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This qualitative case study aims to provide an understanding of people-environment relationships in El Naranjal, an expanding informal settlement in Caracas, Venezuela, against a backdrop of an episode of exceptionally intense rainfall that affected the north of the country in 2010. It is argued that the vulnerability of informal settlements to environmental risks such as weather-related events is shaped not only by the socio-economic particularities of the context in which these emerge, but also by the ways in which the inhabitants of these settlements experience, conceive and relate to their local environment. People-environment relationships are understood as multiple, complex and contextual, where environment comprises the physical, interpersonal, social and cultural aspects of the context that people interact with. The study demonstrates that an in-depth understanding of these relationships can be gained through exploring residents' experiences of place and communities in El Naranjal. Over a fieldwork period of eight months, data were gathered using in-depth and walking interviews, participant observation and group activities. Environment and environmental risks such as the impacts of rainfall were understood, experienced and related to differently by individuals with diverse needs and agendas. Residents' diverse experiences and responses are shaped by pre-existing issues of rapid irregular land occupation, socio-spatial segregation, poor infrastructure, lack of participation and government support within the communities of El Naranjal. This underlines some of the gaps between national policy-making on environmental, land tenure, risk management and community participation matters and residents' understandings and experiences of issues of their places and communities. Thus, this study emphasises the need to approach environmental risks as adding to, and amplifying the complex issues that residents of informal settlements deal with locally on a day-to-day basis. In doing so, it challenges views of informal settlement communities as homogeneous, illegal and paralysed by poverty. Instead, it highlights their central role in the making of cities, as well as their heterogeneity and capacity to innovate in the face of mounting risks.

This thesis investigated whether a fragmented assemblage of fossilized Homo sapiens remains collected from Palau; Micronesia represents a population exhibiting a case of insular dwarfing. The earliest occupation of Palau is ca. 4000 YBP, and the fossil assemblage studied here dates between 2900 – 1400 YBP, thus providing a relatively short time in which body size reduction, due to insular dwarfism could occur. There are well known cases, in both the modern and fossil context, where insular dwarfism and body size reduction is known to occur in human populations that are isolated, but the results of this reduction are seen over a much longer period (e.g., tens of thousands of years). Metric dimensions of the humerus, radius, ulna, femur, tibia, and fibula and os coxa are quantified in order to evaluate other potential insular dwarfs in fossil hominin assemblages, such as Homo floresiensis. Previous studies have shown that the Palau archipelago has remained relatively isolated from human contact due to the surrounding currents, providing ideal conditions for insular dwarfism to occur. Comparing measurements taken on populations encompassing a reasonable range of human variation, this study quantified and compared the Palauan measurements and joint ratios to determine which variables might differentiate among these population groups, thus indicating traits potentially uniquely signalling a reduction in human body size. Disproportionate joint sizes were observed in the humerus, ulna, tibia, and femur of the Palauan sample. While individual measurements from the Palau sample all fall comfortably within the range of measurements taken from other small-bodied human individuals, the articular surfaces of Palauan specimens do not resemble those from other well-established, small-bodied insular populations. As the articular surfaces are smaller relative to the epiphyseal diameters and may be a reflection of the relatively short time in which the reduction has taken place. Morphologically the Palauan population exhibits small orbits, a large interorbital distance, an inflated glabella region and protruding supraorbital tori. A reduction in the mandible may account for the overcrowding of teeth observed in the dentition. The Palauan individuals have disproportionately large maxillary teeth. The mandibular dentition, however, varies: the incisors, canine and first molars are large, while reduction is seen most easily in the premolars and the second molar. This dental reduction is coupled with significant differences between the cervico-enamel junctions for these teeth and the corresponding crown measurements. Large teeth, inflated glabella, and protruding supraorbital tori may be an indication of a founding population. These traits are all found in Australomelanesian populations, and it is thus possible that the Palauan population under study originated from Melanesia (e.g. New Guinea or South East Asia). Application of the present study to Homo floresiensis, a fossil hominin suggested by some authors to have undergone insular dwarfing, reveals that while H. floresiensis is small for some measurements, most fall within the range of the small-bodied comparative sample from Palau. The stature of H. floresiensis is not unusually small and falls within the ranges of the comparative sample used here. The only comparison that can be made for joint size is that both the Palauan and H. floresiensis femoral heads are small and both exhibit the same disproportionate dimensions of the proximal tibia. As potential body size reduction is possibly responsible for the Palauan traits, the similarity in joint proportions may be attributed to insular dwarfing when the population first became isolated, as these joint irregularities are not seen in established insular dwarfs (Andaman and Nicobarese). The differences present in the measurements obtained for all the small-bodied samples examined suggests that even though insular populations may present as small-bodied, the island populations (fossil or extant) should be viewed as a case by case study. Isolation, life history, founding population (genetics) and environmental conditions all affect population body size over time, but to assume that all isolated populations will decrease body size in the same way is incorrect. What is seen in Palauan specimens is likely the adaptive responses of a isolated population from Melanesia, resulting in the insular dwarfism observed. By examining the available aspects of this insular population and found that it was consistent in reflecting size and proportions of small-bodied populations.

Thesis (M.Arch)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Architecture, 1977. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ROTCH / 2 leaves numbered 102. / Bibliography : leaves 150-151. / by Barbara Putnam. / M.Arch

What is and should be the scope of our appeals to human rights? To what desiderata should our theory of human rights adhere? On my proposal, human rights (i) are inherently relational, and (ii) play an important background role in our broader normative practices. Human rights derive from a foundational community relationship that human beings stand in with one another qua human beings. They are not, as naturalistic conceptions have it, grounded in the possession of any specific capacities such as high levels of rationality. They are also not, as political or practical conceptions claim, grounded in more specific relationships such as those between state and citizen. Unlike the current approaches, my relational approach offers both a non-derivative justification for recognizing all living human beings as human rights bearers and all human agents as duty bearers. Rights holder status and duty bearer status both have their source in this basic relationship shared by human beings. As such, neither precedes the other. The relationship gives rise to both. As an upshot, the view accounts for a variety of cases where we ordinarily do not invoke human rights even when their content is relevant, such as in cases of violent crimes or in interpersonal relationships. In turning to these examples, I consider not merely under what conditions human rights exist, but also under what conditions they ought to be invoked. Thus while they have a universal scope, we need not always appeal to them as human rights in order to fulfill them. My inquiry into the grounds of human rights begins with a paradox that emerges for both naturalistic and political conceptions of human rights. Namely, even though human rights have their place in social and political relations, they are often conceived in ways that are blind to the basic role that these relations play in constituting them. While they inhere in individual human beings, the function and content of human rights is largely dependent on facts about human relationships. This paradox is particularly striking in the case of anti-discrimination rights, which many naturalistic views struggle to include as these rights derive not from any particular capacity, but from a comparative egalitarian premise. Instead, a relational view can point directly toward the damaging effects of severely unequal social attitudes–of failures to recognize one another as fellow human beings. Despite these differences, there are ‘natural’ and ‘political’ elements to my proposal as well, though both notions get reinterpreted. The natural, insofar as it figures in my account, is the relational framework in which individual human beings live their lives. The political consists in these overlapping networks of social relations. Thus the natural and the political coincide, and in effect my approach falls in neither of the two traditional camps. Instead, by focusing on the relationship between all human beings and conceiving of this relationship as both natural and social/political, I aim to formulate a genuinely new account of human rights.

張銘豪. / "2001年9月" / 論文 (哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2001. / 附參考文獻. / 附中英文摘要. / "2001 nian 9 yue" / Zhang Minghao. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2001. / Fu can kao wen xian. / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / 引言 --- p.3 / Chapter 第一章 --- p.6 / Chapter <一> --- 理解人類之模式 --- p.6 / Chapter (1) --- 反對問題a的有效性 --- p.6 / Chapter (2) --- 對反對問題a有效性之回應 --- p.8 / Chapter <二> --- 問題B --- p.11 / Chapter (1) --- 對問題β第一個預設的質疑 --- p.11 / Chapter (2) --- 對問題β第二個預設的質疑 --- p.19 / Chapter (a) --- 本納´Ø威廉士（Bernard Williams)的論証 --- p.20 / Chapter (b) --- 歷史研究的獨一無二論証(Argument of Uniqueness) --- p.22 / Chapter <三> --- 以詮釋學理解人類初探 --- p.26 / Chapter (1) --- 詮釋活動的特點 --- p.27 / Chapter (a) --- 對象是融貫的或缺融貫的 --- p.27 / Chapter (b) --- 能把對象的意含與傳遞意含的載體作出區別 --- p.27 / Chapter (c) --- 詮釋活動是預設著由某主體開展或爲某主體而開展的 --- p.28 / Chapter (2) --- 日常生活中對人的行爲的說明 --- p.30 / Chapter (a) --- 經驗性意義（experiential meaning) --- p.30 / Chapter (i) --- 意義是對主體有的意義（meaning is for a subject) --- p.31 / Chapter (ii) --- 意義是某東西底意義(meaning is of something ) --- p.31 / Chapter (iii) --- 意義是某個場域中的意義（things only have meaning in a field ) --- p.32 / Chapter (b) --- 經驗性意義之例示 --- p.32 / Chapter (3) --- 日常生活中對人的行爲之說明帶有詮釋活動的特點 --- p.34 / Chapter <四> --- BA原則 --- p.36 / Chapter <五> --- 第一章結語 --- p.38 / Chapter 第二章 --- p.39 / Chapter < 一 > --- 掃除現代哲學的基本偏見 --- p.40 / Chapter (1) --- 現代哲學的基本偏見 --- p.40 / Chapter (2) --- 對現代哲學基本偏見之反駁 --- p.44 / Chapter <二> --- 正面地建立「人是一種自我詮釋的動物」的論旨 --- p.50 / Chapter (1) --- 宣稱 I- 我們某一些情感具有「意¨إ‘歸屬」的特性 --- p.50 / Chapter (2) --- 宣稱II-這類情感中的意¨إ‘，其中某一些帶有「主體指涉」的特性 --- p.55 / Chapter (a) --- 對羞恥感進行分析以揭示意¨إ‘帶有主體指涉的特性 --- p.57 / Chapter (b) --- 主體指涉的意¨إ‘之兩個特性 --- p.59 / Chapter (i) --- 意¨إ‘是一種情感詞彙 --- p.59 / Chapter (ii) --- 「主體指涉」不等同於「自我指涉（self-referring) 」 --- p.60 / Chapter (3) --- 宣稱III-主體指涉特性的情感是讓我們得以理解「人之爲人」的基礎 --- p.60 / Chapter (a) --- 重要底界域 horizon of significant --- p.60 / Chapter (b) --- 強式評估 Strong-evaluation --- p.63 / Chapter (4) --- 宣稱 IV- 這類情感是由我們自身所接納的「陳構」所構成的 --- p.64 / Chapter (5) --- "宣稱V-這些陳構,又可被稱爲詮釋，其建立需要語言" --- p.66 / Chapter <三> --- 第二章結語 --- p.67 / Chapter 第三章 --- p.69 / Chapter <一> --- 自我證釋、自我理解與實踐理性 --- p.69 / Chapter <二> --- 麥肯泰爾論傳統的合理性 --- p.70 / Chapter (1) --- 問題γ --- p.70 / Chapter (2) --- 解答問題γ的進路 --- p.71 / Chapter (3) --- 傅統的合理性 --- p.71 / Chapter (4) --- 傅統合理性論旨的對象同一性問題 --- p.73 / Chapter (5) --- 解答傅統合理性論旨的對象同一性問題 --- p.75 / Chapter (6) --- 以真理底符合論來理解傅統的進步 --- p.19 / Chapter <三> --- 第三章結語 --- p.87 / 結語 --- p.89

Wordsworth¡¦s Ecological Concepts Abstract The purpose of this thesis is to explore Wordsworth¡¦s concepts of ecology, with emphasis on the relationship between human community and the natural world. Since ecology is closely related to man and nature, it is necessary to discuss man¡¦s relations with the natural world. In Wordsworth¡¦s works, we see many ecological concepts such as man¡¦s adaptation to his habitats, the mutual relationship between people and nature, and the catastrophic results of people¡¦s intervention with the natural world; however, his ecological ideas are often overlooked by critics. Therefore, in this thesis, I would like to examine Wordsworth¡¦s works from an ecological point of view. In the first chapter, I discuss Wordsworth¡¦s ecological concepts, with emphasis on how human beings can live in harmony with the living environment. My discussion shows how Wordsworth advocates a harmonious relationship between man and nature and how he insists that man should be an engaged participant in his interaction with the natural environment. In the second chapter, I discuss Wordsworth¡¦s reaction to the changing living environment. I will show the changes in his living environment and examine Wordsworth¡¦s reaction to these changes. Through my discussion of his ecological concepts, I will claim that Wordsworth is an ecologist who understands the complex relationship between human beings and their dwelling places and who believes that the destruction of the natural world must impoverish human beings.