A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Science, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of requirements for the degree of Master of Science. Johannesburg, 2015. / Standard survival analysis methods model lifetime data where cohorts are tracked from the point of origin, until the occurrence of an event. If more than one event occurs, a special model is chosen to handle competing risks. Moreover, if the events are defined such that most subjects are not susceptible to the event(s) of interest, standard survival methods may not be appropriate. This project is an application of survival analysis in a consumer credit context. The data used in this study was obtained from a major South African financial institution covering a five year observation period from April 2009 to March 2014. The aim of the project was to follow up on cohorts from the point where vehicle finance loans originated to either default or early settlement events and compare survival and logistic modeling methodologies. As evidenced by the empirical Kaplain Meier survival curve, the data typically had long term survivors with heavy censoring as at March 2014. Cause specific Cox regression models were fitted and an adjustment was made for each model, to accommodate a proportion p of long term survivors. The corresponding Cumulative Incidence Curves were calculated per model, to determine probabilities at a fixed horizon of 48 months. Given the complexity of the consumer credit lifetime data at hand, we investigated how logistic regression methods would compare. Logistic regression models were fitted per event type. The models were assessed for goodness of fit. Their ability to differentiate risk were determined using the model Gini Statistics. Model assessment results were satisfactory. Methodologies were compared for each event type using Receiver Operating Characteristic curves and area under the curves. The Results show that survival methods perform better than logistic regression methods when modelling lifetime data in the presence of competing risks and long term survivors.

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by Luk Hing Tak. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 117-121). / ABSTRACT / acknowledgment / CONTENTS / LIST OF CHARTS / LIST OF TABLES / CHAPTERS / Chapter 1. --- introduction / Chapter 2. --- litterature revtew on money. credit and informal finance / Chapter 2.1 --- The Great Depression / Chapter 2.2 --- Money-credit relationship / Chapter 2 3 --- Models in credit-output analysis / Chapter 2.4 --- """Money view"" versus “Credit view´ح to monetary transmission mechanism" / Chapter 2.5 --- informal finance in the developing countries / Chapter 2.6 --- Summary / Chapter 3. --- ftnanciai. DEVELOPMENT in taiwan / Chapter 3.1 --- Current economic profile / Chapter 3.2 --- Monetary reform and other measures / Chapter 3.3 --- Taiwan's dual financial system / Chapter 3.4 --- Money supply and banking system / Chapter 3.5 --- Other financial institutions / Chapter 3.6 --- Summary / Chapter 4. --- "emptrtcal analysis of ""money-output´ح link and ""CREDIT-output"" link" / Chapter 4.1 --- Methodology / Chapter 4.2 --- Transformation and filtering data / Chapter 4.3 --- Causality test procedure / Chapter 4.4 --- Empirical results / Chapter 4.5 --- Summary / Chapter 5. --- SIGNIFICANCE OF UNORGANIZED MONEY MARKET / Chapter 5.1 --- The unorganized money market in Taiwan / Chapter 5.2 --- Empirical results with the inclusion of unorganized money market / Chapter 5.3 --- Financial instruments in the unorganized money market / Chapter 5.4 --- significance of the unorganized financial market / Chapter 5.5 --- Summary / Chapter 6. --- CONCLUSION / Chapter 7. --- BIBLIOGRAPHY

by Wong Wai-chung, Rex, Tsang Kit-may, Carol. / Abstract also in Chinese / Bibliography: leaves 74-76 / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1983

by Daisy Cheng Siu-ling, Andrew Mak Yip-shing. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1981. / Bibliography: leaves 76-77.

by Lau Man Pong, Siu Lai Lai Ying, Joan, Tsui Siu Kwan, Stephen. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 120-121). / Abstract --- p.i / Table of Contents --- p.ii / List of Tables --- p.iii / List of Appendies --- p.iv / Chapter / Chapter I. --- "An, Overview of BIS Rulings" --- p.1-2 / Chapter 1.1 --- Definition --- p.2-8 / Chapter 1.2 --- Reasons For the creation of BIS Ruling on Capital Adequacy --- p.8-10 / Chapter II. --- The Banking Industry of Hong Kong --- p.11 / Chapter 2 .1 --- Backgound --- p.11-12 / Chapter 2 .2 --- Lending Activities Of Hong Kong's Commercial Banks In 1993 --- p.12-14 / Chapter 2.3 --- Application Of Capital Adequacy Ratio In Hong Kong --- p.14-16 / Chapter III . --- Objective of the study --- p.17-19 / Chapter IV. --- Research Methodology --- p.20 / Chapter 4.1 --- Research Design --- p.20 / Chapter 4.2 --- Data Collection Method --- p.20 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Questionnaire --- p.20-21 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Direct interview --- p.21 / Chapter 4.3 --- Sampling Method --- p.22 / Chapter 4.4 --- Analysis Techniques --- p.22-23 / Chapter V. --- Research Findings --- p.24 / Chapter 5.1 --- Introductions --- p.24-25 / Chapter 5.2 --- Limitations On Data Analysis --- p.26 / Chapter 5.3 --- Data Analysis --- p.27 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- Section A: Opinion Towards BIS Standard On CAR --- p.27-36 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Section B： Bank' s Reaction --- p.36-41 / Chapter VI. --- Conclusions --- p.42-44 / Appendix --- p.45-119 / Bibliography --- p.120-121

Summary in Chinese. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong. / Bibliography: p. l. 111-115.

Essay one. For banks, good governances can reduce both the abilities and incentives of insiders to expropriate bank resources and promote bank efficiency, and are supposed to have real economic effect on their customers and firms in that country. This study examines how banking sector's ownership structure is related to the firm-level investment efficiency on a sample of 88,764 firm-year observations across 36 developed and developing countries between 1995 and 2006. I find that, ceteris paribus, a country's banking sector with more cash flow rights by controlling owners improves firms' investment efficiency; whereas, a country's banking sector with larger divergence between cash flow rights and control rights by controlling owners reduces firms' investment efficiency. In addition, I find that the relation between a country's banking sector ownership structure and firms' investment efficiency is stronger for low growth firms, suggesting banks' stronger debt monitoring role on firms with free cash flow problem. Besides, banks have more influence on investment efficiency of firms, which rely on more external financing. Finally, the relation between banking sector's ownership structure and firms' investment efficiency is more pronounced in countries with stronger private monitoring for banks and better information environment of banks. On the whole, the results suggest that banking sector's ownership structure is an important instrument to govern banks' operation with regard to efficient lending and sound governances on firms' investment decision. / Essay two. In this study, we examine whether and how incentives in bank lending, in emerging market like China, influence firms' investment behaviors, the key determinant of firms' productivity. First, being connected with bureaucrats provides firms with a comparative non-economic advantage of access to debt in China. Our empirical results show that loans granting to political connected firms is less sensitive to those firms' profitability, which is consistent with "rent-seeking" hypothesis. Second, political connection is a violated factor in debt markets and politically connected lending is accompanied by less monitoring posted by banks. Consequently, we find that firms with political tie invest less efficiently than firms without political tie when they can access to abnormal debt through political tie. Moreover, the negative relation between politically connected lending and firms' investment efficiency is stronger for SOE firms and low growth firms. Finally, we find that region development with regard to financial development and government quality improvement reduces politically connected lending's negative impact on firms' investment efficiency. In sum, soft lending, like politically connected lending, destroy economic growth because of misallocation of scary resources among firms and also because of less incentive to monitor firms' project selection. / essay 1. Bank ownership structure, bank regulation, and firm investment: international evidence -- essay 2. Bank lending incentives and firm investment decisions in China. / Zheng, Ying. / Adviser: Joseph P.H. Fan. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 70-06, Section: A, page: 2173. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 88-90). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest dissertations and theses, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

The presented thesis is focused on the property valuation from a bank point of views for the purpose of providing loans. Its main objective is the analysis of particular secured bank loans pledged with real estate from contemporary bank practice. The secondary goal is to present the laws in force, explaining policies and procedures of the different methodologies.

In a 2004 study, Harvey, Lin and Roper argue that debt makers with a commitment to monitoring can create value for outside shareholders whenever information asymmetry and agency costs are pronounced. I investigate Harvey, Lin and Roper's claim for bank loans by empirically testing the effect of information asymmetry and direct agency costs on the abnormal returns of the borrowers' stock around the announcement of bank loans. I divide my study into two main sections. The first section tests whether three proxies of the direct agency costs of equity are equally significant in measuring the direct costs associated with outside equity agency problems. I find that the asset utilization ratio proxy is the most statistically significant proxy of the direct agency costs of equity using a Chow F-test statistic. The second main section of my dissertation includes and event study and a cross-sectional analysis. The event study results document significant and positive average abnormal returns of 1.01% for the borrowers' stock on the announcement day of bank loans. In the cross sectional analysis of the borrowers' average abnormal stock returns, I find that higher quality and more reputable banks/lenders provide a reliable certification to the capital market about the low level of the borrowers' direct agency costs of equity and information asymmetry. This certification hypothesis holds only for renewed bank loans. In other words, in renewing the borrowers' line of credit, the bank/lender is actually confirming that the borrower has a low level of information asymmetry and direct costs of equity. Given such a certificate from the banks/lenders, shareholders reward the company/borrower by bidding the share price up in the capital market.