The aim of this work is to defend substance dualism by defeating two of its paramount potential defeaters. I will argue that a substance dualist position, neo-Thomistic hylomorphism, provides a solution to the causal pairing problem and a good explanation of neural correlates of consciousness. After an introductory first chapter, I'll explicate dualism's dominant potential defeaters in the next three chapters. Chapter 2 will clarify what neural correlates of consciousness are and the objection to dualism based on neural correlates. The following two chapters will distinguish and elucidate dualism's principal problem regarding mental causation, which I'll argue is the causal pairing problem. The fifth chapter will introduce and explain neo-Thomistic hylomorphism. Chapter 6 will apply neo-Thomistic hylomorphism to the causal pairing problem, providing a solution that appeals to a fundamental tenet of neo-Thomistic hylomorphism. In Chapter 7 I'll apply the view and an Aristotelian powers ontology to construct a model of neural correlates of consciousness that's intended to explain such correlations. The final chapter will offer a conclusion and briefly discuss relevant future research.

The work aims to demonstrate that at the heart of Eriugena’s approach to Christian theology there lies a profoundly philosophical interest in the necessity of a cardinal shift in the paradigms of thinking – namely, that from the metaphysical to the dialectical one, which wins him a reputation of the ‘Hegel of the ninth century,’ as scholars in Post-Hegelian Germany called him. The prime concern of Eriugena’s discourse is to prove that the actual adoption of the salvific truth of Christ’s revelation about all humans’ Sonship to God (resulting in their return to union with Him) directly depends on the way the truth of God’s Oneness is consistently thought of. It is exactly the dialectic of the universal and particular which allows Eriugena both to tackle the dichotomy between being and non-being (called by him the fundamental division) and to proceed towards raising a question how the totality of God’s being can be approached so as to let him radically reconsider a predominantly metaphysical view of creation the theological reflection traditionally relies on. According to the dialectical understanding of unity (with a strong appeal to a dialectically coherent treatment of contradiction) that Eriugena does adhere to, the reality of creation cannot be thought of, and therefore known, otherwise than in the way of being inseparable from the universal Principle of all. This is the Principle abandoned by nothing, unless the mind corrupted by the senses thinks otherwise and, following the metaphysical pattern of dichotomy (as that of the fundamental division), improperly sets the creation and its Principle apart. Restoration of the mind to the proper rational motion of recta ratio (right reason) freed, as Eriugena argues, from the dictates of senses therefore becomes the way of both the epistemological breakthrough to the infinite whole and practical return (reditus) from the world of finite things (the corrupt mind’s construct) to living in the divine reality of creation. The work’s argument is based on the assumption of close affinity between Eriugena’s discourse and that of his Islamic contemporaries (Allaf, al-Nazzam, al-Kindi, and others), who developed their dialectical ideas within the Mu’tazilah tradition of a philosophically disciplined approach to the truth of God’s Oneness. In particular, al-Nazzam’s engagement with Parmenides’ Periphyseon and his resistance to the danger of a dualistic interpretation of its ontology seem to provoke Eriugena’s innovative approach to Christian theology with a view to suggesting a mode of overcoming dualism as the main obstacle on the way to the Truth revealed. This vision of the meaning of Eriugena’s undertaking allows us not only to better understand the novelty of his approach to Christian theology, but also reconsider some of the key points of his discourse that seem to have become a sort of commonplace in Eriugenian studies: 1. Unlike the prevalent opinion, not the forms of the division of Nature but the modes of interpreting being and non-being are to be understood to constitute the genuine subject-matter of each book of the Periphyseon and, hence, of the five parts of his system. 2. The fourfold division of Nature is to be interpreted not as a basic structure of the system offered by Eriugena, but as a means of introducing dialectic to the body of theology by refuting Augustine’s metaphysical vision of a hierarchical model of the universe and indicating the way of resolution of the cardinally theological contradiction – God does and does not create at the same time. 3. All this gives reason to disagree with a general tendency of associating Eriugena’s work with exploration of the division of God’s Nature and to reinterpret it as an immense anti-division project to be understood as an important turn in the history of Christian thought entirely focused on the truth of God’s Oneness and human life in conformity to it. *** I affirm that this thesis is entirely my own work and has not been submitted for examination in any form elsewhere.

There is a significant body of research on children's preconceptions concerning scientific concepts and the impact this can have upon their science education. One active issue concerns the extent to which young children's explanations for the existence of natural kinds rely on teleological explanations. These explanations either propose a purpose (e.g., muddy puddles are for jumping in) or suggest goal-driven behaviour (e.g., tigers decided to grow stripes for better camouflage). It has been argued that this teleological tendency is a major barrier to children's understanding of causality in the natural world, particularly when learning about evolution. This thesis details four studies which explore and seek to limit children's use of teleological explanations for natural kinds. Study 1 investigated two factors (question wording and questioned topic) that may have led to an overestimation of children's use of teleological explanations for natural phenomena (i.e., time-constrained, natural events or processes such as snow, clouds or night). The findings indicated that children's (aged 5- to 8-years-old, n = 66) responses to open questions involved significantly fewer teleological answers than to the typical leading form used in prior research. Furthermore, the concept of teleology is more nuanced than often suggested, as levels of teleological explanation varied considerably within the category of natural phenomena. Consequently, young children may be more able to learn about causal explanations than the literature implies. Study 1b used methods from corpus linguistics to explore the naturally occurring discourse surrounding the examples of natural phenomena investigated in Study 1. Teleological and scientific patterns of discussion were identified in a specially created corpus of children's discourse. The results of this analysis indicate that the patterns of language that children experience can influence their use and the form of teleological explanations. Studies 2 and 3 consisted of efficacy tests of an intervention designed to limit children's endorsement of teleological explanations to account for the existence of a) natural phenomena (e.g., snow or rainbows) and b) organisms' traits (e.g., giraffes' necks or zebras' stripes). The interventions consisted of short discussion-based activities which sought to develop children's understanding of why teleological explanations are inappropriate to use in scientific contexts. (Study 2, 5- to 7-year-olds, n = 54; Study 3, 9- to 10-year-olds, n = 24). These studies suggest teleology need not be a major barrier to teaching and learning about causality in Early Years education. After only limited discussion about styles of explanation in science, the results revealed that children's teleological preconceptions were malleable to change, a finding which runs counter to current thinking on children and teleology. In terms of a contribution to knowledge, it is proposed that children's use of teleological explanations is more nuanced than currently suggested by the literature. Furthermore, children's use of these explanations can be limited with a series of simple, short discursive lessons. Lessons that do not require additional pedagogical knowledge on the part of primary school teachers.

According to David Lewis’ influential thesis of Humean Supervenience, the world is a plurality of self-contained individuals standing in external relations of spatiotemporal distance. In the last decades, this thesis has been under attack by what I call ‘holistic ontologies’, the most salient of which are Dispositional Essentialism, Ontic Structural Realism, Priority Monism, and Existence Monism. These reactions obey different but closely related suspicions against the central features of Humean Supervenience. On one hand, there are suspicions against the idea of external relations; on the other hand, there are suspicions against the idea of self-contained plurals. Common to these holistic ontologies is to conceive the world not as an externally related heap but, in different degrees of strength, as an ‘internally related whole’. This work, following Bradley’s stance against relations, puts under critical scrutiny the merits of these holistic ontologies. The central aims are to make explicit the different senses of ‘wholeness’ and ‘internal relatedness’ that they happen to endorse; make explicit their internal flaws; and show the relative superiority of Existence Monism. As it happens, Existence Monism vindicates Bradley’s core ideas about relations, namely: that external relations are unable to relate; that internal relations are inherently unstable; and that all relations–external and internal–are better understood as imperfect abstractions from a more substantial, non-relational, kind of unity. I conclude with some skeptical remarks against my own metaphysical preferences and against ontology in general.

That Conrad was familiar with Schopenhauer’s philosophy has been proposed by literary scholars and seconded, in passing, by philosophers. This has resulted in one-way studies of literary influence. This thesis is instead a two-way study in the philosophy of literature. It shows how Schopenhauer’s philosophy can illuminate Conrad’s fiction and how the fiction can become an analytical tool for exploring the philosophy. There are two strands in Schopenhauer’s philosophy. One is uncompromisingly concerned with salvation and will-denial. The second focuses on self-knowledge and character, which leads to self-fulfilment and accommodation with the world. It is the latter strand, with character at its core, where the interests of the philosopher and creative writer coincide. My methodology is different from previous studies in that I propose Conrad’s direct source for Schopenhauer was not The World as Will and Idea but his essays, which are directed more towards the worldly strand of his philosophy. I argue that the use by literary scholars of Schopenhauer’s magnum opus as Conrad’s direct source has diverted them from his main area of interest in the philosophy, namely its approach to self-knowledge and character, and that this misplaced focus has tended to distort interpretations of his fiction.

In this dissertation I address the question, how does power operate in day-today consuming in a consumer society? My theoretical framework has two bases. One base is Foucault's theories of power, including but not limited to his work on normalization, surveillance, examination, confession, and identity. The other base is narrative theory, including the relevance of narratives to personal and social identities, the role of narratives in creating social order, the impact of narratives on such things as the organization of space and time, and the effect of narratives in creating coherence and directionality across operants of power. I suggest that many of the mechanisms of power identified by Foucault have unmistakable narrative features, and that by combining narrative and Foucauldian perspectives a more comprehensive understanding of the operation of power in day-to-day life is attainable. I apply my theoretical framework to data collected using autoethnographic methods. Specifically, I spent one year keeping a detailed journal of my and my family's experiences relating in the broadest sense to consuming. During this period we lived in a middle-sized Canadian city. To heighten my awareness of the taken-for-granted aspects of power and consuming we alternated lifestyles each month, living months 1,3,5,7,9, and 11 as conventional Canadian consumers, and months 2,4,6,8,10, and 12 as committed environmentally-mindful consumers. In addition, I conducted - interviews of small samples of conventional and environmentally-committed consumers; I undertook a content analysis of print advertising delivered to our house; and I conducted background research on various issues relating to consumerism. My research indicates that Foucauldian operants of power are used extensively to support consuming, and that; in addition, many narrative structures are also employed as operants of power, including charms and stories. These operants of power are aligned with one another to form coherent patterns through the effects of metanarratives. I argue that, despite claims by Lyotard (1984) and others, modern consumer societies are highly narrative, and have defining metanarratives. In addition, environmentally-based opposition to the dominant metanarrative of consuming has a metanarrative of its own, but is distinctly lacking in operants of power.

A striking feature of twentieth-century Western cultural history was a preoccupation with silence. This thesis is a survey of the phenomenon across a broad range of literary and theoretical discourses actively engaged in the period in exploring and exploiting silence's expressive and philosophical potential. Its focus, and unifying principle, is the dynamic resourcefulness of the motif-the diversity of its uses and significations. The meaning of silence shifts according to its context and the discourse deploying it. By analysing an array of novels and theoretical formulations-by writers as diverse as James, Chopin, Conrad, H. D., Forster, Lawrence, Faulkner, and Wittgenstein, Benjamin, Blanchot, Hassan, Macherey, Irigaray, Spivak, Derrida-the mobility of silence as a construct is exposed. Silence is identified in the fiction of the period 1900-1950, and its implications are assessed in the light of the various ways in which its uses were understood and interpreted by twentieth-century theorists. Theory provides a heuristic device for the comprehension of the fiction selected for scrutiny whilst further highlighting the extent of the past century's dedication to the motif. Fiction and theory are regarded as two different manifestations of a fascination with silence: fiction dramatizes a commitment to the motif which comes to be formally registered in theoretical discourse as the century progresses. After an introductory chapter outlining the expanse of the phenomenon to be studied, the thesis is divided into two parts illustrating the discrete implications attaching to the motif: 'Social Silences' and 'Ontological Silences'. The project questions whether the multiplicity of silence's usage may work to depotentiate its signifying power; in particular, whether its role in abstract 'ontological' formulations diminishes its force for emancipatory 'social' discourses. In conclusion, by means of the synchronic organization of the thesis, silence's import is shown to lie in its resourcefulness rather than in any intrinsic characteristic it might be thought to possess.

This thesis examines some of the contested meanings of what it is to be a self, person and individual. The law of obligations sets the context for this examination. One of the important aspects of contemporary feminist philosophy has been its move beyond highlighting inconsistencies in political and legal theory, in which theoretical frameworks can be shown to rely upon an ambiguous treatment of women. The feminist theorists whose work is considered use these theoretical weaknesses as a point of departure to propose different conceptual frameworks. I start by analysing contemporary work on the self from within both philosophy of science and feminist metaphysics to draw out common approaches from these diverse positions. These themes are then discussed in the context of the law. I then critically examine the concept of legal personhood in the work of Drucilla Cornell and her proposals for the amendment of tort law. This is juxtaposed with an analysis of the practical operation of tort law by adapting François Ewald's work on risk and insurance to English law. I concentrate on women's ambiguous position with regard to both risk and to the image of the individual that is the subject of Ewald's critique. This is followed by an examination of the changing position of women with regard to 'possessive individualism', 'self-ownership' or 'property in the person' in relation to contract law and social contract theory. There are a number of different social contracts discussed in the thesis: Cornell's reworking of John Rawls and the stories of Thomas Hobbes and of Carole Pateman. The final 'social contract' to be discussed is that of 'new contractualism', the employment of contract as a technique of government. I argue that Pateman's critique of possessive individualism continues to be relevant at a time when the breadwinner/housewife model has broken down.

This thesis will be asking questions about the underlying structure of Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's thoughts on atheism and agnosticism. It will begin with the work of the mature Kant, explaining how his epistemology, as articulated in the Critique of Pure Reason, treated the question of the sense experience of God and then how his theory of biblical hermeneutics treated the question of divine revelation through scripture, before examining Kant's moral proof of God, finding it not to be successful. I next move to a consideration of the atheistic philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer's chief argument against God will be seen to be an argument from exclusion, although significant difficulties will be seen to beset Schopenhauer's endeavour. He will also be seen to shape a moral philosophy which he then turns against God. This argument will be examined in some detail and it too, despite appearances, will be seen to be essentially metaphysical. Since Schopenhauer's moral philosophy is intrinsically metaphysical in this way, his moral objective to God has to be construed as relying upon the prior introduction of an element of his atheistic metaphysics and to that extent is to be considered an expression of, rather than an argument for, atheism. Nietzsche elaborates a metapsychological and physiological analysis of the type of person inclined towards believing in the claims of the monotheistic tradition, demonstrating how theism is connected with the yearning of escape and for the moralisation of the socially unaccountable. After investigating the Nietzschean approach to religion and atheism, I will however, conclude that Nietzsche only achieves some of his aims; and further, that those of his aims which are achieved themselves rely on certain specific empirical assumptions which are in any case problematic.

This dissertation’s contribution consists in providing a novel interpretation of the role time plays in Kant’s transcendental idealism. A significant part of Kant scholarship on the Critiques tends to assume that time, as understood in transcendental philosophy, is solely a formal property of intuition. This assumption has led several commentators to overlook a fundamental feature of transcendental idealism, namely, that in being the most basic form of intuition time is, also, a provider of content in and for experience. In looking attentively at such feature this dissertation shows that time is the activity of the self that grounds the possibility of objectivity and explores the philosophical implications of such an interpretation. In the first Chapter I conduct a comprehensive survey of relevant literature and show that it is impossible to separate general metaphysics from transcendental logic in the context of Kant’s transcendental philosophy without making serious philosophical sacrifices. I then argue, in the second Chapter, that time is not merely a formal property of intuition but is, rather, the fundamental form of intuition and that, even if space is in no way reducible to, or derivable from it, time has nonetheless primacy over space on both logical and ontological grounds. From this I argue that by time, or self-affection, Kant understands the activity of subjectivity that brings about the possibility of relating to objects through the power of imagination. In the third Chapter, I show that such relation is not left wholly undetermined and that, instead, it occurs in accordance with the layout presented by Kant in the Table of Judgments, the Table of Pure Concepts of the Understanding, the Schemata and, importantly, in the System of Principles of the Understanding. I show that only an interpretation that acknowledges the systematicity found in the Analytic section of the Critique of Pure Reason can justify the distinction drawn by Kant between the mathematical and the dynamical and conclude, from that, that time does indeed provide a specific content in and for experience to be found in the Schematism doctrine. Finally, in the fourth Chapter I broaden the philosophical scope and inquire as to whether Kant has the theoretical means to articulate something like an uncategorized schema or time-determination. I conclude that, although in the Critical period Kant can do so only problematically, in the post-Critical period there are means to do so categorically: system, as such, is a time-determination for which the understanding lacks a pure concept.