Thesis advisor: Frederick G. Lawrence / This dissertation seeks to answer the question, arising from Bernard Lonergan's 1972 lectures on philosophy of God and systematic theology, of why he thinks philosophy of God, or natural theology, should be included within the functional specialty Systematics. The author argues that a key to the answer is an analysis of the concrete operations performed by philosophers as they pursue the question of God. Relevant to the distinction between and unity of philosophy of God and Systematics are both natural knowledge of God, which consists of affirmations and negations that can be immanently generated, and supernatural knowledge, which consists of affirmations and negations that cannot be immanently generated and thus require belief in divine revelation in order to be made by humans in this life. There is a way in which Systematics presupposes truths unknowable without revelation that the natural knowledge of philosophy does not, since Systematics includes hypotheses that attempt to account for how those truths could be so, doing so in a way that goes beyond what natural knowledge alone provides. However, even if philosophy results in natural knowledge, when the philosopher is Christian, it often performatively presupposes supernatural knowledge of revelation inasmuch as its inquiry into the question of God often in fact is preceded by and originates from the philosopher's horizon of Christian faith, which is partially constituted by affirmations of truths unknowable without revelation. Performatively, Christian philosophers often seek to understand the Christian God in whom they already believe. This explains Lonergan's practical recommendation to transfer philosophy of God to the theology department, as well as his comment in the essay "Dimensions of Meaning" that once philosophy becomes "existential and historical...the very possibility of the old distinction between philosophy and theology vanishes." Sublated by Systematics, philosophy of God is the aspect of faith seeking understanding that results in analogical understanding and affirmation of God as an unrestricted act of understanding, affirming, and loving. This knowledge provides an explanatory (though analogical) understanding of the God in whom Christians believe through faith. It is even included in theological hypotheses, such as Lonergan's possibly relevant explanation of the Trinity, which takes its starting point from the psychological analogy in which the one unrestricted act of understanding gives rise to a judgment of value and decision. Philosophy also contributes to the control of meaning in systematic theology by ruling out explanations of revelation that are incompatible with natural knowledge. Incorporating philosophy of God into the functional specialty Systematics such that philosophy of God attains "its proper significance" and "effectiveness," the theologian can answer the question of God in a more complete way than is possible through philosophy alone. The dissertation begins in Chapter 1 by giving an account of the distinction between natural and supernatural knowledge of God--as well as the more basic distinction between nature and supernature--in a way that attempts to be adequate to the "the third stage of meaning," in which metaphysical distinctions must have a basis in self-knowledge and self-appropriation. Chapter 2 then explains Lonergan's approach to philosophy of God as that which results in natural knowledge, as in chapter 19 of Insight. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the functional specialty Systematics, which pursues understanding of truths affirmed in the light of faith, including truths unknowable without revelation. Chapter 4 discusses why philosophy of God, when considered in terms of its concrete performance by the Christian philosopher, often is preceded by and emerges from a horizon of faith (and belief) and so is an exercise in faith seeking understanding, with its natural knowledge contributing to Systematics' task of explaining the conditions for the possibility of truths unknowable without revelation. The Conclusion raises and begins to answer further pertinent questions, such as whether Lonergan's understanding of philosophy of God as Systematics holds for non-Christian philosophers. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Lim Wai-Man Jenifer. / Thesis submitted in: December 2002. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 102-105). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgements --- p.iii / INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter 1. --- The Problem of Personal Identity --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- Personal Identity: A Review --- p.3 / Chapter 3. --- Different Versions of the Theory of Personal Identity --- p.6 / Chapter 3.1 --- Different Versions of the Physical Theory --- p.6 / Chapter 3.2 --- Different Versions of the Memory theory --- p.8 / Chapter 4. --- Cases of Exchanging Bodies --- p.14 / Chapter 5. --- Conclusion --- p.17 / Chapter CHAPTER ONE --- THE REDUPLICATION ARGUMENT --- p.19 / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.19 / Chapter 2. --- Shoemaker's Brownson Case --- p.21 / Chapter 3. --- The Reduplication Argument --- p.22 / Chapter 4. --- "Memory Claims, Bodily Presence and Reincarnation" --- p.27 / Chapter 5. --- Objections to the Reduplication Argument --- p.31 / Chapter 5.1 --- The Two Cases are Different --- p.31 / Chapter 5.2 --- A Counter-Example by Robert Coburn --- p.33 / Chapter 5.3 --- A Too High Standard Set by the Reduplication Argument --- p.36 / Chapter 6. --- Conclusion --- p.38 / Chapter CHAPTER TWO --- THE NONDUPLICATION ARGUMENT --- p.40 / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.40 / Chapter 2. --- Story 1: The Memory Theorist's Understanding of 'Exchanging Bodies' --- p.41 / Chapter 3. --- Story 2: Williams' Analysis of the Experiment --- p.44 / Chapter 4. --- Conventionalist Decision and the Best Candidate Theory --- p.49 / Chapter 5. --- Conceptual Undecidability --- p.51 / Chapter 6. --- The Relationships between Criteria and Perspectives --- p.52 / Chapter 7. --- Conclusion: 'Exchanging Bodies' as an Artificial Neatness --- p.55 / Chapter CHAPTER THREE --- PARFIT'S THEORY --- p.56 / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.56 / Chapter 2. --- The Nature of Personal Identity --- p.57 / Chapter 2.1 --- The Basic Teletransportation Case --- p.60 / Chapter 2.2 --- The Branch-Line Teletransportation Case --- p.62 / Chapter 2.3 --- Physical Spectrum and Combined Spectrum --- p.65 / Chapter 2.4 --- Personal Identity: A Conceptual or Linguistic Issue --- p.68 / Chapter 3. --- The (Un)-Importance of Personal Identity --- p.71 / Chapter 3.1 --- Cases of Brain Operation --- p.71 / Chapter 3.2 --- Cases of Duplication --- p.73 / Chapter 3.3 --- Survival and its Moral Significance --- p.76 / Chapter 4. --- Conclusion --- p.78 / Chapter CHAPTER FOUR --- CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF ONE'S IDENTITY --- p.79 / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.79 / Chapter 2. --- The Dependence on External Facts Versus the Principle of Intrinsicness --- p.81 / Chapter 2.1 --- The Non-Branching Memory Theory --- p.81 / Chapter 2.2 --- The Best Candidate Theory --- p.86 / Chapter 3. --- The Importance (or Unimportance) of Personal Identity --- p.92 / Chapter 3.1 --- Unimportance: ´بPersonal Identity' as a Linguistic Issue? --- p.92 / Chapter 3.2 --- Importance: Subjective Linkage of the First Person --- p.94 / Chapter 4. --- Conclusion --- p.98 / References --- p.102

L'objectif général de ce mémoire est d'étudier la présence animale dans l'oeuvre du dramaturge français Bernard-Marie Koltès. Cette expression nous sera indispensable, car elle décrit autant le peuplement animal des textes de ce dernier que la présence animale à l'intérieur de ses personnages, c'est-à-dire leur animalité. L'étude de la présence animale est féconde, puisqu'elle nous révèle à la fois l'idéologie défendue par Koltès, en plus de mettre en lumière un type très particulier de subjectivation de ses personnages littéraires: les devenirs-animaux. Les objectifs spécifiques de ce mémoire sont, premièrement, de cataloguer les divers animaux présents dans notre corpus littéraire. Nous effectuerons ce repérage dans le but de dresser le bestiaire sommaire du dramaturge. Cet exercice nous permettra ensuite de caractériser les animaux koltésiens, avant de les comparer à ceux qui constituaient le bestiaire littéraire traditionnel. Par l'entremise de cette comparaison, nous dévoilerons l'idéologie et certaines valeurs défendues par Koltès. Le deuxième objectif spécifique de ce mémoire est d'étudier, de manière théorique cette fois, l'animal en le traitant comme un processus de subjectivation des êtres. En effet, la rencontre, que nous pourrions quailifier de noce contre nature, entre les animaux et les sujets koltésiens engage ces derniers dans des phénomènes singuliers que Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari nomment des devenirs-animaux. En étudiant ceux-ci à partir des théories de Deleuze et Guattari, nous ferons la jointure entre l'identité des personnages du dramaturge et l'animalité. Par ailleurs, nous décrirons certaines voies qu'empruntent les devenirs pour se manifester, en analysant les cas particuliers de trois personnages de Koltès. Le troisième et dernier objectif spécifique de ce mémoire est d'aborder les conséquences affectives et perceptives -les affects et percepts -des devenirs-animaux chez les sujets devenant. Nous montrerons que les devenirs-animaux, en entraînant les personnages dans une autre dimension ontologique, suscitent en eux une intense circulation d'affects et de percepts de nature animale. Ces affects et percepts animaux déshumanisent les personnages qui se transforment en des animaux en puissance. La présence animale chez Koltès constitue un rhizome au sens deleuzien et guattarien du terme. Le rhizome conçu par le dramaturge compte trois plateaux qui correspondent à chacun des chapitres de notre mémoire. D'un chapitre à l'autre, la topique de l'animalité suit un mouvement de sémiose, c'est-à-dire que sa signification connaît des avancées. C'est dire que le rhizome koltésien est bien davantage qu'une thématique; il est plutôt une structure signifiante complexe et complète en elle-même. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Affect, Animal, Animalité, Bestiaire, Devenir-animal.

Dissertation--Kunstgeschichte--Universität Zürich, 2005. / Bibliogr. p. 335-343.

Reproduction de : Thèse de doctorat : Science politique : Lyon 2 : 2005. / Titre provenant de l'écran-titre. Bibliogr. Index.

Mémoire d'étude diplôme de conservateur des bibliothèques : Bibliothéconomie : Villeurbanne, ENSSIB : 2004.

Thesis (M.A.)--Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2001. / Bibliography: leaves [170]-182.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Religious diversity has become a central topic in the philosophy of religion. This study proposes a methodological approach to the topic by exploring the division of tasks set out by Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984). Lonergan’s methodological framework, which he called functional specialization, provides a generic differentiation of tasks, each of which is central to the overall project of understanding religious diversity. This thesis explores the relevance and utility of functional specialization as a methodological approach to religious diversity in the philosophy of religion. [...] / La diversité religieuse est aujourd’hui une préoccupation centrale dans l’étude de la philosophie des religions. Cette étude propose une démarche méthodologique en explorant la division des tâches mise de l’avant par Bernard Lonergan (1904- 1984). La méthodologie employée par celui-ci, qu’il nomma « spécialisation fonctionnelle», permet d’établir une séparation générique des tâches, chacune d’elles jouant un rôle important dans la compréhension globale de la diversité religieuse. Cette étude illustré la pertinence et l’utilité de la spécialisation fonctionnelle en tant qu’approche méthodologique dans la philosophie des religions, et particulièrement dans l’étude de la diversité religieuse. [...]

A wealth of recent scholarship has focused on interreligious dialogue as a resource for the transformation of religious conflicts. Such studies often mention the importance of discoveries or 'insights' as key factors in successful dialogue processes. However, few authors have devoted sustained attention to understanding how insights contribute to transforming conflict dynamics during interfaith dialogues. / The present study draws on the cognitional theory of Canadian philosopher Bernard Lonergan as a framework for exploring the significance of insights in interreligious dialogue processes. The study begins with an overview of representative perspectives on learning in interfaith dialogue and conflict transformation. Following this, I offer a detailed analysis of Lonergan's work on insight in understanding, judgment, and practical learning, highlighting the important role that insights play in structuring interpretation and communication in dialogue situations. / Drawing on Lonergan's theoretical framework, I explore how insights are implicated in shaping communication in dialogues between religious actors, both in the development of conflicts, as well as in their transformation. Using case studies from dialogues involving Christians, Muslims, and Jews, I examine how mistaken insights can contribute to sustaining relationships of threat among parties in religious conflicts. I then examine how dialogue processes can act as catalysts for the emergence of new and more accurate insights that transform parties' understanding of the conflict. By helping parties correct mistaken interpretations and discover alternate ways of communicating, such insights can often play an important role in facilitating shifts from hostile patterns of interaction to more cooperative forms of engagement. / Throughout, I explain how Lonergan's work offers significant advances over existing discussions of insight and its role in conflict transformation processes. His approach identifies a range of different types of insights, and thus facilitates an analysis of the different roles insights can play in structuring communication at different phases of dialogue processes. It also permits a more developed exploration of the various cognitional and environmental conditions that facilitate or frustrate the occurrence of insights in dialogue situations. His work thus constitutes an important resource for theorists and practitioners seeking a better understanding of the cognitive dynamics that contribute to the transformation of interreligious dialogue processes.