Yes / Richard Guthrie describes the central pillars of the verification regime for the Chemical Weapons Convention and assesses the relevance of a similar verification architecture for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

Yes / For the past 7 seven years the so-called Ad Hoc Group had been mandated to negotiate a legally binding verification and compliance Protocol to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. In this video we asked Nicholas A. Sims whether it was the intention of the United States to put forward a proposal during the course of the Review that was intended to terminate the work of the Ad Hoc Group and its mandate.

Yes / Jayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, Civil Society Organisations and the BWC speech given at launch of the Bio-Weapons Prevention Project, during the Resumed Session of the 5th Review Conference of the BWC, United Nations, Geneva, 12 November 2002.

Yes / In this report, we identify some of the key technical and political challenges currently facing the broader Chemical and Biological Weapon (CBW) regime- with a particular emphasis on major forthcoming diplomatic meetings. Most significantly the Ninth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (1972) (BTWC) which will take place in 2022 and preparations for the Fifth Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) (CWC), expected in 2023. This report is an output of an ongoing project, designed to stimulate thinking and discussion about these issues, within relevant stakeholder communities. The report provides an introduction to this issue area for the general reader before surveying key issues and developing a series of practical policy suggestions for further consideration.

Yes / The devastating effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have acutely shown the need for maintaining robust international and national systems for biological security and ensuring that life sciences are used only for peaceful purposes. Life science stakeholders can play an important role in safeguarding scientific and technological advances in biology and related fields against accidental or deliberate misuse, not least because they are on the frontlines of driving innovation. In this paper, we argue that enhancing awareness and understanding of the risk of deliberate disease is essential for effective biological security. We first discuss the issue of ‘dual use’ in science and technology as it relates to disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Second, we review how scientist engagement with dual-use risks has been addressed in the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Third, we report on the development of an innovative awareness-raising tool, a cartoon series, that can be used for engaging life science stakeholders with BTWC issues. Finally, we outline a set of practical considerations for promoting sustainable life science engagement with the BTWC. / The graphic design of the Cartoon Series and the publication of this manuscript have been funded by a grant provided by the UK Research and Innovation Strategic Priorities Fund and HEIF Rescaling Fund through London Metropolitan University, UK.

Yes / The devastating COVID-19 disease outbreak of 2020 is likely to cause a profound rethink of how national and international communities deal with such outbreaks whether they are caused naturally, accidentally or deliberately. This paper suggests that now is the time to build on two decades of work within the BTWC and for States Parties to agree on a Biosecurity Code of Conduct under the Convention as proposed by China. Over the past two decades, as part of their attempts to strengthen the BTWC and thereby to help prevent the development of biological and toxin weapons, States Parties have given considerable attention to the potential utility of Codes of Conduct for life and associated scientists. This paper reviews these debates about this novel dual-use ethical challenge within the Convention and concludes that a Code of Conduct should be agreed at the 2021 Review Conference, but that radical reorientation of the mandatory education of such scientists will also be needed to make the agreed code effective.

Yes / Acceleration of the applications of cutting edge science is often most likely in situations involving conflict and warfare between different groups. That is the focus of this paper. It asks what we know of the past, present and possible future applications of advances in our understanding of the brain in the development of chemical weapons, and what might best be done to moderate the most dangerous aspects of that process at the present time, particularly by members of civil society. The paper therefore begins by examining this possibility of hostile manipulation of the brain in some detail. It then briefly reviews the current state of the chemical and biological arms control and disarmament regime as embodied in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) following the 2016 8th Five Year Review Conference of the BTWC and in the lead up to the 2018 4th Five Year Review Conference of the CWC. Finally, our civil society initiative to assist in achieving a successful outcome of the 2018 CWC Review Conference is described. This initiative involves the production of a multi-authored edited book, to be published in advance of the Review Conference by the UK Royal Society of Chemistry that explores many of the critical issues facing the CWC States Parties as they seek to agree effective measures to prevent the development and use of chemical weapons, as the life and chemical sciences advance.

Until now little attention has been paid to the development of military capabilities designed to target food crops with biological warfare agents. This book represents the first substantive study of state-run activities in this field. It shows that all biological warfare programmes have included a component concerned with the development of anti-crop biological warfare agents and munitions. Current concern over the proliferation of biological weapons is placed in the context of the initiative to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The book concludes by arguing that the risks posed by this form of warfare can be minimised, but that this would depend largely on the effective and efficient implementation of regimes concerning the peaceful use and control of plant pathogens that pose a risk to human health and the environment.

Yes / Welcome to the first issue of the Genomics Monitor. The Genomics Monitor provides information and analysis on developments in the international regulations relevant to the control of the biotechnology revolution. This introductory issue outlines the full range of applicable regulations at the international level - providing details on each regulation's aims, provisions, development and current status. Thirty-five key regulations are covered within the areas of arms control, health and disease control, environmental protection, trade, drugs control and the social and ethical impacts of human genetics. Because this Issue was launched in mid-November 2006 - just prior to the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention - there is also a section covering Key Points for the Conference. It is clear from the content of the Monitor that there are significant connections between the rules in the different issue areas as they apply to biotechnology. Because of these connections, awareness of developments throughout the set of regulations is important to ensure they develop in a mutually supportive manner. A key aim of this and future Issues is therefore to raise awareness of the connections between the regulations and highlight cross-cutting work being undertaken by associated international organisations. The Genomics Monitor is of relevance to anyone interested in the international regulation of biotechnology, and of particular use to those involved in informing and making policy in this area. / Carnegie Corporation

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