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The extent of devastation caused by a biological warfare attack is highly correlated to the time from release to detection. As a step towards lowering the detection time the international project TWOBIAS was launched. Here, the main goal is to develop an automated, specific and sensitive combined detection and identification instrument capable of identifying a biological threat within an hour. The identification unit is comprised of a sample preparation module, an amplification module and a detection module and utilizes a proximity ligation assay in combination with circle-to-circle amplification in order to detect a biological threat. This thesis describes the automation of the sample preparation steps of the assay and the integration with the downstream units. The functionality of the sample preparation module was verified by subjecting it to biological samples in a laboratory and at a real-life location. The results showed that the sample preparation module was capable of preparing a sample collected in a complex environment with the same results as a sample prepared in a laboratory.

Until now little attention has been paid to the development of military capabilities designed to target food crops with biological warfare agents. This book represents the first substantive study of state-run activities in this field. It shows that all biological warfare programmes have included a component concerned with the development of anti-crop biological warfare agents and munitions. Current concern over the proliferation of biological weapons is placed in the context of the initiative to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The book concludes by arguing that the risks posed by this form of warfare can be minimised, but that this would depend largely on the effective and efficient implementation of regimes concerning the peaceful use and control of plant pathogens that pose a risk to human health and the environment.

No / Scientific and technological change in the life sciences is currently transforming the problem of preventing biological warfare and biological terrorism. This transformation will demand a radical and rigorous new approach to biochemical arms control, for which the existing prohibition regimes for chemical and biological weapons are necessary but insufficient building blocks. Examples from the areas of immunology, neurosciences, and the neuroendocrine-immune system are used to show the magnitude of the problem. This book will conclude with outlining additional measures required to control biochemical weapons in the 2lst Century.

Life scientists have increasingly been asked to incorporate a dual use responsibility in their research conduct. In this thesis, different aspects of what constitutes a reasonable responsibility in terms of avoiding harmful misuse of research for biological weapon purposes have been explored. The first study investigated the claim that scientists have a dual use responsibility, and also outlined some of its possible content. Criteria for what may constitute preventable harm were used to analyze some proposed obligations in the field, and it was concluded that reasonable obligations include: e.g. considering the potential negative implications of one’s research and reporting activities of concern. In the second study, the conditions for a Precautionary Principle (PP) were explored and applied to the dual use research context. The study found that the main conditions of the PP frequently appear in present discussions and formulations of life scientists’ responsibility. It was also concluded that the PP is applicable to the dual use field and that it is meaningful and useful as a normatively guiding principle. The third study suggested an ethics of dissemination, based on the assumption that scientists have a responsibility to occasionally constrain the dispersion of their research findings. Three core aspects were proposed for an ethics of dual use dissemination. Additionally, to help scientists understand when constraints may be justified, three corresponding conditions for their application were suggested. In the fourth study, the concept of ethical competence was introduced and explored within a dual use context. It was concluded that competence-building is important in the nurturing of individual responsibility and, subsequently, in achieving a culture of dual use responsibility in the life sciences. Finally, the discussion on ethical competence was included in a proposed ethic of deliberation, in which various stakeholders in the dual use debate are conceived to participate in communicative processes. It was argued that spaces for deliberative activities should be institutionalized by the scientific community to ensure structural opportunities for individuals to both assume responsibility and share it. Moreover, it was argued that deliberation can constitute a cornerstone of responsible dual use governance.

In 1981 the apartheid military initiated a chemical and biological warfare (CBW) programme (code-named Project Coast). The programme, terminated in 1993, was aimed at developing novel irritating and incapacitating agents for internal and external use, covert assassination weapons for use against apartheid opponents, and defensive equipment for use by South African Defence Force (SADF) troops in Angola. The CBW programme was driven by a single individual, Dr Wouter Basson, who reported to a military management committee (the Co-ordinating Management Committee) which comprised a select group of high ranking officers. Practical and financial oversight of the programme was weak which allowed both for the abuse of programme funds and for senior military officers to deny knowledge of aspects of the programme. The biological component of Project Coast was conducted in violation of the commitments of the South African government to the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC). While the state’s commitment to the BTWC was one of the factors considered when initiating the programme, it was not a sufficient constraint to prevent the development of the biological weapons programme, but rather influenced its structure such that the programme could avoid national and international detection. Despite efforts to conceal the military front companies where the chemical and biological warfare (CBW) research and development was undertaken, evidence presented in this thesis shows that the United States had sufficient information about the programme to have been aware of its existence. Yet, it was only in 1993, on the eve of the democratic election in South Africa, that any attempt was made by the US administration to pressure the government to terminate the programme. This thesis considers the factors which influenced the decision to develop Project Coast; the structure and nature of the programme; the motivations of scientists to become involved in the programme and remain involved; the use of chemical and biological agents against opponents of the state, and the factors which influenced the termination of the programme on the eve of the first democratic elections in 1994. It also considers the nature and exent of international support, both tacit and overt, for the programme and argues that the failure of Western nations to call for the termination of the programme before the early 1990s was a function of political expediency and indicates a significant weakness in the ability of international agreements to constrain the development of such programmes.