This thesis develops the view that the semantics of spatial prepositions are more fully realised within a framework of functionality, incorporating knowledge of the world, than within the spatial, geometrical framework more often used to analyse prepositions. It is argued that previous approaches which support full specification of lexical entries through the use of polysemy and prototype notions are not satisfactory or psychologically valid. It will also be shown that the minimal specification Classical approaches fail to account for all uses of the locatives described. It is suggested that minimal specification of lexical entries can be achieved by means of functional controls that can provide a more psychologically valid account of the semantics of spatial prepositions. Functional geometric control relations of fContainment, fSupport and fSuperiority are proposed for IN, ON and OVER respectively. These focus on the importance of location control in prepositional choice. It is argued that such controls underlie the use of spatial prepositions. The controls are suggested to be inherently dynamic and state that the relatum object is some way able to control the location of the referent object. For example, the use of the preposition IN is guided by the principle of fContainment which operates on the basic premise that the relatum (y) controls the location of the referent (x) such that when y moves there will be a correlated movement in x (or uncorrelated movement within the convex hull of y) by virtue of some degree of enclosure. The control relation that guides the use of OVER is fSuperiority and it operates on the basic premise that x threatens to come into contact with y as a consequence of gravitational force. Finally, the use of the preposition ON is suggested to be guided by notions of fSupport which operates on the premise that the relatum protects the referent from the force of gravity.

This thesis examines the development of Plato's thought on the subject of the soul-body relation. I will not attempt to cover everything that Plato says about the soul - for example I will discuss 'proofs' of immorality only in so far as they have a bearing on the interpretation of soul and body. In this life at least human beings have both a soul and a body; as a result, the soul by necessity interacts with the body. This interaction, though, is not simply an interrelation between two completely different and separate entities; rather the relation between soul and body is far more complicated. The purpose of the introduction is to present a preliminary view of the soul, in that way we could better understand the background that Plato had to take under consideration. Within the introduction the Apology is used so as to show the importance of the idea of the soul in Socratic ethics, and to indicate that the Socratic idea that we should care for the soul rather than the body, becomes crucial within Plato's philosophy. The dialogues that follow, the Gorgias and the Meno, provide early indications of the complex relation required between soul and body, for Plato's moral, metaphysical and epistemological concerns. Thus, although Plato, in these dialogues, does not give us a clear definition of the soul's nature and its relation to the body, the perplexity and ambiguity concerning the soul's nature leads to the more detailed analysis of it in later dialogues. The Phaedo appears to offer a view of the soul as a simple immaterial entity wholly distinct from the body. Even within this dialogue, though, there are signs that this simple view of the soul is not adequate for Plato's moral and metaphysical concerns, this becomes evident as well in the Symposium.

Whilst Hegel's influence upon the Frankfurt School's reconstruction of Marx has not gone unnoticed, this influence has never really been adequately theorised. In particular, the question of how the Frankfurt School understood the relation between Hegel's method and Marx's materialism has received very little systematic attention. The present study is a response to this situation: it presents the Frankfurt Marxist tradition as a significant although by no means uncritical contribution to the theory of historical materialism. Moreover, that contribution is shown to derive from some of the central concepts of Hegel's philosophy. Thus in opposition to those commentators, Marxists and non-Marxists alike, who have tended to view Frankfurt Marxism as an exercise in eclectic revisionism, I argue that the work of Horkheimer and his colleagues constitutes an attempt to restate and defend, on the basis of an immanent critique of Hegel's idealism, the fundamental principles of Marx's historical materialism. Accordingly, the central chapters of this thesis are devoted to a close examination of the way in which members of the Frankfurt School, building on the work of Lukács and Korsch, sought to appropriate Hegel's subject-object dialectic on behalf of materialism. In the course of this investigation the following themes come to prominence: the relation between Hegel's social philosophy and a critical theory of society; Horkheimer's project of multi-disciplinary materialism; the methodological significance of the category of totality; materialism as the preponderance of the object; the possibility and nature of a Freud-Marx synthesis; the concept of a critical as opposed to a traditional scientific theory of society. Taken together these themes constitute the basic problematic of the Frankfurt Marxist tradition. The intention of this study is to demonstrate the importance of that problematic for the further development of the materialist theory of history and society.

The consumerist lifestyle of modernity has had a detrimental impact on the environment. In part, this is supposed by the traditional philosophical conceptualisation of subjectivity, which privileges human subjects from surrounding objects. Concern over our attitude to the environment has been present from the beginning of civilisation and particularly since the emergence of the industrial revolution. This thesis traces a genealogy of these concerns, from the Romantics, to 20th century philosophers such as Heidegger, through the political movements of the 1960-1980s and the recognition of pollution, resource depletion and climate change by pan global organisation from the 1980s to the present day. The changes in epistemology in the wide context of society have influenced the way environmental education has emerged. Philosophy informs the way we understand subjectivity, language, pedagogy, curriculum, and our understanding of the environment. Education also operates in a political context, and the concepts that inform policies permeate educational institutions. Heidegger’s philosophy engages with the scope of the environmental problem, offers a critique of modernity, develops a new conceptualisation of subjectivity and the relationship between humanity and Being, and an analysis of the impact modern technology has mediating that relationship. Heidegger began to develop his ideas on technology during the period between World Wars, in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s. His philosophy was influenced by the Romantic Volk movement, and the ideas of Nietzsche, Spengler and Jünger. The tense political surroundings have influenced his thinking, in both constructive and detrimental ways. Heidegger remains one of the most influential philosophers to engage with the framework of technological modernity and its constraints on human subjectivity, and our way of relating to the earth. He challenges traditional ontology and epistemology. He raises the status of poetry from mere lyrical wordplay to means of developing a more authentic relationship between beings and Beings. I make a critical analysis of his philosophy, to distinguish the elements that remain inherently conservative and nationalistic from those that are immanently helpful in throwing light on the dilemma of modern life, and the escalating problem of environmental devastation.

In this thesis, I propose to explore Plato's moral and political thought in the Republic and compare it with similar ideas in Confucian thought, and in modern liberal thought. In Part I, I deal with Plato's notion of 'doing one's own job' in the just state (ch. 1), and with the Confucian approach to achieving an orderly society (ch. 2). In Chapter 3 the idea that both the Platonic just state and Confucian orderly society are communitarian by nature will be discussed. It is noticeable that although both Plato's and Confucius' accounts of the just state have the colour of communitarianism, yet their accounts are in one way or another different from the modern communitarian's account of the just state. In addition, there are also important differences between Plato and Confucius. Take the relation between personal good and the common good as an example. Both Plato and Confucius hold that in the ideal state one's own good is identical with the good of the state as a whole. But communitarians hold that the common good is prior to personal good. That is, for the communitarians, there is a distinction between personal good and the common good (Section 3). In Part II, I shall consider a problem which arises from the discussion of Plato's notion of the tripartite soul that there is a sub-division in each part of the soul, which leads to infinite regress. I argue in Chapter 4 that this problem can be avoided. So long as there is no 'degree of rationality' among the three parts. That is, only reason is capable of calculating, and the other two parts do not have the capacity of reasoning. This account of the tripartite soul makes sense of why Plato puts such strong emphasis on education. For through education, spirit and appetite are willing to be under the control of reason.

This thesis is concerned with the meaning of metaphors. In particular, it examines a contemporary dispute in the philosophy of language, primarily comprising critical responses to Donald Davidson’s seminal work in the area, which focuses on the question of whether metaphorical utterances, qua metaphors, ought to receive distinctive semantic evaluations. I treat this debate as an instance of a more general form of philosophical dispute, which has been explored in some detail in recent work on the nature of realism and anti-realism. The thesis has five chapters. In the first chapter, I outline, motivate and evaluate two contrasting approaches to realism, proposed by Michael Devitt and Crispin Wright. I argue that neither is wholly satisfactory, but that a modified version of Wright’s approach is likely to be most fruitful in the philosophy of metaphor. In the second chapter, I examine the character of Davidson’s anti-realism, concluding that he is best thought of as an error-theorist about metaphorical meaning. I go on to set out a unified Davidsonian argument for semantic and pragmatic anti-realism about metaphor, and offer a sustained discussion and partial defence of the six premises that such an argument proceeds from. My third chapter outlines a series of common objectives to Davidson’s views, and argues that error-theorists have the resources to address many of these criticisms in a fairly plausible manner. In the fourth chapter, I go on to investigate the realist standing of metaphorical meaning in more detail. I examine the open-endedness of metaphor in the light of Wright’s response-dependent theory of intention, and argue that this approach offers a novel response to certain anti-realist concerns. The fifth chapter concerns the relationship between metaphor and non-conceptual content. I argue that thinking of metaphorical meanings as non-conceptual entails that the non-propositional and limitless character of metaphor does not pose a fatal objection to a pragmatic realist account, contra Davidson. I apply my suggested account to two test cases: metaphors that describe one’s emotional state, and religious metaphors, and argue that in each case, thinking of the metaphors as expressing non-conceptual contents is potentially suggestive and helpful. In that chapter, I also examine the possibility of an robustly realist approach to metaphorical meanings, modelled on the epistemicist approach to vagueness set out in recent work by Timothy Williamson. I demonstrate how the dominant objection to this account can be partially defused, and go on to examine the final standing of the dispute between realist and anti-realist.

The thesis proposes, defends, and applies a new model of inter-theoretic reduction, called "Neo-Nagelian" reduction. There are numerous accounts of inter-theoretic reduction in the philosophy of science literature but the most well-known and widely-discussed is the Nagelian one. In the thesis I identify various kinds of problems which the Nagelian model faces. Whilst some of these can be resolved, pressing ones remain. In lieu of the Nagelian model, other models of inter-theoretic reduction have been proposed, chief amongst which are so-called "New Wave" models. I show these to be no more adequate than the original Nagelian model. I propose a new model of inter-theoretic reduction, Neo-Nagelian reduction. This model is structurally similar to the Nagelian one, but differs in substantive ways. In particular I argue that it avoids the problems pertaining to both the Nagelian and New Wave models. Multiple realizability looms large in discussions about reduction: it is claimed that multiply realizable properties frustrate the reduction of one theory to another in various ways. I consider these arguments and show that they do not undermine the Neo-Nagelian of reduction of one theory to another. Finally, I apply the model to statistical mechanics. Statistical mechanics is taken to be a reductionist enterprise: one of the aims of statistical mechanics is to reduce thermodynamics. Without an adequate model of inter-theoretic reduction one cannot assess whether it succeeds; I use the Neo-Nagelian model to critically discuss whether it does. Specifically, I consider two very recent derivations of the Second Law of thermodynamics, one from Boltzmannian classical statistical mechanics and another from quantum statistical mechanics. I argue that they are partially successful, and that each makes for a promising line of future research.

The thesis explores the question of how should a rational moral agent reason and make choices when he finds himself accepting inconsistent moral judgments. It is argued that it is both conceptually and psychologically justified to describe such an agent as suffering from uncertainty. Such uncertainty, however, is not uncertainty regarding the truth of some descriptive claim, but rather uncertainty regarding the truth of a normative claim. Specifically it is uncertainty regarding the truth of a moral judgement. In the literature this is sometimes called “moral uncertainty”. Two different lines of philosophical literatures that explore the idea of moral uncertainty are discussed. The first line – the one that originated from David Lewis‟ argument against the “Desire as Belief Thesis” – explores the mere possibility of moral uncertainty, while the second line explores the question how ought a rational moral agent choose in face of moral uncertainty. The discussion of these two lines of research leads to the conclusion that a consistent account of moral decision making under conditions of moral uncertainty that will be applicable to the kind of cases that the thesis explores, must make use of degrees of beliefs in comparative moral judgements (i.e. judgements of the form “act a is morally superior to act b”) and of them alone. Specifically, no references to degrees of moral value should be made. An attempt to present such an account in the framework of an extension of Leonard Savage‟s model for decision making is carried out. This attempt leads to a problematic result. Several implications of the result to ethic and meta-ethics are discussed as well as possible ways to avoid it. The conclusion is partly positive and partly negative: While a plausible account of moral decision making under conditions of moral uncertainty is presented, an account of moral reasoning that aims at finding a complete moral theory (i.e. a moral theory that gives a prescription to every possible moral choice) is shown to be a very difficult – if not impossible - aim to achieve.

In the Introduction I briefly lay out the history of the value terms that I will be considering in my thesis and consider the philosophical relevance of the development of such values in the 5th century. The infiltration of modern ideas of morality into what was considered to be good to the Greeks has a great influence on the literature and philosophy of this period. Plato prioritises these quiet moral virtues, but also tries to hang on to some of what had come before, and thus faces difficulties with his moral theory. I will show that courage presents Plato with an acute difficulty when attempting to develop a consistent ethical theory. In Chapter 2 I look at the Protagoras where the main issues about courage that Plato will continue to discuss throughout his life are introduced. The questions of the extent to which the virtues can be taught and the unity of the virtues are introduced early on. What follows is an attempt to explain and justify the Socratic idea that the virtues are co-dependent and that they all in some way boil down to knowledge. In Chapter 3 on the Laches I will show that the discussion focuses more particularly on the virtue of courage and is mostly a more sophisticated attempt to understand courage than the one presented in the Protagoras. In the following three chapters (4-6) I examine the position taken in the Republic in detail, which I take to be more representative of the Platonic rather than Socratic position. Plato’s psychological model – which includes direct influence from the lower soul – is a more reasonable interpretation of the internal workings of the agent than the simpler model in the early dialogues of the only direct motivator being beliefs or knowledge. The chapter on the Laws considers the idea that some of the apparent differences between the Republic and the Laws are due to Plato’s growing realisation that courage will not be assimilated into a unified ethical theory of the type that he wishes to propose.

Background: Through their experiences of stigma and discrimination, people with intellectual disabilities may develop negative beliefs about themselves and compare themselves negatively to others. This may make them more sensitive to criticism from others. In addition, receiving praise may be discrepant with the self-views of people with intellectual disabilities and they may be less likely to benefit from praise. Being distressed by criticism has been associated with vulnerability to mental health difficulties in the general adult population. It is not known how people with intellectual disabilities perceive and experience criticism and praise. Method: Two study groups were recruited; one with intellectual disabilities, one without. The praise and criticism task (PACT) was developed for the study. Participants were presented with ten scenes in which they were asked to imagine someone saying something positive (praise) or negative (criticism). Following the presentation of each scene, participants were asked about their emotions, beliefs, thoughts and actions. Results: People with intellectual disabilities were more likely to believe and be distressed by criticism. Contrary to predictions, this group were also more likely to believe and experience positive affect in response to praise. No differences were found in the frequency of self-supporting thoughts or actions reported in response to criticism. Conclusions: The results may represent a difference in the way people with intellectual disabilities develop their sense of self and may suggest that the self-perceptions of this group are more dynamic and reliant on the views of others. In theory, such sensitivity could make people more vulnerable to mental health difficulties. On the other hand, the possibilities for positive influence have implications for psychological and social interventions.