This thesis seeks to demonstrate the continuing relevance of Wittgenstein’s approach to the problem of freedom of the will, primarily as expounded in his “Lectures on Freedom of the Will” (LFW). My overall aim is to show how Wittgenstein works to reconfigure the debates about freedom of the will so that it can be confronted as the kind of problem he thinks it ultimately is: an ethical and existential problem. Not published until 1989, the LFW have received scant critical attention. I argue that Wittgenstein’s approach is highly distinctive in a way that makes it significantly less vulnerable than its closest cousins to certain powerful lines of critical attack. Chapter One brings out the distinctiveness of the LFW, especially vis-à-vis a putatively Wittgensteinian form of compatibilism, exemplified by Kai Nielsen. Albeit in different ways, Wittgenstein and Nielsen are both concerned to show why being caused to act, e.g. by the laws of nature, does not equate to being compelled to act, e.g. against one’s will. Unlike Nielsen, however, Wittgenstein further recognises that showing the compatibility of freedom and natural laws establishes no more than the logical consistency of holding people responsible, given determinism, and so cannot itself constitute a defence of our practices. Chapter Two introduces, as a still closer comparison with Wittgenstein, P. F. Strawson’s practice-based defence of interpersonal, ‘reactive’ attitudes (e.g. feelings of resentment, gratitude, etc.). I argue that the same correlation between a belief in freedom of the will and the primitive expression of ‘reactive’ attitudes/feelings is central also to the LFW. However, I further argue that certain major lines of criticism of Strawson’s practice-based defence of our current practices, familiar in the critical literature, do not in the same way threaten Wittgenstein’s defence of a broader practice-based approach, one that encompasses both reactive and non-reactive attitudes. Chapters Three and Four deal with the difficulties arising from the recognition that our most entrenched and ‘natural’ attitudes are non-reactive rather than reactive, including attitudes that are properly called ‘fatalistic’. Chapter Three develops a response to Galen Strawson’s criticism that if reactive and non-reactive attitudes are both equally expressive of human nature, then any merely descriptive approach to these attitudes will be incapable of resolving the fundamental question of which of these sorts of attitude we ought to adopt. Finally, Chapter Four examines Wittgenstein’s sustained interest in forms of life, especially religious forms of life, which appear to give equal weight to both reactive and non-reactive attitudes.

There are four positions one might take in respect of the ontological status of the physical world: physicalism, which says that the physical world is ontologically fundamental, and nothing else is; substance dualism, which says that the physical world is ontologically fundamental, but so is the human mental realm, and that these are in some strong metaphysical sense separate; idealism, which says that the physical world is constitutively sustained, at least in part, by facts about the human mental realm; and a rough collection of views I term 'compatibilism', which holds that both the physical and the mental are fundamental, but that they are not separate as in substance dualism. Of these positions, I argue mainly against the first and last. I begin by demonstrating that all forms of compatibilism are committed to a radically revisionary definition of 'mental' and 'physical', since in ordinary usage, and for good reason, the terms are taken as mutually exclusive. I formulate a definition of 'mental' according to which it means 'subjective, non-spatial, and non-quantifiable', and demonstrate that these properties are necessarily coextensive. Against physicalism, I consider a range of arguments which purport to show that physical space, as a necessary feature of the physical world, cannot be ontologically fundamental, concluding that physical space, or at least the physical space that we are interested in, must be the one which we inhabit, and that our relationship of inhabitancy of this physical space plays a constitutive role in it. Since this assumes that physical space must be in some way constituted rather than fundamental, I finish by refuting a set of strategies which attempt to show that physical space itself must be constituted.

Modernity is stuck between the potential of its emancipatory spirit and the difficulty of implementing it. This impasse has generated the need to look for a feasible form of critique that is capable of grounding reason in order to revitalize the modern project of emancipation. In this aim, the dominant strategies, intend to provide reason with a way to mediate its own comprehension:radical critique. In this regard, I evaluate Habermas’ and Taylor’s work for they are two paradigmatic and opposing examples of that strategy. I come back to them because there are still generations of thinkers that use, or can be recognized as using, the philosophical instruments shaped by them. However those instruments are structurally faulty as I demonstrate, from new perspectives, in Chapters I and II, respectively. Their failures, I argue, either open up the way to an idle repetition of the same mistakes or, (should) push us to look for an alternative approach to the modern project of emaciation as there is still the need of it. Against the impracticable option of using ill-suited tools, without having explored alternative approaches, I investigate what I take to be a re-conceptualization of the modern project of emancipation . Through Foucault’s work, with the Chapter III, I explore and then defend a project that I reckon as capable to both explain why radical critique fails, and open up a feasible new path for emancipation.

There are broadly speaking two varieties of views regarding the nature of coincident entities such as statues and the pieces of matter which constitute them. According to Monists, (some) coincident entities are identical while according to pluralists coincident entities are always distinct. The aim of this thesis is to defend the view that many cases of coincidence, including cases of temporary coincidence, are instances of identity. First, I will argue that pluralism ought to be rejected because it faces serious philosophical challenges monism avoids. Next, I will argue that monism can adequately resist the three most common Leibniz law arguments levied against the plausibility that (some) coincident objects are identical. Specifically I will argue that the best monist response to the modal Leibniz law is to adopt a counterpart theoretic account of de re modality to justify the claim that modal contexts are referentially opaque. Next, I will show how monists can resist the linguistic version of LLA by either denying the truth (or falsity) of one of the relevant premises, or by denying the validity of the argument in question. Finally I will argue that the best monist response to the temporal version of LLA is to adopt a stage theoretic account of persistence which can offer a unified account of what Michael Rea has called the 'the problems of material constitution'.

Kierkegaard is well known as a witty writer mainly occupied with Christianity. In this thesis however, Kierkegaard is depicted as a philosopher who can provide us with some new and authentic ideas about the nature of history. Kierkegaard’s approach to the problem of history is compared with Hegel’s philosophy of history and Heidegger’s view of history. Hegel’s philosophy of history is examined and analysed first and the conclusion is that we can clearly detect two main Hegelian assertions regarding history: first that reason is the main historical agent and second that human beings can fully know their past history. Kierkegaard’s arguments follow a totally different approach from that of Hegel’s. Kierkegaard argues that we cannot fully know our past history and that the crucial element in history is to decide about our future history instead of simply trying to understand our past history. It is also argued that Kierkegaard constructs human self in such a way that human beings must simultaneously create themselves and history by making decisions regarding their present and their future. It is further argued that neither Hegel nor Kierkegaard can, on their own, provide us with a total and full picture of the nature of history because Hegel on the one hand, focuses on the macroscopic view of history and Kierkegaard on the other, on the microscopic view (that is, from the point of view of the individual). This is why a possible synthesis of both views is suggested as a better way to truly understand history. Heidegger’s view of history is examined as a possible ‘existential’ alternative approach to history from that of Kierkegaard’s. The conclusion is that Heidegger cannot really offer us any help because he is either borrowing his main concepts from Kierkegaard or he is too vague.

This thesis presents, discusses and critically evaluates the content and contribution of a selection of research papers published in international peer-reviewed sports science journals. Collectively, these works make a novel contribution to the field of motion analysis of physical performance in official professional soccer competition. Rather than being the result of an initial grand working plan, the programme of research represents the evolution and expression of the author's work over a period of 4 years in a professional soccer club. The research was partly shaped by the author's concomitant experience of the industry and academia but mainly driven by emerging and evolving needs-analyses identified within his work. A total of 1 review (presented in the thesis as an introduction to the field of study) and 9 original peer-reviewed articles are included. This thesis introduces and critically comments on papers within two main streams of work investigating competitive physical performance in the author’s own professional soccer team: a) general characteristics and position-specific demands of play, and; b) factors potentially affecting performance. The original research papers are presented in a conceptual sequence within the two themes, rather than a strictly chronological order so as to demonstrate the coherence and synergy within the two collections. The thesis provides critical reflection on the overall contribution to the current body of scientific knowledge and the collective impact of the papers that has been achieved. Limitations in study designs encountered over the course of the work are discussed as are current and future themes for research.

Community Based Tourism (CBT) emerged during the 1980s as a result of the increasing need to define and implement ways of addressing the challenges of tourism development in the destination through a ‘community approach’. It has since become a popular approach to tourism development that seeks to address the negative environmental and social impacts derived from such development whilst adopting the principles of sustainable development. Unsurprisingly, given its focus on benefiting and engaging local destination communities within tourism development, CBT has also attracted a significant degree of academic attention. However, such attention has been concerned primarily with the planning and management of CBT from a ‘supply’ perspective; conversely, a gap in the literature exists in regards to considering CBT as a tourism product in general, and from the perspectives and experiences of tourists in particular. In other words, limited attention has been paid to the demand for CBT as a tourism ‘product’. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to address this gap by developing an understanding of CBT from not only the perspective of the supply side but also from the perspective of the consumer, more specifically, both international and domestic tourists. Consequently, Pai, a well-known destination in Thailand for both international and domestic tourists was selected as a case study. Given the focus of this study on seeking to identify and appraise the perceptions and experiences of tourists consuming the CBT product, in-depth interviews were conducted to obtain rich and detailed data, the samples comprising 25 domestic and 25 international tourists. In addition, interviews were undertaken with the supply-side stakeholders, including three representatives of the local public sector administration and eight private sector respondents, including entrepreneurs and members of the local community, in order to understand the current situation with regards to CBT development in Pai. Brochure contents analysis was also undertaken in order to identify the contemporary ‘induced’ destination image of Pai as one influence on the destination choice and decision making process made by tourists. The outcomes of the interviews and contents analysis, along with a cross-cultural analysis of the responses of international and domestic tourists, revealed that the destination images held by both groups of tourists matched those portrayed by tour operators in the brochures. However, tourist knowledge and recognition of CBT in general, and Pai as a CBT destination in particular, were found to be limited. Nevertheless, international visitors in particular perceived the authenticity of the destination more so than domestic tourists, reflecting the differing characteristics and motivations based on their own cultures. Furthermore the community itself lacked the participation and unity required for CBT to be effective. Hence, this study concludes that not only does a destination such as Pai, that originally developed within a community based development policy framework, face significant challenges in developing tourism according to the principles of CBT, but also that tourist themselves have difficulty in understanding the concept of CBT. Nevertheless, the study reveals that, despite the differing perceptions and demands of international and domestic tourists, the potential exists to develop tourism in Pai to bring greater benefit to the local community. Therefore, the thesis proposes collaborative plans that are necessary to allow CBT managers to better design and develop strategies that enhance the community’s benefits from tourism, whilst meeting the needs of both international and domestic tourists.

This thesis explores the social construction and performance of Technological Human Enhancement Advocacy through multi-sited ethnographically inspired participant observation across a range of sites. It argues that advocacy efforts surrounding the ideal of technological human enhancement share the ideational feature of Techno-centrism - an object-level belief embedded in the material present while simultaneously future-oriented and thus principally immaterial. This purposive neo-dualism blurs 'real' and 'imagined' futures to satiate the materialist ontological grounding associated with the scientific worldview, while granting extended licence to more indulgent, compelling visions for technology as an enabler of affirmative, forward-facing action - including revivifying pursuit of humanist ideals associated with the modernisation project. The thesis makes contributions to three areas. Firstly, in substantive terms, it contributes towards sociological knowledge by detailing the intersubjective values, semiotic framing mechanisms and narrative tropes evoked to both justify and promote the notion of Technological Human Enhancement Advocacy (THEA), an area which remains under-researched. Secondly, the thesis makes a theoretical contribution through its modelling of a non- spatially determined constant which recurs across sites associated with THEA: The Techno-centred Imagination (TCI). Finally, the thesis offers a methodological contribution through its novel and creative application of multi-sited research strategy for the study of non-spatially determined cultures of extreme support for science and technology. A 24-month programme of fieldwork was undertaken, comprising multi-locational participant-observation, interviews and surveys. The thesis concludes that far from being new, the emerging social forms associated with THEA capture ambivalences which have long cast a shadow over late-modern society and culture. Although TCI appears most pronounced in the practice of transhumanism - where it is acted out in extreme, almost hyperbolic ways - the phenomena mirrors broader concerns around the future of science, technology and human self-identity in the new millennium. As such, it is deserving of further study.

This thesis is a study of the role of the phenomenon of death in Heidegger's philosophy. The central argument is twofold. First, death is the fulcrum of Heidegger's philosophy. As such, second, death is a crucial key to Heidegger's thought in its entirety. Thus I claim is that a response to the question of being can be given, if one takes death into account. This thesis, therefore, investigates the four main blocks of Heidegger's philosophy and the role of death in them. I identify the four main blocks of Heidegger's philosophy as follows. First, Heidegger's early transcendental analysis of Dasein's existence. Second, the thinking of being as event. Third, Heidegger's critique of technology. Fourth, Heidegger's engagement with language. The thesis is divided into four topical parts according to these blocks. In the first part I argue that death serves as Dasein's utmost limit and as such death is constitutive of Dasein's existential possibilities. The analysis of Dasein's horizons of understanding is what leads Heidegger to turn to being itself. In the second part I identify the place of death in the thinking of the event and in Heidegger's theory of history as the history of being. I argue that death becomes an interest of being as such and is testimony to its epochs. Third, I argue that death continues to play a significant role in Heidegger's philosophy of technology. This is because the essence of technology is a mode of being itself in the sense that being allows for a certain understanding of the current technological age. Thus, technology is an interest of being itself, too, and the essence of technology is sheer availability. Heidegger begins to call death the refuge of being at this time, which indicates that death is as the utterly unavailable, the resting place of being. As such, I argue in parts III and IV, death coenables the fourfold, which is Heidegger's response to the technological world. In the fourfold things are not manipulated but form the bedrock of a shared communal world. In part IV I develop Heidegger's claim that there is an essential relation between death and language. In the information age language is reduced to a transmitter of information. Thanks to its relation with death as the utterly unavailable language retains other dimensions that elude the demands of technology.

In the search for the foundations of cognition philosophers often encounter a familiar problem - the problem of content. The problem of content is essentially the problem of how content, whether experiential or intentional, is possible. In practice providing a response to this problem involves providing an account of how an active self-consciousness is able to conceive/perceive, or in some way be consciousness ofx. The unique nature of this problem imposes significant constraints on the field of explanatory possibilities. Since the x which is to be accounted for is essentially the possibility of absolutely any x there is no y which is not also an x. Hence, nothing remains outside of the explanandum which can be appealed to in order to account for it without, to some extent, presupposing that which needs to be explained. In many of the theories we will examine overcoming this problem involves appealing to a transcendental "structure of awareness" which more often than not is composed of "universal-like" transcendental "entities" of indeterminate nature and ontological status. A major appeal of transcendental entities (e.g., forms, species, essences, pure categories, and dharmas) is that they can at least appear to provide a way of supplying the power of objective "determinateness" necessary to account for the possibility of determination without themselves being determinates (i.e., without presupposing content). The general strategy of appealing to such transcendental "entities" has, however, for some time been suspiciously regarded as it is unclear how such an appeal is able to avoid the aforementioned presupposition of content. But if the appeal to transcendental cognizing intermediates is to be ' dismissed we may be left to face up to the fact that content simply "happens"- that the process of determination, of "judgment", is a mysterious talent that can neither be taught nor understood. Through a critical examination of both Western and Eastern philosophical approaches to the problem of content this dissertation identifies and describes, insofar as is possible, "that" through which content is rendered possible. In so doing it draws attention to previously neglected points of contact between major philosophical traditions and clarifies the central issues surrounding the problem. The dissertation supports the conclusion that, although there is a need to acknowledge a particular role for a transcendental "self- consciousness" in providing a coherent response to the problem of content, the attempt to articulate a mechanism through which this role is fulfilled most likely misguided. Although it appears to be possible both to know something about this "self-consciousness", and even to know it more directly, it cannot be understood in the usual sense.