The threat of terrorism, and in particular the threat of terrorists using biological weapons, has grown since the early 1990s, over the decade the assessment and perception of threat escalated despite an absence of biological weapons use. This research explores policy responses to the threat from bioterrorism in the UK between 1990 and 2005. A case study approach is used to examine the emergence and rise of the bioterrorism threat, and the institutional arrangement in place to confront that threat. The dissertation further investigates the construction of the threat narrative. The policy area of bioterrorism is obscured by secrecy. Therefore, this dissertation looks towards policy responses to pandemic influenza, and uses responses to pandemic influenza as a heuristic device to illustrate the difficulties of risk assessment and the accompanying institutional complexity. The study posits that traditional, academic risk assessment methodologies do not appear to have as large an influence as the narratives. Furthermore, the prevailing conceptualisation of the bioterrorism threat is the product of the confluence of three threat narratives. These narratives have become entangled and subsequently embedded in the institutional response. Moreover, a number of events have influenced and shaped the threat narrative of bioterrorism. First, a change in perception (sarin, 1995); then a jolt to the political and institutional structures (September 11, 2001); and finally, further bombings and plots have augmented the threat narrative (Madrid & London). This study is positioned at the intersection of policy studies and risk assessment, contributing to an understanding of the formation of institutional threat perceptions.

Thesis (Master of Arts in Security Studies(Homeland Security and Defense))--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor: Supinski, Stanley. Second Reader: Lynch, Dean. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 29, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed; AVA; BioThrax; Homeland Security; Strategic National Stockpile; biodefense; bioterrorism; biological warfare; Amerithrax; Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program; AVIP; Gulf War Illness; Gulf War Syndrome; Investigational New Drug, IND; Experimental; Civilian Control of the Military, Presidential Study Directive; PSD; Presidential Policy Directive; PPD. Includes bibliographical references (p. 195-237). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.A.A.S.) -- Air University, 2004. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on April 24, 2009). "June 2004." Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 83-86).

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense))--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Maria Rasmussen. Includes bibliographical references (p. 65-71). Also available online.

Yes / This report addresses the scientific and technological discoveries in the biological sciences that enabled the early interest in biological warfare to move from hurling infected corpses into enemy cities in ancient times, through use of small cultures of animal pathogens to sabotage enemy livestock in World War I, to the origins of organised military biological weapons (BW) programmes directed at humans, animals, and plants in the inter-war period. It builds on Dando¿s 1999 paper: The Impact of the Development of Modern Biology and Medicine on the Evolution of Offensive Biological Warfare Programs in the Twentieth Century.1 For the historical aspects of biological warfare programmes this report primarily draws from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute volume: Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945.2

Yes

Knowledge can be dangerous. As neuroscience delves more deeply into our organ of thought and its complex soup of neurotransmitters - could it also be exploited for malign purposes? Is the brain the next target of terrorism? Pharmaceutically enhanced soldiers, chemical torture, incapacitants, neurological weaponry... The possibilities are frightening and progress rapid. Two leading researchers into biological weapons present their concerns, and argue scientists need to take action now. But are we at risk of paranoia?

Yes / Professor Graham S. Pearson discusses the scope of the international legal prohibition against biological warfare and provides an overview of the status of negotiations, currently in the end-game phase, to agree a legally-binding verification Protocol to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

No / The threat of biological weapons has never attracted as much public attention as in the past five years. Current concerns largely relate to the threat of weapons acquisition and use by rogue states or by terrorists. But the threat has deeper roots--it has been evident for fifty years that biological agents could be used to cause mass casualties and large-scale economic damage. Yet there has been little historical analysis of such weapons over the past half-century. Deadly Cultures sets out to fill this gap by analyzing the historical developments since 1945 and addressing three central issues: Why have states continued or begun programs for acquiring biological weapons? Why have states terminated biological weapons programs? How have states demonstrated that they have truly terminated their biological weapons programs? We now live in a world in which the basic knowledge needed to develop biological weapons is more widely available than ever before. Deadly Cultures provides the lessons from history that we urgently need in order to strengthen the long-standing prohibition of biological weapons

This thesis analyzes the current intelligence reform initiatives in light of multiple recommendations from post-9/11 commissions tasked with studying intelligence shortcomings. Using North Korea as a case study, it examines how reform efforts will increase capabilities to better understand Pyongyang's WMD programs and affect U.S. strategy on North Korea. Three reform sets should significantly improve U.S. understanding of North Korea's WMD programs. Collection reforms should allow intelligence agencies to gather more information to gain increased insight into Pyongyang's WMD programs. Analysis reforms will develop alternative methods and create streamlined procedures to avoid failures such as those witnessed in Iraq. Collaboration reforms should enable the Intelligence Community to shed its "stovepipe" mentality, facilitating unity of effort in reducing intelligence gaps on North Korea's dangerous programs. Intelligence reform, while necessary, is insufficient to deal with the North Korean threat. An engagement strategy could help the Intelligence Community better understand North Korea and its WMD programs by bringing Pyongyang into the international fold and lowering its isolationist tendencies. Engagement could increase intelligence collection opportunities and give decisionmakers more relevant information yielding better decisions and improved counterproliferation efforts. Finally, ongoing reforms should better equip policymakers to tackle broader issues such as terrorism and counterproliferation.