This thesis is the study of the role and regulation of the external audit in the UK and US. It argues that the current audit model is fundamentally flawed, which has a negative impact on the quality of financial audits. This research contributes to the debate on external auditing by suggesting a free-standing legal re-conceptualization of the audit model, which aims to improve the quality of audits and reduce opportunity for accounting fraud. The research findings are drawn from qualitative analysis of legal and financial accounting sources. The thesis consists of three main themes. Firstly, it provides a comprehensive analysis of the regulatory framework for auditing by looking at why, how and by whom audit is regulated. Secondly, it analyses numerous flaws inherent in the current audit model. The focus throughout the thesis is on problems relating to auditors' independence, deficiencies in the spheres of legal, professional and social accountability of auditors, and excessive concentration of the audit market. Thirdly, following the analysis of various theoretical and international audit arrangements, the thesis suggests a new audit model. A key function in this model would be played by an external, public body - the Public Auditing Board, which would be in charge of appointment and remuneration of auditors carrying out audits in the public interest. It is submitted that moving audits to the public sector is desirable in order to introduce genuinely autonomous auditors, to provide better quality of audits and to restore public confidence in capital markets.

This dissertation documents and evaluates certain financial and non-financial strategies used by the public accounting profession to influence audit regulation during the policy formation period of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). The dissertation is comprised of three separate, but related studies. Each study uses prior research in accounting and related disciplines to investigate significant aspects the profession's strategies. The first study evaluates the rationality and effectiveness of political action committee (PAC) contributions paid by the accounting profession to members of Congress. The study finds that the accounting profession rationally allocated more PAC contributions to top congressional leaders and to members of committees having jurisdiction over SOX. The study also finds that the accounting profession allocated more PAC contributions to legislators with a history of pro-business roll call voting behavior and to candidates in close electoral races. This evidence suggests that the profession is motivated to contribute cash to legislators in order to gain access to lobby and to influence the ideological composition of the legislature. A voting model also finds a positive relationship in two instances between PAC contributions and roll call voting favorable to the economic interests of the profession in the House of Representatives. The second study evaluates the effect of these PAC contributions on Committee members' frequency and mode of speech during public hearings related to SOX. Using computerized computational linguistics, the study finds a significant positive association between PAC contributions and speech performance. The study also finds differential uses of modals and certain verbs between legislators depending upon party affiliation. The third paper explores the rhetoric of the accounting profession's public interest ideal and the profession's motivation to invoke public interest arguments in various contexts. I approach my analysis from three different perspectives. The first perspective analyzes the public interest language of the profession as well-intentioned rhetoric. The second approach eschews any well-intentioned motivations on behalf of the profession and casts public interest arguments as propaganda cloaking self-interested action. The third approach deconstructs the public interest ideal as myth, embodying a constellation of elements including cultural values, political doctrine and contingent interests.

To gain insight into the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) impact on audit quality, this study investigates the association between PCAOB inspection exposure (akin to the threat of a PCAOB inspection) and auditor reporting decisions. Certain foreign governments prohibit PCAOB inspections of their domestic auditors of U.S. SEC registrants citing sovereign control. This unique setting provides an opportunity to observe variation in the reach of the PCAOB inspection program and isolate its' effect on auditor reporting. I find that auditors in jurisdictions allowing PCAOB inspections are more likely to report going concern opinions and material weaknesses relative to auditors in jurisdictions barring PCAOB inspections. I find no difference in these auditor reporting propensities in the pre-PCAOB regulatory. This study provides evidence that PCAOB inspection exposure is associated with auditor reporting incentives, and ultimately audit quality, which is the fundamental purpose of the PCAOB inspection program.

The audit firms play an important role in the capital markets by verifying that auditors provide reliable information to the decision makers. However, trust in auditing firms has been questioned following Enron‘s failure and accounting scandals at WorldCom and other companies. As a result, Arthur Anderson failed and the number of big audit firms fell to four firms and no one knows who might be next. Defond and Francis (2005) believe that a critical trigger occurred when Deloitte & Touch issued a “clean” peer review report on Arthur Andersen in December 2001, just a few weeks before Andersen publicly announced that it had shredded documents related to Enron audit. The credibility and integrity of the profession‘s self-regulation program was immediately in doubt. To protect public interests and to restore confidence in the capital markets, the USA government issued the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. Similarly, the Financial Reporting Council in the UK provided the Professional Oversight Board with similar mission. This thesis aims to explore the role of independent audit regulators in promoting confidence in the audit profession, and analyse the big four firms’ strategies that react toward these regulatory changes in the audit markets. The lack of studies in this area supports the use of grounded theory as a research methodology. 24 semi-structured interviews were conducted with the top management level of the audit regulators and big four firms’ partners. This study contributes to the literature as it provides a better understanding of the satisfaction of the big four audit firms toward the new independent regulators, and how these firms react toward the additional requirements of the independent inspectors.

Samhällsproblemet kring den ekonomiska brottsligheten är ett faktum, och härtill debatteras huruvida det finns ett samband mellan avsaknaden av revision och ekobrott. Frånvaron av revision aktualiserades i samband med avskaffandet av revisionsplikten år 2010, således blev det frivilligt för små svenska företag att anlita en revisor. Reformen hade i huvudsak som ändamål att minska företags kostnader och administrativa bördor. Emellertid har det riktats uppmärksamhet på flertalet konsekvenser efter avskaffandet av revisionsplikten, som minskad efterlevnad av redovisnings- och skattelagstiftning, ökad möjlighet till ekonomisk brottslighet samt utmaningar med att upptäcka och avslöja sådan brottslighet. Mot bakgrund av de bekymmer och ståndpunkter som uttryckts är det av intresse att reflektera över motiven bakom regelförenkling kring revision för små svenska företag, särskilt med tanke på att diskussionen återigen tagits upp till debatt. Syftet med studien är att beskriva och analysera vilka faktorer och argument som ligger till grund för Sveriges regelförenkling kring revision för små aktiebolag som trädde i kraft 2010, samt reflektera kring orsaker och konsekvenser av regelförenklingen. Med utgångspunkt i en kvalitativ forskningsansats, har en dokumentstudie genomförts för att besvara studiens syfte.  Studiens empiriska resultat framställer att flera olika teman har beaktats och diskuterats under processen för avskaffandet av revisionsplikten för små svenska aktiebolag, där vissa teman var förutsebara och andra oväntade. Ekonomisk brottslighet var ett tema som förväntades diskuteras, en förväntan som baserades på efterföljande diskussioner kring reformen. Studiens resultat visar att ekonomisk brottslighet uppmärksammades, däremot inte i den omfattning som väntades. En stor del av de identifierade temana behandlade även revisorns roll och ansvar, där det observerades en oenighet kring dess funktion och skyldigheter. Resultatet visar att det inte fanns en enhetlig syn på revisorns roll och dess uppgifter. Med utgångspunkt i det empiriska resultat och slutsatser bidrar studien med kunskap och insikter om vilka övervägande som kan ligga bakom en förändring av revisionsreglering. / The social problem surrounding financial crime is a fact, and the debate revolves around whether there is a connection between the lack of auditing and financial crime. The absence of an audit was actualized in connection with the abolition of the mandatory audit in 2010, making it optional for small Swedish companies to hire an auditor. The reform was mainly aimed at reducing companies’ costs and administrative burdens. However, attention has been drawn to several post-decommissioning consequences, such as reduced compliance with accounting and tax laws, increased opportunity for financial crime, and challenges in detecting and exposing such crime. Against the background of the concerns and positions that have been expressed, it is of interest to reflect on the motives behind the simplification of rules regarding auditing for small Swedish companies, especially considering that the discussion has once again been brought up for debate. The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze which factors and arguments that lie as the basis for Sweden’s regulatory simplification regarding auditing for small companies that came into effect in 2010, and to reflect on the causes and consequences of the simplification. Based on a qualitative research approach, a document study has been carried out in order to answer the purpose of the study.  The study’s empirical results reveal that several different themes have been considered and discussed during the process of abolishing the mandatory audit for small Swedish companies, where some themes were predictable and others unexpected. Financial crime was a theme that was expected to be discussed, an expectation that was based on the subsequent discussions around the reform. The study’s results show that financial crime was acknowledged, although not to the extent that was expected. A large part of the identified themes also addressed the auditor’s role and responsibilities, where a disagreement about its function and duties can be observed. The result shows that there was not a unified view of the auditor’s role and its tasks. Based on the empirical results and conclusions, the study contributes knowledge and insights into which considerations may lie behind a change in audit regulation.

Dans la perspective d’une évaluation critique des réformes adoptées récemment par la commission européenne et la législation des pays membres, cette recherche analyse les rôles respectifs de l’auditeur et de la réglementation qui régit son activité sur la qualité et le coût de l’audit. S’appuyant sur un échantillon 4218 firmes européennes pour une période allant de 2007 à 2010, notre première étude traite de l’impact de l’auditeur et de la réglementation de l’audit sur la qualité des chiffres comptables. Les résultats montrent que les Big n’offrent aucune garantie particulière sur la qualité de l’information comptable s’ils ne sont pas simultanément spécialistes de l’activité de la firme auditée. Elle montre aussi que la nature et l'ampleur de la gestion des résultats sont influencées par les réglementations nationales de l’audit. Il apparait en effet que l’audit conduit à une information de meilleure qualité lorsque la responsabilité de l’auditeur est délictuelle plutôt que contractuelle, mais aussi lorsque son mandat peut être remis en cause chaque année. Cette étude offre également un éclairage nouveau aux différends qui opposent auditeurs et régulateurs en matière de services annexes en montrant qu’il n’est pas forcément souhaitable d’interdire ou de contraindre trop fortement ces services. Ils conduisent les auditeurs à mieux percevoir l’entreprise, ce qui leur permet d’agir utilement sur l’ampleur des manipulations réelles. Il apparait enfin que les mesures visant à imposer la rotation de l’associé signataire responsable de la mission d’audit ou à imposer un audit joint sont sans effets réels.Retenant un échantillon de 4293 firmes européennes sur la période allant de 2003 à 2011, la deuxième étude traite de l’impact de l’auditeur et de la réglementation de l’audit sur les honoraires d’audit. Les résultats montrent que recourir à des auditeurs réputés (Big ou spécialistes du secteur d’activité de la firme auditée) génère, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, des honoraires d’audit plus élevés. Il apparait aussi que trois des attributs réglementaires étudiés (la responsabilité délictuelle de l’auditeur, la remise en cause annuelle du mandat de l’audit, l’obligation d’un audit conjoint) affectent positivement les honoraires d’audit versés par les firmes européennes. Le rapprochement des résultats des deux études que nous avons menées montre donc que, moyennant le paiement d’honoraires plus élevés, des auditeurs spécialistes sont un gage de qualité des chiffres comptables audités. Ce rapprochement montre aussi que la responsabilité délictuelle de l’auditeur et la possibilité d’une remise en cause annuelle de son mandat garantissent la qualité des chiffres comptables, ces deux contraintes réglementaires étant par ailleurs associées à des honoraires d’audit plus conséquents. / This dissertation includes two studies. The first study analyzes the impact of auditor quality and audit regulation on the quality of accounting information, particularly on tradeoff between accrual-based and activity-based earnings management. In the second study in order to better understand the audit fees incurred by listed European companies we analysis the impact of audit regulation on the level of audit fees.Our representative sample is 4219 firms listed on European capital markets from 15 European countries over the period 2007 to 2010. Based on our sample, in the first study we analyze the respective impacts of both auditor quality and audit regulation on earnings quality. We capture auditor quality through using both audit firm size and audit firm industry specialization. We analyze five attributes of audit regulation including namely duration of audit tenure, restrictions on provision of non-audit services, nature of the auditors’ liability, constraints on audit partners’ rotation and obligation of a joint audit.Our main results are as follows: A) Only income-increasing earnings management, which is resulted in overstated earnings, is affected by auditor quality or audit regulations. B) Audit firm expertise influences negatively on the level of the both accrual-based earnings management and activity-based earnings management. Audits provided by large audit firms (i.e. Big4 auditors), have no impact on both accrual-based and activity-based earnings management. C) Audit firm expertise is not the only factor that affects audit quality and earnings quality. Regulation that governs audit services plays a major role in earnings quality as well. Two regulatory attributes have significant beneficial impact on accrual-based earnings management: the nature of the auditor’s liability and the minimal duration of the audit mandate. D) There is a substitution effect between accrual-based and activity-based earnings management, regarding the two attributes of audit regulation that are effective in curbing discretionary accruals. Because of regulatory constraints, the firms that cannot manage accruals upward apply more real activity management, and consequently their earnings are left affected by management actions.In 14 European countries, the diversity of regulations that govern statutory audits provides us with the opportunity to analyze how audit regulation affects audit fees. Using a sample of 4293 European firms over the period 2003 to 2011, in the second study we analyze the attributes of audit regulation, namely duration of audit tenure, restrictions on provision of non-audit services and nature of the auditors’ liability joint audit. Based on Our main results, in addition to usual determinants of audit fees (auditor reputation, firm size, leverage, audit risk…), the three attributes under study impact audit fees significantly. Fees are lower when regulation allows long audit tenure, or non-audit services, as well as when the auditor’s liability is based on tort law.

The Thesis is focused on the concepts of audit committee and audit quality, which are the basic control mechanisms for the quality of financial statements. The Thesis first presents the reasons and conditions for the appointment of audit committee, then follows with the legal rules applicable for mandatory audit of financial statements and presents some common definitions and measures of audit quality. Next, the new regulation for mandatory audit in the European Union is presented. The practical part of the Thesis starts with an analysis of the annual reports of the companies that are a part of CZECH TOP 100 for the year 2014. The analysis is focused on auditor choice, audit fees, public interest entities and their obligation to appoint an audit committee. The next part contains an empirical analysis of the association between audit committee existence, auditor choice and audit quality, which is defined as the quality of reported earnings.