indicate that directors understand and believe strongly in the benefits of solo and ensemble activities to students, but factors such as time, job demands, band program expectations, and festival and contest adjudication, format, and timing may hinder directors' inclusion of solo and ensemble activities as an integral part of their program. Further research is suggested to investigate directors' attitudes within individual states as well as ways to integrate solo and ensemble activities into daily band rehearsals. / Dissertation/Thesis / D.M.A. Music Education 2011