A presente dissertação de mestrado tem por escopo a análise do administrador judicial na recuperação judicial e na falência, de acordo com a Lei nº 11.101/05. Entre as grandes mudanças advindas com a introdução da citada lei, está a figura do administrador judicial, em substituição à do antigo comissário da concordata e do síndico na falência. Não obstante serem aplaudidas muitas das alterações já incorporadas há quase 10 (dez) anos, o regime jurídico do administrador judicial não é isento de problemas e lacunas, ainda não discutidos na sua totalidade pela doutrina e jurisprudência pátria. De fundamental importância o entendimento desta figura jurídica para que as demais inovações constantes da lei sejam aplicadas de forma completa e eficaz, atingindo-se, assim, seus fins primordiais. Para tanto, iniciamos com um breve estudo das soluções possíveis para as empresas em crise, com base na Lei nº 11.101/05, traçando os seus pontos mais significativos e que tenham relação com o tema proposto (capítulo 1). Apresentamos uma breve análise histórica da figura do agora denominado administrador judicial, com base na legislação e na doutrina brasileira (capítulo 2). O estudo prossegue analisando a natureza jurídica do administrador judicial. Serão analisados também os pressupostos legais, impedimentos e o critério discricionário do juízo para a sua nomeação, com a confrontação do direito comparado. Discorremos sobre os deveres e as atribuições do administrador judicial, instituídos pela Lei nº 11.101/05, tanto na recuperação judicial como na falência, inclusive para a hipótese de prosseguimento da atividade negocial na falência. Estudamos a responsabilidade do administrador judicial segundo a legislação e jurisprudência pátrias, especialmente nas esferas cível, penal e tributária. Também tratamos das hipóteses e respectivas consequências da substituição e destituição do administrador judicial, disciplinadas na Lei nº 11.101/05, e os critérios legais para a sua remuneração (capítulo 3). A dissertação termina com as considerações finais em relação ao estudo realizado (capítulo 4). / This masters degree thesis examines the role of the judicial administrator in reorganization (judicial recovery) and bankruptcy procedures, according to Law 11.101/05. Among the important changes brought by the enactment of this law is the figure of the judicial administrator, substituting the former trustee in moratorium (concordata) and bankruptcy procedures. Although it is acknowledged many improvements introduced by the new regime almost ten years ago, the role of the judicial administrator is not exempt from problems and gaps, which so far have not been fully discussed by the doctrine and jurisprudence. It is of fundamental importance to understand this legal figure for the other innovations contained in the law to be completely and effectively applied, to reach the main goals of the law. For this purpose, we start with a study of the possible solutions available to distressed companies, based on Law 11.101/05, tracing out its most significant points that are related to the theme (chapter 1). Then we present a brief historical analysis of the figure now called the judicial administrator, in light of Brazilian legislation and doctrine (chapter 2). The study continues with the analysis of the legal nature of the judicial administrator (chapter 3). In this chapter, we also analyze the legal prerequisites, impediments and discretionary criteria for appointing people to this position, in light of comparative law. We examine the duties and powers of judicial administrator, as established by Law 11.101/05, both in reorganization and bankruptcy, including the possibility of continuing the companys business activity during the bankruptcy process. Another aspect examined is the potential liability of the judicial administrator according to the nations legislation and jurisprudence, especially in the civil, criminal and tax areas. We also cover the situations and respective consequences of the replacement and removal of the judicial trustee in accordance with Law 11.101/05, and the legal criteria for his remuneration (chapter 3). The dissertation concludes with final remarks regarding the study (chapter 4).

<p>År 2007 gick 5 791 svenska företag i konkurs. Företagskonkurser kan få svåra ekonomiska konsekvenser för företagens intressentkrets. Utöver den uppenbara ekonomiska förlusten för företagsledningen och ägarna drabbas även andra intressenter såsom bolagets kreditgivare, leverantörer, kunder, staten och naturligtvis bolagets anställda. Följderna av en företagskonkurs kan dock mildras om företagets intressenter får en möjlighet att förbereda sig. Genom att förutse ett företags konkurs ges intressenterna en chans att vidta nödvändiga åtgärder för att skydda sina intressen. Traditionellt sett har finansiella nyckeltal allena utgjort verktygen för att förutsäga konkurser. Vi utgår från finansiella nyckeltal i denna studie, men adderar även förvaltningsberättelsen som förklaringsvariabel.</p><p>Syftet med denna studie är att avgöra huruvida förvaltningsberättelsen kan bidra till de finansiella nyckeltalen när det gäller att förutse ett företags konkurs samt ta reda på huruvida det finns en motvilja att i förvaltningsberättelsen rapportera uppriktigt om en dyster framtid. För att utreda detta har vi valt att studera hur variablerna balansomslutning, soliditet, kassalikviditet, bruttovinstmarginal, räntabilitet på eget kapital samt förvaltningsberättelsens innehåll påverkar konkursrisken. Detta främst med hjälp av logistisk regression.</p><p>Resultaten visar att alla finansiella nyckeltal enskilt är signifikanta inom ett 95-procentigt konfidensintervall och förvaltningsberättelsen är enskilt signifikant inom ett 90-procentigt konfidensintervall. Enligt den logistiska regressionsmodellen, vilken testar alla variabler gemensamt, är balansomslutningen, soliditeten och bruttovinstmarginalen signifikanta mått för att förutsäga konkurser. Alla finansiella nyckeltal visar även negativa samband med konkursrisken, vilket innebär att ökade värden på dessa nyckeltal minskar konkurssannolikheten. De förvaltningsberättelser som inte bara nämner möjligheter utan även framtida risker är också signifikanta i sammanhanget. Sådana förvaltningsberättelser ökar konkursrisken fem gånger.</p><p>Genom att eliminera förvaltningsberättelsen ur den logistiska regressionen sjönk modellens totala förklaringsgrad, vilket indikerar att förvaltningsberättelsen bidrar till konkursförutsägelser. Bidraget kunde dock vara större om framtidsutsikterna uttrycktes på ett mer sanningsenligt sätt, detta mot bakgrund i att förvaltningsberättelser som inte bara behandlar möjligheter utan även risker och osäkerhetsfaktorer var signifikanta enligt den logistiska regressionsmodellen och ökade konkursrisken markant. Vi drar också slutsatsen att det verkar finnas en motvilja att rapportera sanningsenligt om framtiden när denna inte ser ljus ut.</p> / <p>In the year of 2007, 5 791 Swedish companies went bankrupt. A corporate failure may have severe economical consequences on its environment. Besides the obvious setback to the management and owners when the company goes bankrupt, creditors, suppliers, customers, the government and of course the company’s employees are all affected. The consequences of corporate failures may be mitigated however if the company’s stakeholders get an opportunity to prepare themselves. By predicting corporate failures, stakeholders get a chance to take necessary measures to protect their interests in the company. Traditionally financial ratios have been used exclusively as tools to predict corporate failures. In this study we use financial ratios as a starting-point but to those we also add the companies’ management reports as a variable to predict corporate failures.</p><p>The purpose of this paper is to examine to what extinct the companies’ management reports contribute to the financial ratios when it comes to predicting corporate failures and also investigate whether there is an aversion towards reporting truthfully in the management’s reports about a depressing future. In order to examine this we chose to study how variables such as balance sheet total, solidity, quick asset ratio, gross profit margin, and return on shareholders’ equity as well as the management’s report affect the probability of corporate bankruptcy. These relationships have been investigated mainly through the use of logical regression.</p><p>The results of this study show that all of the financial ratios on their own are significant when it comes to predicting corporate failures within a confidence interval of 95 percent, while the management’s report is significant within a confidence interval of 90 percent. The logical regression, which investigates the significance of the variables jointly, indicates that the balance sheet total, the solidity and the gross profit margin are significant tools to predict bankruptcy. All ratios included in the model show negative coefficients with the probability of bankruptcy, which means that superior values of those ratios reduce the risk of bankruptcy. Managements’ reports that not only process future opportunities but also discuss future risks are significant when it comes to predicting corporate failures. Those management’s reports increase the probability of corporate failures five times.</p><p>By eliminating management’s reports from our logical regression the model’s ability to classify firms as failure companies or surviving companies decreased. This indicates that the management’s report in fact do contribute to the bankruptcy predictability. However, the contribution could have been greater if corporate management would express their thoughts about the company’s future in a more truthful manner. This considering that management’s reports that discuss risks as well as possibilities are significant according to the logical regression model and considerably increased the risk of corporate failure. We also concluded that there seams to be an aversion towards reporting truthfully about an unfortunate future.</p>

<p><strong>Datum: </strong>2009-06-02</p><p><strong>Nivå: </strong>Magisteruppsats i ekonomistyrning, 15 hp</p><p><strong>Författare</strong>: Charlotta Lind och Martin Sloberg</p><p><strong>Titel: </strong>Ditt företag kan inte förutse konkurs -kan Z-score?</p><p><strong>Handledare: </strong>Esbjörn Segelod</p><p><strong>Problem: </strong>Våra forskningsfrågor är:</p><ul><li>Går det att förutse konkurs tre, fyra respektive fem år innan</li></ul><p>          konkursbeslutet?</p><ul><li>Vilka av den senaste Z-scoremodellens fyra nyckeltal är viktigast vid</li></ul><p>           prognostisering av konkurs?</p><p><strong>Syfte: </strong>Att testa i vad mån Z-scoremodellen kan användas för att förutse konkurser</p><p>bland icke börsnoterade, icke tillverkande företag tre, fyra respektive fem år</p><p>innan konkurs; samt att undersöka vilka av denna modells inbördes nyckeltal</p><p>som är viktigast vid predicering av konkurser.</p><p><strong>Metod: </strong>Vi har genom kvantitativ metod analyserat årsredovisningar från 51 företag</p><p>som gått i konkurs 2008, dessa utgjorde vår huvudundersökningsgrupp och 29</p><p>slumpmässigt utvalda företag, vilka utgjorde vår kontrollgrupp. Analysen</p><p>skedde genom användandet av Altmans vidareutvecklade modell för att</p><p>förutspå konkurser från år 1995. Totalt analyserades på detta sätt 240</p><p>årsredovisningar.</p><p><strong>Slutsats: </strong>Modellens träffsäkerhet för de undersökta konkurs företagen var</p><p>2003 45,09 %</p><p>2004 47,05 %</p><p>2005 54,90 %</p><p>Vid hypotesprövning kunde vi endast för år 2005 påvisa samband för</p><p>företagsklassificeringsfrekvenser mellan konkursföretagen och</p><p>kontrollgruppen, detta gör att modellens prognostisering bör anses alltför</p><p>osäker tidigare än tre år innan konkurs. Mot bakgrund till de påvisade</p><p>träffsäkerheterna för åren och hypotesprövningarna anser vi att modellen</p><p>endast bör användas i kombination med andra analysformer .</p><p>Sammanfattningsvis är Z-scoremodellens prognostiseringsförmåga för svag att</p><p>självständigt förutse konkurser.</p><p><strong>Sökord: </strong>Konkurs, Z-score</p> / <p><strong>Date:</strong> 2009-06-02<strong> </strong></p><p><p><strong>Level:</strong> Master thesis in Management Accounting, 15 hp</p><p><strong>Authors: </strong>Charlotta Lind and Martin Sloberg</p><p><strong>Title: </strong>Your company cannot predict bankruptcy;- can Z-score?</p><p><strong>Tutor: </strong>Esbjörn Segerlod</p><p><strong>Our problem questions:</strong></p></p><ul><li>Is it possible to predict a bankruptcy three, four or five years before</li></ul><p>           the adjudication of bankruptcy?</p><ul><li>Which one of the four keyratios in the Z-scoremodel is the most</li></ul><p>          important when predicting a bankruptcy?</p><p><p><p><strong>Purpose: </strong></p><p>To test if the Z-score model can be used to predict bankruptcy for</p></p></p><p>private own companies three, four or five years before the</p><p>adjudication. To get knowledge which one of the key ratios is most</p><p>important when predicting a bankruptcy?</p><p><p><p><strong>Method:</strong></p>Through a quantitative study of Altman's Z-score model has 51</p></p><p>bankrupt companies, 29 control companies and 240 annual reports</p><p>been analyzed.</p><p><p><p><strong>Conclusion:</strong></p>The Z-score model's accuracy for the studied bankrupt companies</p></p><p>is:</p><p>2003 45,09 %</p><p>2004 47,05 %</p><p>2005 54,90 %</p><p>Only in 2005 could a relationship between the bankrupt companies</p><p>and the control companies be established through the Z-score model</p><p>tests. This makes the model too uncertain to be used earlier than</p><p>three years before the adjudication of bankruptcy. It is therefore our</p><p>opinion that the Z-score model is too weak to be used by itself but</p><p>should rather be used as a complement with other models to predict</p><p>bankruptcies.</p><p><p><p><strong>Keywords:</strong> Bankruptcy, Z-score model</p></p></p>

År 2007 gick 5 791 svenska företag i konkurs. Företagskonkurser kan få svåra ekonomiska konsekvenser för företagens intressentkrets. Utöver den uppenbara ekonomiska förlusten för företagsledningen och ägarna drabbas även andra intressenter såsom bolagets kreditgivare, leverantörer, kunder, staten och naturligtvis bolagets anställda. Följderna av en företagskonkurs kan dock mildras om företagets intressenter får en möjlighet att förbereda sig. Genom att förutse ett företags konkurs ges intressenterna en chans att vidta nödvändiga åtgärder för att skydda sina intressen. Traditionellt sett har finansiella nyckeltal allena utgjort verktygen för att förutsäga konkurser. Vi utgår från finansiella nyckeltal i denna studie, men adderar även förvaltningsberättelsen som förklaringsvariabel. Syftet med denna studie är att avgöra huruvida förvaltningsberättelsen kan bidra till de finansiella nyckeltalen när det gäller att förutse ett företags konkurs samt ta reda på huruvida det finns en motvilja att i förvaltningsberättelsen rapportera uppriktigt om en dyster framtid. För att utreda detta har vi valt att studera hur variablerna balansomslutning, soliditet, kassalikviditet, bruttovinstmarginal, räntabilitet på eget kapital samt förvaltningsberättelsens innehåll påverkar konkursrisken. Detta främst med hjälp av logistisk regression. Resultaten visar att alla finansiella nyckeltal enskilt är signifikanta inom ett 95-procentigt konfidensintervall och förvaltningsberättelsen är enskilt signifikant inom ett 90-procentigt konfidensintervall. Enligt den logistiska regressionsmodellen, vilken testar alla variabler gemensamt, är balansomslutningen, soliditeten och bruttovinstmarginalen signifikanta mått för att förutsäga konkurser. Alla finansiella nyckeltal visar även negativa samband med konkursrisken, vilket innebär att ökade värden på dessa nyckeltal minskar konkurssannolikheten. De förvaltningsberättelser som inte bara nämner möjligheter utan även framtida risker är också signifikanta i sammanhanget. Sådana förvaltningsberättelser ökar konkursrisken fem gånger. Genom att eliminera förvaltningsberättelsen ur den logistiska regressionen sjönk modellens totala förklaringsgrad, vilket indikerar att förvaltningsberättelsen bidrar till konkursförutsägelser. Bidraget kunde dock vara större om framtidsutsikterna uttrycktes på ett mer sanningsenligt sätt, detta mot bakgrund i att förvaltningsberättelser som inte bara behandlar möjligheter utan även risker och osäkerhetsfaktorer var signifikanta enligt den logistiska regressionsmodellen och ökade konkursrisken markant. Vi drar också slutsatsen att det verkar finnas en motvilja att rapportera sanningsenligt om framtiden när denna inte ser ljus ut. / In the year of 2007, 5 791 Swedish companies went bankrupt. A corporate failure may have severe economical consequences on its environment. Besides the obvious setback to the management and owners when the company goes bankrupt, creditors, suppliers, customers, the government and of course the company’s employees are all affected. The consequences of corporate failures may be mitigated however if the company’s stakeholders get an opportunity to prepare themselves. By predicting corporate failures, stakeholders get a chance to take necessary measures to protect their interests in the company. Traditionally financial ratios have been used exclusively as tools to predict corporate failures. In this study we use financial ratios as a starting-point but to those we also add the companies’ management reports as a variable to predict corporate failures. The purpose of this paper is to examine to what extinct the companies’ management reports contribute to the financial ratios when it comes to predicting corporate failures and also investigate whether there is an aversion towards reporting truthfully in the management’s reports about a depressing future. In order to examine this we chose to study how variables such as balance sheet total, solidity, quick asset ratio, gross profit margin, and return on shareholders’ equity as well as the management’s report affect the probability of corporate bankruptcy. These relationships have been investigated mainly through the use of logical regression. The results of this study show that all of the financial ratios on their own are significant when it comes to predicting corporate failures within a confidence interval of 95 percent, while the management’s report is significant within a confidence interval of 90 percent. The logical regression, which investigates the significance of the variables jointly, indicates that the balance sheet total, the solidity and the gross profit margin are significant tools to predict bankruptcy. All ratios included in the model show negative coefficients with the probability of bankruptcy, which means that superior values of those ratios reduce the risk of bankruptcy. Managements’ reports that not only process future opportunities but also discuss future risks are significant when it comes to predicting corporate failures. Those management’s reports increase the probability of corporate failures five times. By eliminating management’s reports from our logical regression the model’s ability to classify firms as failure companies or surviving companies decreased. This indicates that the management’s report in fact do contribute to the bankruptcy predictability. However, the contribution could have been greater if corporate management would express their thoughts about the company’s future in a more truthful manner. This considering that management’s reports that discuss risks as well as possibilities are significant according to the logical regression model and considerably increased the risk of corporate failure. We also concluded that there seams to be an aversion towards reporting truthfully about an unfortunate future.

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Datum: 2009-06-02 Nivå: Magisteruppsats i ekonomistyrning, 15 hp Författare: Charlotta Lind och Martin Sloberg Titel: Ditt företag kan inte förutse konkurs -kan Z-score? Handledare: Esbjörn Segelod Problem: Våra forskningsfrågor är: Går det att förutse konkurs tre, fyra respektive fem år innan           konkursbeslutet? Vilka av den senaste Z-scoremodellens fyra nyckeltal är viktigast vid            prognostisering av konkurs? Syfte: Att testa i vad mån Z-scoremodellen kan användas för att förutse konkurser bland icke börsnoterade, icke tillverkande företag tre, fyra respektive fem år innan konkurs; samt att undersöka vilka av denna modells inbördes nyckeltal som är viktigast vid predicering av konkurser. Metod: Vi har genom kvantitativ metod analyserat årsredovisningar från 51 företag som gått i konkurs 2008, dessa utgjorde vår huvudundersökningsgrupp och 29 slumpmässigt utvalda företag, vilka utgjorde vår kontrollgrupp. Analysen skedde genom användandet av Altmans vidareutvecklade modell för att förutspå konkurser från år 1995. Totalt analyserades på detta sätt 240 årsredovisningar. Slutsats: Modellens träffsäkerhet för de undersökta konkurs företagen var 2003 45,09 % 2004 47,05 % 2005 54,90 % Vid hypotesprövning kunde vi endast för år 2005 påvisa samband för företagsklassificeringsfrekvenser mellan konkursföretagen och kontrollgruppen, detta gör att modellens prognostisering bör anses alltför osäker tidigare än tre år innan konkurs. Mot bakgrund till de påvisade träffsäkerheterna för åren och hypotesprövningarna anser vi att modellen endast bör användas i kombination med andra analysformer . Sammanfattningsvis är Z-scoremodellens prognostiseringsförmåga för svag att självständigt förutse konkurser. Sökord: Konkurs, Z-score / Date: 2009-06-02 Level: Master thesis in Management Accounting, 15 hp Authors: Charlotta Lind and Martin Sloberg Title: Your company cannot predict bankruptcy;- can Z-score? Tutor: Esbjörn Segerlod Our problem questions: Is it possible to predict a bankruptcy three, four or five years before            the adjudication of bankruptcy? Which one of the four keyratios in the Z-scoremodel is the most           important when predicting a bankruptcy? Purpose: To test if the Z-score model can be used to predict bankruptcy for private own companies three, four or five years before the adjudication. To get knowledge which one of the key ratios is most important when predicting a bankruptcy? Method: Through a quantitative study of Altman's Z-score model has 51 bankrupt companies, 29 control companies and 240 annual reports been analyzed. Conclusion: The Z-score model's accuracy for the studied bankrupt companies is: 2003 45,09 % 2004 47,05 % 2005 54,90 % Only in 2005 could a relationship between the bankrupt companies and the control companies be established through the Z-score model tests. This makes the model too uncertain to be used earlier than three years before the adjudication of bankruptcy. It is therefore our opinion that the Z-score model is too weak to be used by itself but should rather be used as a complement with other models to predict bankruptcies. Keywords: Bankruptcy, Z-score model

In this dissertation, I try to advance our understanding of how managerial discretion and corporate financial flexibility affect various corporate outcomes such as failure, excessive (sub-optimal) continuation, firm growth and investment, in three novel ways. First, I show that the empirical effect of finance is not merely a misspecified real influence but rather that the financial structure of firms matter for firm growth and investment where the real effects of finance arise out of the imperfect substitutability between internal funding and external private credit. Second, using managerial mergers and acquisitions (M&A) investment decisions as an identification mechanism, I find that managerial discretion combined with corporate financial flexibility may lead to distortions in corporate investment and financing policies, and those distortions cost the various stakeholders of the firm dearly. Furthermore, using another sample of distressed firms worth more dead than alive, I, along with a co-author, show that most of these firms continue operations long after the optimal exit time. The failure to liquidate costs the typical sample firm over three years 8.7% of its assets in lost earnings relative to the industry median. Finally, I find that capital market does not fully internalize the costs associated with managerial sub-optimal behaviors in the short run. Although the market disciplines managerial sub-optimal behaviors in the long run, the market disciplinary mechanisms may not be swift enough to forestall falling values for the various stakeholders of the firm. Succinctly, the findings in this dissertation suggest that managerial discretion and corporate financial flexibility entail real consequences for various firm dynamics. The traditional line of argument, ``Blame It on the Market," may not be well grounded, and firms need to carefully examine their investments and financing policies in good times to cushion against systematic shocks in bad times.

The purpose of this study was to determine what the critical factors are to an airline’s financial turmoil, leading ultimately to a bankruptcy filing. Over the past decade, the airline industries’ performance has been dismal, leading to 20 bankruptcy filings. As competition increases, it is crucial for airlines to know which core business areas are essential to success. This paper identifies 8 specific industry metrics that are used to compare airlines, revealing where certain airlines falter and others shine. Some of these metrics are later applied to a case study examining Trans World Airlines (TWA) and American Airlines (AA), highlighting the factors leading to TWA’s bankruptcy filing during the same time period American Airlines remained profitable. The results show that the labor inefficiency, operating inefficiencies, unsuccessful fuel hedging programs, and high long-term debt are critical factors leading to an airlines bankruptcy. Four recommendations for airlines are provided, namely: 1.) The cross-utilization of employees, 2.) Maintain Cost Discipline, 3.) Focus on Breakeven Load Factor, and 4.) Do not neglect the intangibles such as brand reputation.

In this dissertation, I try to advance our understanding of how managerial discretion and corporate financial flexibility affect various corporate outcomes such as failure, excessive (sub-optimal) continuation, firm growth and investment, in three novel ways. First, I show that the empirical effect of finance is not merely a misspecified real influence but rather that the financial structure of firms matter for firm growth and investment where the real effects of finance arise out of the imperfect substitutability between internal funding and external private credit. Second, using managerial mergers and acquisitions (M&A) investment decisions as an identification mechanism, I find that managerial discretion combined with corporate financial flexibility may lead to distortions in corporate investment and financing policies, and those distortions cost the various stakeholders of the firm dearly. Furthermore, using another sample of distressed firms worth more dead than alive, I, along with a co-author, show that most of these firms continue operations long after the optimal exit time. The failure to liquidate costs the typical sample firm over three years 8.7% of its assets in lost earnings relative to the industry median. Finally, I find that capital market does not fully internalize the costs associated with managerial sub-optimal behaviors in the short run. Although the market disciplines managerial sub-optimal behaviors in the long run, the market disciplinary mechanisms may not be swift enough to forestall falling values for the various stakeholders of the firm. Succinctly, the findings in this dissertation suggest that managerial discretion and corporate financial flexibility entail real consequences for various firm dynamics. The traditional line of argument, ``Blame It on the Market," may not be well grounded, and firms need to carefully examine their investments and financing policies in good times to cushion against systematic shocks in bad times.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2000. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 160-171). Also available on the Internet.