Darbe nagrinėjami įvairūs karo tematikos aspektai Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštystės laikų literatūroje ir XIX a. pradžios istoriografo Simono Daukanto veikaluose. Medžiaga surinkta iš Lietuvos metraščių (XV a. – XVI a. I p.), iš penkių XVI a. – XVII a. pradžios herojinių poemų, vieno poleminio publicistinio teksto, taip pat iš žymaus baroko epochos poeto Motiejaus Kazimiero Sarbievijaus (Matthias Casimirus Sarbievius) poezijos. Darbe tiriama, kaip skirtingų laikotarpių, skirtingų pažiūrų autoriai vertina patį karo reiškinį, analizuojami mūšių aprašymai, karo atnešamos nelaimės ir baisumai, aptariamas idealaus karvedžio portretas. Renesanso poetai karą stengėsi pavaizduoti kuo tikroviškiau, meniškiau. Jie karą vaizduoja kaip stichinę nelaimę, kaip katastrofą, atnešančią vargus ir bėdas. Išskiriamas vienintelis atvejis, kai karas yra pateisinamas – valstybės gynyba. Herojinių poemų autoriai kūrė karvedžio idealą: pasakodami apie realaus valstybės veikėjo darbus, išryškindavo tik tuos asmens bruožus, kurie buvo labiausiai vertinami Renesanso epochoje. M. K. Sarbievijus karą dažnai vaizduoja tarytum spektaklį. Jo vertinimu, karas - tai išmėginimas, parodantis tikrąją asmens vertę, taip pat galimybė pelnyti nemirtingą šlovę. Poetas išryškina pozityvų karo poveikį visuomenei, - ilgalaikės taikos metu stipriausioji visuomenės dalis aptingsta, ištyžta (degradacijos motyvas). S. Daukantas apie karą kalba pasitelkdamas kuo įvairesnę medžiagą – istorinių šaltinių duomenis, žodinę... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / The thesis analyzes various aspects of the theme of war in the literature of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the works of Simonas Daukantas, the historiographer at the beginning of the 19 century. The material used was taken from the Lithuanian Chronicles (the first half of the 15-16 centuries), five heroic poems of the beginning of 16-17 centuries, one polemic-publicistic text as well as poetry by famous Baroque poet Matthias Casimirus Sarbievius. The thesis investigates how authors from different periods and with different attitudes evaluate the same war event. Battle descriptions, distress and atrocities caused by war are analyzed, and the portrait of an ideal military leader is discussed. The Renaissance poets sought to depict war as realistically and artistically as possible. They described war as a natural disaster that brings trouble and misery. There is only one case when war is justified: defence of the State. The authors of the heroic poems were putting together an ideal of a military leader: when describing works of a real state official they highlighted only his characteristics that were valued during the Renaissance. M. C. Sarbievius often depicted war as a stage performance. He maintained that war was a challenge that revealed what a person was really worth; it was also a chance to gain immortal glory. The poet stressed the positive effects of war to society: during prolonged peace the strongest part of society slackened and became weaker (a motive of... [to full text]

The cruel nature of war gives reason for its study. A crucial component of this research aims to uncover the reasons behind victory and defeat. Winning, after all, is the central attraction of organized violence. Unfortunately, political science efforts in this direction have been rare, and the few theories on offer (numerical preponderance, technology theory, and proficiency) are infrequently tested against the empirical record. This dissertation therefore not only subjected the main theories of battlefield victory to a systematic test against the historical record, but also did so with a dataset more comprehensive and with greater chronological breadth than any other in the political science literature. The range of battles included runs from Megiddo (1469 BC) to Wanat (2008). Such a historically ambitious undertaking is unfortunately fraught with a series of methodological concerns. However, fears regarding the reliability of these historical statistics are best allayed by the assortment of historiographical techniques that have been used to eliminate the more dubious estimations. Concerns regarding data validity are similarly met with a clear delineation of methodological scope: current data is both western-centric and fails to speak to combat in pre-agrarian settings; the conclusions drawn below therefore keep a recognition of these limitations in mind. Ultimately, the chief findings of this study are that neither Napoleon’s ‘big battalions’ nor armies boasting technological supremacy over their rivals are assured any guarantee of battlefield success. This result is a powerful blow to both mainstream realist theory (whose power calculations rely on raw aggregations like army size) and Western defence planners (who have predicated their strategies on the belief that technology is the chief underpinning of victory). That being said, the most compelling causal explanation for battlefield victory, combat proficiency, appears subject to a crucial caveat: even the most talented armies can be ground into dust. This finding will provide little comfort to gifted armies that find themselves involved in a costly and prolonged campaign, such as Canada and America in Afghanistan. Lastly, this project’s contribution should be seen as not only theoretical and practical in nature, but also as providing a methodological toolkit and empirical resource of use to anyone subsequently interested in tracing the evolution of organized violence over time. In short, this project is summation of how political science thinks about the most basic aspect of war: battle. As the findings of this dissertation suggest, what is distinctly troublesome is that our existing theories and assumptions about who wins and why appear to bear little resemblance to reality. If anything, this dissertation calls attention to the urgent need for further research into the matter of battle victory.

The Battle Cruiser was the result of the naval arms race and the realisation that England's undisputed mastery of the seas was over. The ship was the next logical step in the evolution of the Cruiser. Historians have generally considered this type of warship as an expensive mistake. While it was not as successful as its creators might have hoped, neither was it the disaster claimed by many of its critics. Once the British chose to build these ships, not only did they have no choice but to keep building more of them, but they also had to build larger, more powerful and expensive Battle Cruisers in order to maintain the lead in the arms race with Germany.

Photocopy of typescript. / Bibliography: leaves 345-351. / Microfiche. / vii, 351 leaves, bound 28 cm

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 112-120). / vi, 120 leaves, bound maps 29 cm

Thesis (B.A.Hons.) -- University of Adelaide, Department of History, 1980.

Thesis--Utrecht. / "Stellingen" inserted at end.

Thesis (Ed. D.)--West Virginia University, 2002. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 145 p. : ill. (some col.). Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 65-78).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Halle, 1867.

Thesis (M.M.A.S.) -- U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1985. / "85-3250"--Cover. Includes bibliographical references (p. 152-158). Available electronically via the Combined Arms Research Digital Library.