A presente dissertação expõe o ambiente em que o Problema de Merton é construído e, baseando-se na bibliografia apresentada, constrói exemplos em softwares cujas especificidades podem colaborar na clareza da resolução. O software Matlab engloba as soluções numéricas, enquanto o software Maple é responsável pela solução de equações diferenciais ordinárias e parciais de forma simbólica. Apresenta-se modificações do Problema de Merton original como exercícios para melhor esclarecer os diferentes parâmetros abordados. Na seção final é apresentada a solução de viscosidade, uma alternativa quando a função valor não apresenta características desejáveis para a análise apresentada. / This dissertation explicit the environment which Merton’s problem is built, according to the presented bibliography, exemples are built in softwares whose specificity might help to clarify the solution. The Matlab software embraces numeric solutions, while Maple software is appropriate to solve ordinary and parcial differential equations in symbolic form. Some modifications are presented to Merton’s Problem as exercise to improve understanding on the variations adopted. On final section, viscosity solutions are presented as an alternative solution for when the value function does not possess the desirables properties that allow the analysis on focus.

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(農学) / 甲第22488号 / 農博第2392号 / 新制||農||1076(附属図書館) / 学位論文||R2||N5268(農学部図書室) / 京都大学大学院農学研究科地域環境科学専攻 / (主査)教授 藤原 正幸, 教授 村上 章, 准教授 宇波 耕一 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Agricultural Science / Kyoto University / DFAM

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(農学) / 甲第20006号 / 農博第2190号 / 新制||農||1045(附属図書館) / 学位論文||H28||N5015(農学部図書室) / 33102 / 京都大学大学院農学研究科地域環境科学専攻 / (主査)教授 藤原 正幸, 教授 村上 章, 准教授 宇波 耕一 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Agricultural Science / Kyoto University / DFAM

Merton’s Optimal Investment-Consumption Problem is a classic optimization problem in finance. It aims to find the optimal controls for a portfolio with both risky and risk-less assets, inorder to maximize an investor’s utility function. One of the controls is the optimal allocationof wealth invested in a risky asset and the other control is the consumption rate. The problemis solved by using Dynamic Programming and the related Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.One of the disadvantages of the original problem is the consideration of constant volatility. Inthis thesis, we extend Merton’s problem considering the Grzelak-Oosterlee-Van Veeren modelthat describes the dynamics of a risky asset with stochastic volatility and stochastic interestrate. We derive the related Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman for Merton’s problem considering theGrzelak-Oosterlee-Van Veeren model. We simulate the controls from Merton’s problem intwo different cases, one case where the volatility and interest rate are stochastic, following theGOVV-model. In the other case, the volatility and interest rate are assumed to be constant, asin Merton’s problem. The results obtained from simulations show that the case with stochasticvolatility and interest gave the same results as the case where the volatility and the interest ratewere assumed to be constant.

In this thesis we study the optimal stochastic control problem of the drift of a Lévy process. We show that, for a broad class of Lévy processes, the partial integro-differential Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the value function admits classical solutions and that control policies exist in feedback form. We then explore the class of Lévy processes that satisfy the requirements of the theorem, and find connections between the uniform integrability requirement and the notions of the score function and Fisher information from information theory. Finally we present three different numerical implementations of the control problem: a traditional dynamic programming approach, and two iterative approaches, one based on a finite difference scheme and the other on the Fourier transform. / text

>Magister Scientiae - MSc / Bank asset management mainly involves profit maximization through invest- ment in loans giving high returns on loans, investment in securities for reducing risk and providing liquidity needs. In particular, commercial banks grant loans to creditors who pay high interest rates and are not likely to default on their loans. Furthermore, the banks purchase securities with high returns and low risk. In addition, the banks attempt to lower risk by diversifying their asset portfolio. The main categories of assets held by banks are loans, treasuries (bonds issued by the national treasury), reserves and intangible assets. In this mini-thesis, we solve an optimal asset allocation problem in banking under the mean-variance frame work. The dynamics of the different assets are modelled as geometric Brownian motions, and our optimization problem is of the mean- variance type. We assume the Basel II regulations on banking supervision. In this contribution, the bank funds are invested into loans and treasuries with the main objective being to obtain an optimal return on the bank asset port- folio given a certain risk level. There are two main approaches to portfolio optimization, which are the so called martingale method and Hamilton Jacobi Bellman method. We shall follow the latter. As is common in portfolio op- timization problems, we obtain an explicit solution for the value function in the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation. Our approach to the portfolio prob- lem is similar to the presentation in the paper [Hojgaard, B., Vigna, E., 2007. Mean-variance portfolio selection and efficient frontier for defined contribution pension schemes. ISSN 1399-2503. On-line version ISSN 1601-7811]. We pro- vide much more detail and we make the application to banking. We illustrate our findings by way of numerical simulations.

Optimal control problems can in many cases become complicated and difficult to solve. One particular class of difficult control problems to solve are singular control problems. Standard methods for solving optimal control are discussed showing why those methods are difficult to apply to singular control problems. Then standard methods for solving singular control problems are discussed including why the standard methods can be difficult and often impossible to apply without having to resort to numerical techniques. Finally, an alternative method to solving a class of singular optimal control problems is given for a specific class of problems.

In this dissertation, certain problems of stochastic optimal control and relevant analysis of random vibrations are considered. Dynamic Programming approach is used to find an optimal control law for a linear single-degree-of-freedom system subjected to Gaussian white-noise excitation. To minimize a system's mean response energy, a bounded in magnitude control force is applied. This approach reduces the problem of finding the optimal control law to a problem of finding a solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) partial differential equation. A solution to this partial differential equation (PDE) is obtained by developed 'hybrid' solution method. The application of bounded in magnitude control law will always introduce a certain type of nonlinearity into the system's stochastic equation of motion. These systems may be analyzed by the Energy Balance method, which introduced and developed in this dissertation. Comparison of analytical results obtained by the Energy Balance method and by stochastic averaging method with numerical results is provided. The comparison of results indicates that the Energy Balance method is more accurate than the well-known stochastic averaging method.

This thesis focuses on optimization on a generic objective function based on reflected Brownian motion (RBM). We investigate in several approaches including the partial differential equation approach where we write our objective function in terms of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation using the dynamic programming principle and the gradient descent approach where we use two different gradient estimators. We provide extensive numerical results with the gradient descent approach and we discuss the difficulties and future study opportunities for this problem.

Questa tesi è una raccolta di tre articoli riguardanti l’economia dell’informazione. Il primo articolo riguarda i possibili effetti negativi delle elezioni sul benessere degli elettori. Infatti, il controllo ottimo nei confronti di un politico dipende in modo non banale dalla relazione tra effetto disciplinante, effetto di selezione e effetto di riduzione della rendita. Il risultato è che un eccessivo controllo nei confronti di un politico può ridurre il benessere sociale. Il secondo articolo analizza un modello di competizione elettorale nel quale l’abilità del politico è sconosciuta anche al politico stesso oltre che agli elettori. L’analisi è in tempo continuo e sviluppata mediante tecniche di programmazione dinamica e di filtraggio. Le credenze sull’abilità vengono aggiornate secondo la regola di Bayes tramite l’osservazione del processo diffusivo che descrive il valore del settore pubblico. Il politico trae utilità da una rendita che è però inferiore in presenza di una scadenza elettorale. Il terzo articolo descrive una relazione principale-agente in tempo continuo dove l’output è rappresentato da un processo diffusivo il cui drift è determinato dallo sforzo dell’agente, che il principale non osserva, e dall’abilità dell’agente, che non è osservata nemmeno dall’agente stesso. Vengono analizzati sia gli incentivi espliciti dati dal contratto che gli incentivi impliciti legati ai career-concerns. L’analisi è sviluppata in tempo continuo; vengono applicate tecniche di programmazione dinamica e di filtraggio. / This thesis is a collection of three essays about information economics. The first essay studies the possible negative effects of elections on voters’ welfare. In fact, the optimal control of politicians depends on the interplay of disciplining, selection and rent-shrinking effects in a non-trivial way. We show that too much control on the politician may reduce social welfare. The second essay studies an agency model of electoral competition where the incumbent’s ability is unknown to the voters as well as to the politician herself. The analysis is developed in a continuous-time stochastic framework using dynamic programming techniques. Competence is unobservable to everyone and learned over time in a Bayesian fashion through the observation of the value of the public sector. Politicians can divert resources being in office thus reducing the economy wealth but this rent is lower (all other things the same) with an electoral constraint. The third essay describes a continuous-time principal-agent model in which the output is a diffusion process whose drift is determined by the agent’s unobserved effort and by manager’s competence (it is assumed symmetric information about it). We study separately both explicit incentives arising from the contract and implicit incentives arising from career concerns.. All the analysis is developed in a continuous-time stochastic framework; we apply dynamic programming and filtering techniques.