Little research has been done on the personality of internal auditors. However, there does exist a negative stereotype. They are seen as hostile and unsympathetic. The purpose of this research was to see if the negative stereotype was indeed true and to see if undesirable behavior could be changed through training.

This research was undertaken to test the effects of conservatism on the decisions made by auditors. The evaluation of the research results provided by the two psychological tests indicated that, when measured on the construct of resistance to change, auditors as a group are essentially heterogeneous and slightly conservative. However, the auditors' test scores on the construct of aversion to risk reflected a homogeneous group who were distinctly conservative. Based on these results, this research seems to indicate that the firm effect is more important in auditors' decision making than personal characteristics except, perhaps, in the area of compliance testing decisions. If this is indeed the case, it could be said that the different audit philosophies held by the public accounting firms and instilled in their auditors may be the prime cause of the substantial differences that have been continuously found in auditor judgments.

This dissertation is a descriptive, exploratory examination of professional commitment, organizational commitment, and conflict between those commitments in the internal audit profession. That conflict has been suggested in prior studies as the source of dysfunctional outcomes such as increased role stress, high turnover, decreased job satisfaction, and the exercise of improper judgment leading to audit failures. The descriptive aspect of this study deals with the development of a more comprehensive structural model of the factors and relationships involved in commitment and conflict than has been developed by previous research dealing with accountants. The exploratory aspect deals with the testing and refinement of the developed model utilizing the internal audit profession as the field of examination. The model developed in this study is derived from the synthesis of factors suggested by role theory, the concept of side bets, the cosmopolitan-local construct, and the concept of commitment as a process. This research utilizes a questionnaire administered to 205 practicing internal auditors in order to test 30 hypothesized relationships. Path analysis is used to determine the significant direct relationships between variables with a process of theory trimming being conducted in order to produce more parsimonious structural models. Indirect relationships between significant variables are identified and their redundant or suppressive nature determined. Explanations of these suppressive or redundant relationships are provided based on the theoretical considerations identified above. Such a determination and explanation of the redundant and suppressive indirect relationships involved in the commitment-conflict relationship has not been accomplished in earlier studies of the subject. Although the procedures used here do not support causal conclusions, the findings of this study indirectly provide evidence that conflict between the two commitments in the internal audit area is not to be considered inherent. The findings also suggest a possible undesirable relationship between organizational formalization and professional commitment.

The study examines the potential threat to an auditor’s independence in fact which may result from the extraordinarily favorable personal reputation (superstar status) of an audit client’s CEO This potential threat to an auditors’ independence is the result of a halo effect bias which can distort an individual’s judgment and behavior Accounting firms use a business risk audit approach which involves conducting a strategic risk assessment which assesses the overall threats to the business model of an audit client Prior research has demonstrated that the strategic risk assessment can bias the judgment of auditors pertaining to financial account level risk assessments For example, the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme demonstrated how an extraordinarily well respected individual with superstar status can distort the judgment of knowledgeable and normally skeptical individuals An experiment was conducted to examine the potential threat of a superstar CEO on an auditor’s independence as demonstrated by the ability to distort the judgment of the auditor during the performance of the strategic risk assessment In addition, the experiment was designed to examine whether the halo cognitive bias can lessen the impact that an auditor’s professional skepticism has on his or her judgment and behavior during the audit of a client’s financial statement Unlike other studies which have sought only to demonstrate that a cognitive bias exist which impairs auditor judgment; the study also examined whether the influence of a halo effect bias can be mitigated by the formal rating of audit evidence in a similar manner that was used by Embu and Finley (1977) to successfully mitigate a framing effect The experiment did not support the main hypothesis of the study that auditors assess the strategic risk at a lower risk level for firms that employ a superstar CEO than for those whom employ a non-superstar CEO This result may primarily be due to the inability of the scenario used in the experiment to sufficiently differentiate the characteristics of the superstar and non-superstar CEO Without establishing that the participants’ judgment was being distorted by a superstar CEO; the other hypotheses which involved testing a debiasing method to mitigate the halo effect caused by a superstar CEO and investigating whether a halo effect reduces the impact that auditors’ trait skepticism level has on their judgment could not be properly tested / Includes bibliography / Dissertation (PhD)--Florida Atlantic University, 2016 / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

I show that auditors experience cognitive dissonance when they fail to take appropriate professionally skeptical (hereafter PS) action in line with high PS judgment I specifically show that cognitive dissonance leads auditors to revise their attitudes on low ranking audit actions upward and lower their risk assessments, consequently, lower overall professional skepticism I also find that auditor cognitive dissonance leads to exaggerated ex-post auditor self-assessments professional skepticism Professional skepticism is fundamental to performing an audit according to auditing standards and critical to audit quality Extant research that investigates treatments to enhance professional skepticism predominantly treats both skeptical judgment and skeptical action as analogous outcomes of professional skepticism If, however, there is a breakdown between PS judgment and PS action, the overall benefits of these treatments will be trivial I show that cognitive dissonance due to the incongruence between PS judgments and PS actions leads to an unforeseeable corollary of lower overall professional skepticism I also demonstrate a specific mechanism of how auditor incentives lead to lower professional skepticism, hence, lower audit quality Both researchers and practitioners can benefit from this study by better understating the intricacies in the critical link between PS judgment and action Additionally, I provide an empirical investigation of the components in Nelson’s (2009) model of professional skepticism and extend the model to reflect the intricacies between PS judgment and PS action I test my hypotheses via a three-group research design with attitude change as a proxy measure of cognitive dissonance / Includes bibliography / Dissertation (PhD)--Florida Atlantic University, 2016 / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

by Lam Man-ho, Leung Yee-mei, Annie. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 68-70). / ABSTRACT --- p.ii / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iii / LIST OF TABLES --- p.v / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.vi / Chapter / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Objective of Study --- p.2 / Scope --- p.3 / Limitations --- p.3 / Chapter II. --- THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNAL AUDITING --- p.5 / "Nature, Roles and Value" --- p.5 / Historical Development --- p.7 / Audit Committee --- p.8 / Evolution of Audit Approaches --- p.10 / Implications of Behavioural Issues --- p.12 / Chapter III. --- CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK --- p.13 / The Need for Behaviouralism in Internal Auditing --- p.13 / Job Satisfaction --- p.14 / Stress --- p.15 / Sources of Stress --- p.15 / Organizational Factors --- p.16 / Organizational Status --- p.16 / Relations with Audit Committee --- p.17 / Career Prospect --- p.17 / Departmental Support --- p.17 / Task and Role Factors --- p.18 / Audit Scope --- p.19 / Internal Auditor Role --- p.21 / Interpersonal Factors --- p.22 / Internal Auditor-Auditee Relations --- p.23 / Working Relationship with External Auditors --- p.27 / Chapter IV. --- METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS --- p.29 / Methodology --- p.29 / Structure of Questionnaire --- p.29 / Organizational Factors on Job Satisfaction --- p.30 / Organizational Status --- p.30 / Audit Committee --- p.34 / Career Prospect --- p.37 / Departmental Support --- p.37 / Task and Role Factors on Job Satisfaction --- p.39 / Audit Scope --- p.39 / Internal Auditor Roles --- p.42 / Interpersonal Factors on Job Satisfaction --- p.43 / Internal Auditor-auditee Relations --- p.46 / Relations with External Auditors --- p.49 / Chapter V. --- CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS --- p.51 / Summary and Conclusions --- p.52 / Organizational Factors --- p.52 / Task and Role Factors --- p.53 / Interpersonal Factors --- p.53 / Recommendations --- p.54 / APPENDICES / Chapter I. --- The Structure of Hong Kong Banking Industry --- p.60 / Chapter II. --- Survey Questionnaire Sample --- p.63 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.68

Subordination of judgment is a fundamental threat to auditor objectivity. Subordination of judgment occurs when auditors agree with their superiors either in spite of or without forming their own independent judgments. Many audit procedures rely on independent, critical thinking at every level of the audit team; however, a number of studies suggest that auditors tend to agree with superiors even when a superior's views clearly run contrary to generally accepted accounting principles. While there is general agreement among scholars that subordination of judgment is "bad," very little attention has been given to moral biases that might influence an auditor's tendency to subordination of judgment, or to potential remedies that could mitigate an auditor's tendency to subordinate judgment. Moral Foundations Theory suggests that individuals tend to make intuitive, normative evaluations of situations based upon a set of personal moral biases or preferences called "moral foundations." Two specific moral foundations could influence subordination of judgment in divergent ways. The moral foundation of loyalty-respect may make agreement with a superior's views seem more acceptable than would disagreement. Meanwhile, the moral foundation of fairness may make an auditor more sensitive to the observance of rules, resulting in less subordination of judgment when a superior's views run contrary to professional rules. Social Identity Theory suggests that in-group favoritism may exacerbate subordination of judgment in general; however, strengthening an auditor's professional identity salience (PIS) could strengthen an auditor's objectivity. PIS is the temporary, heightened awareness of an auditor's identity as a professional and their role as guardian of professional rules. As a result, PIS may interact with an auditor's innate sense of fairness, resulting in less subordination of judgment than when professional identity is less salient. Results supported the hypothesis that auditors tend to subordinate their judgment to that of a superior, but not that PIS mitigates the effect of subordination of judgment. Results also supported the hypotheses that the moral foundations of loyalty-respect and fairness influence the tendency of auditors to subordinate their judgment to that of a superior. Specifically, auditors with higher levels of loyalty-respect were more likely to agree with a superior who suggested an incorrect accounting treatment than auditors with lower levels of loyalty-respect. Whereas, auditors with higher levels of fairness were less likely to agree with a superior who suggested an incorrect treatment than were auditors with lower levels of fairness. Therefore, this dissertation provides evidence that moral foundations bias professional judgment and decision making in auditing and calls for further research into the influence of moral heuristics.