公司取得聯貸是否是一項特殊資訊？過去已經有許多文獻指出，銀行核定企業的聯合貸款對投資人來說是一項特殊資訊，因為當銀行借錢給公司之前，通常有實地查核的動作，一旦銀行核定該項貸款，則代表銀行認可借款公司的財務狀況，所以會對股市投資人產生認證效果，市場會將該訊息視為一項對公司股價有正面影響的訊息。但是晚近文獻出現不同的看法，有學者發現獲得銀行貸款的公司，除了長期經營績效並未表現較好之外，其短期宣告效果也有樣本選擇偏誤的問題。 本文嘗試利用較完整的公司獲得聯貸資金的樣本、以及較高頻率的股價資料，重新檢視公司取得聯貸是否是一項特殊資訊。在實證部份，採用較完整的公司獲得聯貸資金的樣本，此資料來自美國證券管理委員會EDGAR資料庫。本論文以該資料庫做為搜集聯貸宣告的樣本，可以避免樣本選擇偏誤的問題。實證結果發現聯貸宣告時，並沒有產生顯著正向的股價報酬，本論文也發現美國公司近年來有逐漸將聯貸訊息轉移到盤後再宣告的趨勢，因此本論文再將聯貸案宣告的資料，分成交易時間和非交易時間加以分析，而實證結果顯示，不論於交易時間或非交易時間出現的聯貸宣告，其公司股價均沒有顯著的異常報酬，而且很多公司甚至有負報酬的現象。最後，本論文進一步使用高頻率的日內資料來分析，公司取得聯貸是否是一項特殊資訊。而實證結果發現，雖然在銀行核定公司聯貸的前後，該公司股價的日內報酬率為正值，但是在統計上並不顯著。因此基於以上的實證結果，本論文的結論為：銀行核定企業聯合貸款並不具有認證效果，因此並不是一項特殊的資訊。

The common justification, in financial theory, for the existence of debt covenants is their use as contractual devices that reduce agency problems between borrowers and lenders. The thesis first examines the extent to which debt covenants alleviate these agency problems, and how they affect a borrower's debt financing decisions. Then, building on recent theories on the costs of bank financing, the dissertation suggests a new economic rationale for debt covenants as instruments that can reduce these costs. The thesis consists of three essays: / The first essay shows that, debt covenants create underinvestment incentives while reducing the overinvestment cost of debt It also finds that the borrower's choice between different contracts with, and without covenants, depends on the magnitude of the agency problems, and the quality of the lender's monitoring technology. / The second essay shows how debt covenants reduce the costs of banks information monopoly. In fact, contingent contracting with debt covenants can be used by banks to precommit against using their informational advantage to hold up borrowers and extract rents, thus giving borrowers incentives to exert greater effort. / The third essay shows that the renegotiation that debt covenants permit, can reduce liquidity risk defined as the risk that a solvent but illiquid borrower is unable to obtain refinancing. It also shows that a debt contract with covenants is similar to a mix of debt contracts with different maturities. / The thesis concludes with a review of the determinants of corporate debt maturity structure, and the literature on corporate reliance on bank financing and suggests future research in this area.

This dissertation consists of three essays: (I) Double Liability, Moral Hazard and Deposit Insurance Schemes, (II) Contract Costs, Lender Identity and Bank Loan Pricing, and (III) Bank Capital Structure and Differential Lending Behaviour. The first essay proposes to add double liability to a deposit insurance scheme to induce insurees (depository financial institutions) to reveal their true risk types. The second essay looks at the differential lending patterns of American banks versus Japanese banks. The third essay discusses the relationship between the characteristics of a lender and those of the borrower.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Michigan, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 126-129).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--New York University, 1991. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 237-245).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaiʻi, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 141-146).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--American University, 1991. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 229-253).

Originally presented as the authors Thesis (Ph. D.--Universität Hannover, 2002). / Includes bibliographical references (p. 157-165).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--American University, 1988. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 411-425).

Thesis (PhD)--AUT University, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references. Also held in print (xv, 236 leaves : ill. ; 30 cm.) in the Archive at the City Campus (T 332.742095493 SAL)