Proefschrift--Utrecht--Rijksuniversiteit, 1991. / Bibliogr p. [154]-168. Index. Résumé en anglais.

Habili.-schr.--Philosophische Fakultät--Universität zu Köln, 1996. / Bibliogr. p. 313-333.

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The aim of this Thesis is to determine the value of the company: Rodinný pivovar Bernard, a.s. especially in the case of sale in the day 31st december 2010. The practical part of the thesis focuses on analysis of the company itself and its production structure and financial analysis. Other part of the thesis focuses on the micro-enviroment, including the Czech beermarket and on the analysis of the czech market as a whole. The actual calculation is based on the assumption that the firm does not increase its production capacity and that the sale is concluded at faktory's state at 31st december 2010. The financial plan was determined by the forecasts of the author. The actual value of the equity is calculated on the basis of the Discounted Free Cash Flow method based on two phase DFCFE.

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<p> This dissertation examines Bernard Lonergan' s understanding of value, its assumptions and its development, for the sake of determining the role of human nature and human historicity in the experience of value. The categories of nature and history reflect a specifically modem form of the long-standing question of the relationship between physis and nomos- i.e., nature and convention, or 'nature and nurture'-for modernity has made us accutely aware of the historicity of cultural conventions. We ask of Lonergan: how or to what extent is the experience of value determined by human nature, and how or to what extent is it historically conditioned?</p> <p> To understand Lonergan' s position one must appreciate both the difference and the continuity between his earlier and later thought. Lonergan' s earlier thought reflects a rather Kantian fonnalistic account of value as the rational good, but his later thought embraces Scheler' s non-fonnal, material account of value-i.e., the good is an object of natural appetite-a position in which affectivity plays a role in revealing value. In spite of this development, there yet remains an underlying unity: there is a fundamental opposition of affect and intellect that precludes the possibility of understanding value as both rationally and materially good. Lonergan associates affect with natural spontaneity, and intellect with the deliberate:, progressive dynamic of history. Because of this, in his earlier work he presents value as rationally, and therefore historically, determined; yet in his ma1ure position value is grasped primarily in affective apprehensions, which are ahistorical intuitions, grounded in human nature and the 'reasons of the heart'.</p> <p> In response, it will be argued that this dichotomy of feeling and rationality can be transcended without sacrificing Lonergan' s account of self-transcendence.</p> / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

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