What constitutes effective corporate governance? Which director characteristics render boards effective at positively influencing firm-level performance outcomes? This dissertation examines these questions by taking a multilevel, multidisciplinary approach to corporate governance. I explore the individual-, team-, and firm- level factors that enable directors to serve effectively as strategic resources during international expansion. I argue that directors’ international experience improves their ability to serve as effective strategic consultants and resource providers to firms during the complex internationalization process. However, unlike prior research, which tends to assume that directors with the potential to provide important resources uniformly do so, I acknowledge contextual factors (i.e. board cohesiveness, strategic relevance of directors’ experience) that affect their propensity to actually influence outcomes. I explore these issues in three essays: one review essay and two empirical essays. In the first empirical essay, I integrate resource dependence theory with insights from social-psychological research to explore the influence of board capital on firms’ cross-border M&A performance. Using a sample of cross-border M&As completed by S&P 500 firms from 2004-2009, I find evidence that directors’ depth of international experience is associated with superior pre-deal outcomes. This suggests that boards’ deep, market-specific knowledge is valuable during the target selection phase. I further find that directors’ breadth of international experience is associated with superior post-deal performance, suggesting that these directors’ global mindset helps firms in the post-M&A integration phase. I also find that these relationships are positively moderated by board cohesiveness, measured by boards’ internal social ties. In the second empirical essay, I explore the boundary conditions of international board capital by examining how the characteristics of firms’ internationalization strategy moderate the relationship between board capital and firm performance. Using a panel of 377 S&P 500 firms observed from 2004-2011, I find that boards’ depth of international experience and social capital are more important during early stages of internationalization, when firms tend to lack market knowledge and legitimacy in the host markets. On the other hand, I find that breadth of international experience has a stronger relationship with performance when firms’ have higher scope of internationalization, when information-processing demands are higher.

The dissertation empirically examines the efficacy of internal control mechanisms by analyzing 94 forced turnovers of chief executive officers (CEOs). It seeks to answer two primary questions: One, do governance-related characteristics influence the promptness with which poorly-performing CEOs are removed from office; and two, are removals of CEOs followed by changes in internal control mechanisms? The results suggest that poorly performing managers are removed more quickly in firms that have a larger percentage of independent outside directors on their board, that have higher equity ownership by the non-CEO directors and lower equity ownership by the CEO, and that separate the positions of CEO and chairperson. The results also suggest that the removal of the CEO provides both the opportunity and the incentive to alter internal governance systems. There is significant turnover of board members and the new boards generally have a higher fraction of independent outside directors and are more likely to separate the positions of CEO and chairperson. In addition, the sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm performance increases significantly following turnover. These post-turnover improvements in monitoring and incentive schemes are more significant in those firms that require a crisis in the product and/or capital market before they remove their CEOs. However, there is no evidence of short-term improvement in operating performance following changes in CEOs and governance systems. Overall, the results suggest that board and ownership characteristics do influence the effectiveness of internal monitoring systems and that CEO turnover is associated with broad changes in monitoring and incentive systems. / Ph. D.

Thesis (MBA.) -- University of Limpopo, 2016 / This research examined whether an improved participation of women in the board of Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) firms has any relationship with sustainability disclosure. Accordingly, the objective of this research was to examine the relationship between the number of women on the board and environmental, social and gender-employment disclosure in South African firms. The research applied a purposive sampling design to study the nine best socially responsible investing firms on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange and secondary data were collected from the sustainability reports of the firms. Using a quantitative approach, the panel-data regression analysis was used to analyse the relationship between women on the board of directors, environmental, social and gender employment disclosure. Energy consumption disclosure, social investment and the number of women employment in the firms were the proxy for environmental disclosure, social investment and gender employment disclosures respectively. Findings show a positive relationship between the number of women on the board of directors and firm disclosure on energy consumption, disclosure on women employment and social investment disclosure. However, the number of women employed in the corporate is still very low in comparison with the male counterparts. The research recommends that, given the unique social and environmental sensitivity of women, the corporate should recruit more women onto the boards to enhance accelerated corporate sustainability performance and disclosures. Key words: sustainability disclosure, women in the board, sustainability performance, energy disclosure, sustainable development

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2004. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The main problem area this dissertation studied is whether there the appointment of independent directors to the board, is firstly an adequate way to ensure good corporate governance, and secondly, if it is not the case, what must companies do to amend the situation. As result of various factors, amongst them the spectacular corporate failures worldwide that demonstrated the flaws in the shareholder democratic model, shareholder activism and global competitiveness corporate governance has taken centre stage. Pivotal to good corporate governance is the board of the company, as postulated not only by the majority of corporate governance models, but also by all the corporate governance codes. Furthermore, the perception of shareholders that independent directors are the most effective way to ensure that shareholder interests are protected has also been entrenched in the directives of corporate governance codes, with the inclusion of the South African King Code. As a result of the foregoing the role of independent directors has come under the spotlight, especially their failure to act in some of the instances of governance abuse by management. In this regard strong responses and possible prosecution has now alerted non-executive directors to the fact that there is no difference in liability between them and the executive brothers. Non-executive directors or independent directors have primarily two functions, they must monitor the performance of management and provide strategic input. As a result of the aforesaid corporate collapses non-executive directors are of the opinion that their monitoring role is being emphasis at the cost of their strategic role, which might be to the detriment of the company. Independent directors as the solution to all governance problems are however not flawless. Independence interpreted restricts access to possible suitable candidates. Furthermore, ineffective selection processes curtail the optimal functioning of boards, manipulation of information by management, lack of director training, and the increasing cost attendant to ensure adequate independent representation on the board. There are also "soft issues" that are even mere pervasive and destructive, the boardroom atmosphere that precludes open and honest discussion, the powerful chief executive and the failure of some directors to distinguish between managing and directing. In view of the problems highlighted above, this study project proposes that there has, firstly been an over-emphasis of the role that the independent director can play in ensuring good corporate governance at the cost of other measures that can be implemented. A more optimal situation can be created through a combination of a strong independent presence coupled with ongoing training and evaluation of boards and directors. There are two prerequisites for such training and evaluation to be successful. Firstly, the process must be actively driven by the chairman of the board and, secondly, directors must be made aware of the fact that shareholders have become more demanding and critical of their performance. Unless they are perceived to add value to the company they may find that they are without a job. In today's demanding environment companies and boards that do not actively encourage a learning culture will not survive. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die kern-probleemgebied wat in die verhandeling bestudeer is is tweeledig, eerstens, of die aanstelling van onafhanklike direkteure op die direksie voldoende is om goeie korporatiewe bestuur te verseker, en tweedens, indien dit nie die geval is nie, wat maatskappye te doen staan om die situasie reg te stel. As gevolg van verskeie faklore, onder andere die skouspelagtige korporatiewe mislukkings wereldwyd, wat die gebreke in die aandeelhouer demokratiese model aan die kaak gestel het, aandeelhouer aktivisme en globale mededinging, het korporatiewe bestuur 'n sentrale rol aangeneem. Die kern tot goeie korporatiewe bestuur is die direksie van die maatskappy, soos daargestel deur beide die meerderheid van koperatiewe bestuursmodelle en al die kodes ten opsigte van korporatiewe bestuur. Voorts, word die aanname van aandeelhouers dat onafhanklike direkteure die mees doeltreffendste wyse is om hulle belange te beskerm, verder ingeburger in die voorskrifte van korporatiewe bestuurskodes, wat die Suid-Afrikaanse King Kode 2 insluit. As gevolg van voormelde het die rol van onafhanklike direkteure in die spervuur beland, veral as gevolg van hulle versuim om op te tree in sommige gevalle van korporatiewe vergrepe deur die bestuur van die maatskappy. In die verband, het die sterk reaksie en die sprake van vervolging, 'n waarskuwing aan nie-uitvoerende direkteure gerig dat hulle net so aanspreeklik gehou kan word as hulle uitvoerende broers. Nie-uitvoerende direkteure or onafhanklike direkteure het primer twee funksies, hulle moet die prestasie van die bestuur monitor and hulle moet strategiese insette lewer. As gevolg van gesegde korporatiewe mislukkings is nie-uitvoerende direkteure nou van mening dat hulle moniteringsrol beklemtoon word ten koste van hulle strategiese rol, wat tot die nadeel van die maatskappy mag strek. Onafhanklike direkteure as die oplossing tot alle bestuursprobleme is egter nie volmaak nie. 'n Streng interpretasie van onafhanklikheid beperk die keuse van moontlike geskikte kandidate. Voorts word die optimale funktionering van direksies ingeperk deur ondoeltreffende keuringsprosesse, die manipulering van inligting deur die bestuur, gebrek aan direkteursopleiding and die stygende koste verbonde aan 'n voldoende onafhanklike teenwoordigheid op die direksie. Daar is ook "sagte" aspekte wat selfs meer vernietigend inwerk, naamlik die atmosfeer wat heers in die direksiesaal, die magtige hoof uitvoerende direkteur en die gebrek aan insig by direkteure rakende die verskil tussen die pligte van 'n direkteur en 'n bestuurder. Gegewe die voorafgaande probleme, is die verhandeling van mening dat die rol wat die onafhanklike direkteur kan speel om goeie korporatiewe bestuur te verseker oorbeklemtoon word. Hierdie klem is ten koste van ander maatreels, wat ingestel kan word. 'n Meer optimale klimaat kan geskep word deur 'n kombinasie van 'n sterk onafhanklike teenwoordigheid op die direksie, gekoppel aan deurlopende opleiding en evaluering van direksies en direkteure. Ten einde te verseker dat sodanige opleiding en evaluasie suksesvol is, is daar twee voorvereistes. Eerstens, moet die proses aktief deur die voorsitter bestuur word, en tweedens, moet 'n bewustheid by direkteure gekweek word aangaande die verwagtinge van aandeelhouers, wat meer veeleisend en krities staan teenoor hulle prestasie. Tensy hulle geag word waarde toe te voeg, mag direkteure hulle sonder 'n werk bevind. In vandag se veeleisende omgewing kan maatskappye en direksies, wat nie 'n leerkultuur aanmoedig nie, nie verwag om te oorleef nie.

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Picture the scene: It's Monday morning and the main article in Business Day is headlined ·Company X Board is under investigation for not diclosing the truth about its financial wellbeing". In recent times life has been very messy and difficult for many boards, but many of them are in a better position to direct their organisation and to add real shareholder value. A sequence of events triggered board changes in organisations. Many boards have realised over the last few years that the rules for direction-giving have changed. The need for accountability is high, the status quo needs to be challenged and sound strategic thinking is critical in their decision-making. Boards need to establish a performance culture with the correct people, equipped with the necessary competencies and capabilities. Leading shareholders demanded board appraisals to evaluate the continuous underperformance of board structures and processes. Some of the questions asked are, if the board is effective as a group to meet the organisation's purpose and if they can monitor the external and internal environment effectively. It is also asked whether the skills and competencies of individual members are sufficient to enable them to fulfill their risk assessment and decision-making director roles sufficiently. Board members must understand their roles to evaluate their personal development and board needs. Boards must ensure a process for appropriate development plans for their individual directorial duties. They need to define which essential strategic decisions are made during the various administrative and information sharing meetings. The annual cycles of boards are important, as is the need to check that all accountabilities are on track. This feedback does not merely concern financial matters. It is important to evaluate strategic decisions to ensure that they are carefully measured against the targets set at the beginning of the year. Many boards have adopted a triple bottom line approach, measuring their financial performance, physical environment and social responsibility reports against agreed targets. These targets need to be incorporated in a board scorecard which will graphically depict the board's value-adding activities. These scorecards will give any board an indication of its effectiveness. Boards have accepted evaluation processes and have gone through a steep learning curve in developing and implementing them. There are numerous approaches to evaluate board performance. Each board must decide whether it is better to do a peer level evaluation, outside evaluation or follow the bottom-up approach. Formal board evaluations have given boards more credibility and have helped to identify gaps in the development of board members. Boards must be developed to become more competent at direction-giving, ultimately in order to contribute to the effectiveness of the organisation. Boards must continue to drive the organisation ahead, while keeping it under control. Board members must realise that their ultimate tests are business effectiveness, in that they must add shareholder value to the balance sheet, and business efficiency, referring to the improvement realised on the profit and loss accounts. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Stel jouself voor : Dit is Maandagoggend en die hoofartikel in Business Day is as volg: "Daar is 'n ondersoek gelas na Maatskappy X se kredietwaardigheid rakende hulle finansiele welstand." Direksies oor die laaste paar jare was in 'n warboel. Ons vind tans dat organisasies beter gelei word en dat welvaart geskep word vir alle aandeelhouers. Heelwat faktore het aanleiding gegee dat direksies verander het. Die reels om leiding te gee het verander: direksies moet meer aanspreeklikheid neem, die status quo word meer bevraagteken en goeddeurdagte strategiese denke is almal bydraende faktore. Direksies moet streef om 'n prestasie-kuItuur te vestig met lede wat oor die nodige vaardighede en vermoens beskik. Aandeelhouers dring aan dat direksies se prestasie beoordeel moet word. Tipiese vrae wat gevra word is: is die direksie effektief as 'n groep om die organisasie se primere doel na te streef en kan hulle die interne en eksterne faktore effektief monitor? Individuele direksielede moet oor die nodige bevoegdhede beskik om voldoende risk-analise en direksie-besluitnemings uit te voer. Direksielede moet hulle onderskeie ontwikkelingsrolle verstaan. Dit moet duidelik gedefinieer word watter kritiese strategiese besluite word by watter vergaderings geneem. Jaarlikse siklusse vir direksies is belangrik, dit stel hulle in staat om te evalueer of al die strategiese besluite wat geneem is, uitgevoer is teenoor die ooreengekome doelwitte. Direksies evalueer meestal hulle finansiele prestasie, fisiese omgewing en sosiale verantwoordelikheid teenoor ooreengekome doelwitte. Hierdie doelwitte word meestal ingesluit in die organisasie se telkaart. Die doel van die telkaart is om vir direksies 'n aanduiding te gee of hulle effektief is of nie. Baie direksies het een of ander vorm van evaluasie geimplimenteer. Daar is verskeie benaderings om direksie-prestasie te evalueer. Elke direksie moet self besluit watter benadering is die mees geskikte - eksterne evaluering of "peer to peer" evaluering. Formele evaluering gee meer kredietwaardigheid aan die proses en help ook met die identifisering van ontwikkelingsmoontlikhede. Direksies moet fokus op ontwikkeling sodat hulle meer bevoeg kan raak om beter leiding te gee in die organisasie. Direksies moet onthou dat die bepalende toets is besigheideffektiwiteit, waar aandeelhouer-waardetoevoeging gemeet word en of daar verbeterde besigheidsdoeltreffendheid op die wins en verliesrekening is.

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2004. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Corporate governance has become the latest business "buzz-word" during the last number of years. It is almost being used as an excuse for too many things that go wrong with, or within, companies. However, the word is not going to disappear from business lexicon, it has come to stay. Too many companies and investors have suffered due to the greed of individuals, appointed to lead and manage the business that have misused their position of trust and enriched themselves in many ways. This could have been brought about by many reasons: • Directors who have not been trained properly for their fiduciary duties and other duties and responsibilities. • Directors who have not been evaluated on their performance as a board or individually. • No formal governance structures within the organisation. • No culture of accountability within the organisation. • Simple greed. This study concentrates on some of the literature, ranging from the Cadbury report released in 1992, the OECD principles and international trends, to the South African King II Report, released in 2002. From the literature, and the recommendations from it, there can be no doubt that the pressure to improve governance structures will become fiercer around the globe. Investors are taking it seriously and are willing to pay a premium for shares in a properly governed enterprise. Directors will have to sharpen their skills in being the primary instrument in preventing further corporate scandals. The importance of their accountability towards the company will be measured when board evaluation no longer is an exception, but the rule, in creating effective boards. Agricol Beherend Limited should be no exception. Although not required to formally comply with the recommendations of the King II Code, it can only be advantageous in striving to long-term sustainability. It is further concluded that entrepreneurship is at the heart of capitalistic society, the sphere in which businesses operate in creating wealth for their investors. This is where the influence and leadership abilities of non-executives play a vital role in creating the environment and culture for enterprises to flourish in. They have to determine the equilibrium between conformance and performance in keeping the entrepreneurial spirit alive, yet complying with best practice principles of corporate governance. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Korporatiewe bestuur, of beheer, het oor die laaste aantal jare die nuutste gebruikswoorde in die besigheidsomgewing geword. Dit word feitlik as verskoning gebruik vir alles wat met, of binne-in, organisasies verkeerd loop. Desnieteenstaande, die woorde gaan nie van die algemene besigheidsspreektaal verdwyn nie, dit het gekom om te bly. Te veel maatskappye en beleggers het gely onder die hebsug van individue wat aangestel is om maatskappye te lei en te bestuur, maar wat hulle vertrouensposisie misbruik het om hulself op verskeie maniere te verryk. Dit kon deur 'n verskeidenheid van redes teweeggebring gewees het: • Direkteure wat nie behoorlik opgelei is in hulle fudisiëre pligte, asook ander pligte en verantwoordelikhede nie. • Direkteure wat nie behoorlik geëvalueer is op hulle prestasie as 'n raad of op individuele basis nie. • Geen behoorlike formele korporatiewe bestuursstrukture binne die maatskappy nie. • Geen kultuur van verantwoording binne die maatskappy nie. • Eenvoudige hebsug. Die studie konsentreer op sekere gedeeltes van die literatuur wat strek van die Cadbury verslag wat in1992 vrygestel is, die OECD beginsels en internasionale tendense, tot by die Suid-Afrikaanse King II verslag wat in 2002 verskyn het. Uit die literatuur, en die aanbevelings daarin vervat, kan daar geen twyfel wees dat die druk om korporatiewe beheerstrukture te verbeter in die toekoms, wêreldwyd, slegs groter sal word nie. Beleggers is besig om ernstig daarna op te let en is selfs bereid om 'n premie te betaal vir aandele in 'n organisasie wat behoorlike korporatiewe bestuur toepas. Direkteure sal hulle vaardighede moet opknap, aangesien hulle die primêre instrument is om verdere korporatiewe skandale te voorkom. Die belangrikheid van hulle verantwoording teenoor die maatskappy sal gemeet word wanneer die evaluering van direksies nie meer die uitsondering is nie, maar die reël, in die samestelling van effektiewe direksies. Agricol Beherend Beperk behoort geen uitsondering te wees nie. Alhoewel dit nie verlang word om formeel aan die aanbevelings van die King II Kode te voldoen nie, kan dit slegs tot voordeel wees in die strewe na langtermyn volhoubaarheid. Die verdere gevolgtrekking is dat entrepreneurskap die kern vorm van 'n kapitalistiese bestel, die ruimte waarin besighede opereer om welvaart vir beleggers te skep. Dit is waar die invloed en leierskapsvaardighede van nie-uitvoerende direkteure 'n belangrike rol speel in die skepping van 'n omgewing en kultuur waarbinne besighede kan floreer. Hulle moet die ekwilibrium bepaal tussen voldoening en prestasie, deur 'n gees van entrepreneurskap, terwyl daar voldoen word aan beste korporatiewe bestuursbeginsels.

After the financial crisis and several corporate scandals, efforts to improve the quality of corporate governance have been made but extended regulatory actions can be seen as insufficient as issues still arise. According to several scholars and practitioners one way for boards to become more efficient is by increasing their involvement in strategy. However, there are discrepancies in what the boards are expected to do and what they are capable of doing. By researching what the barriers are for boards’ active involvement in strategy, the purpose of this paper is to fill, or at least partly explain, this empirical gap. Palepu (2012) has identified four potential barriers for boards’ strategic involvement; the role of the board, external pressures, access to information and boardroom dynamics. Based on Palepu’s framework 17 board members were interviewed with the aim to explore underlying issues and problems preventing strategic work in the boardroom. The results of this study show that the potential barriers for strategic involvement have two different effects on strategy. The role of the board, as well as the external pressure affect the amount of time spent on strategy in the boardroom. The boardroom dynamics and the access to information on the other hand have an impact on the quality of the strategic discussions. These four factors may then limit boards’ involvement in strategic questions if not handled correctly. Two main areas that have shown to be of utmost importance in improving the strategy engagement and the board work in full are increasing the level of engagement of the individual director and having more diversified boards in large. Diversification and higher levels of engagement are thereby two key factors which should be prioritized in order to ensure a sustainable development of corporate governance with more efficient boards actively involved in strategy.

Charles University in Prague Faculty of Social Sciences Institute of Economic Studies Title Page MASTER'S THESIS Executive Compensation in Firms Producing Addictive Goods Author: Bc. Michael Janský Supervisor: Jiří Novák, M.Sc., Ph.D. Academic Year: 2014/2015 Abstract This thesis investigates executive compensation, turnover and migration patterns in firms that produce addictive goods (tobacco, alcohol, and gambling). Previous research has identified costs associated with the production of harmful goods specific to these industries. Consistent with this stream of research, I find increased executive compensation in tobacco, alcohol, and gambling firms. This finding seems to be driven by industry specific characteristics, rather than by executives' traits or by the 'traditional' determinants of executive compensation. Executive migration patterns and the effect of job change on compensation indicate that the higher compensation is not caused by executives' attributes well suited for these firms' specific needs, by executives' contribution to value-creating activities, or by other executive-specific characteristics. Rather, the higher compensation seems to reflect a payment to executives for having to bear society's aversion to or displeasure with these harmful goods, and those who produce them. JEL...

Made available in DSpace on 2015-12-03T18:35:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rodnei_Caio_Baptista.pdf: 1002032 bytes, checksum: 512c0153b5b3d4b0b8bb59668a0a1aed (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-10-27 / In Brazil, the debate around the corporate governance intensified enough in the last decade, in the measure in that the relationships between shareholders and administrators and among majority and minority shareholders are changing with the companies restructuring caused by the privatizations and the new partners' entrance in the companies of the private sector, mainly foreigners and institutional investors. With the growth of the stock base of the corporations, active and efficient board members are becoming more necessary for the great Brazilian companies. Being like this the present work sought to verify in that degree the board members are following recommendations of corporate governance during the exercise of their functions. The research was accomplished with 143 board members through structuralized questionnaire developed specifically to take care of to the objectives of the study. The considered population was the board members of the IBGC, being that this cast congregates professionals of the main corporations in Brazil. The main results of the work show clearly that there is the necessity of the professional development between the current occupants of the function. / No Brasil, o debate em torno da governan??a corporativa se intensificou bastante na ??ltima d??cada, na medida em que as rela????es entre acionistas e administradores e entre acionistas majorit??rios e minorit??rios est??o mudando com a reestrutura????o societ??ria provocada pelas privatiza????es e a entrada de novos s??cios nas empresas do setor privado, principalmente estrangeiros e investidores institucionais. Com o crescimento da base acion??ria das corpora????es, conselheiros de administra????o atuantes e eficientes est??o se tornando mais necess??rios do que nunca para as grandes empresas brasileiras. Sendo assim, o presente trabalho procurou verificar em que grau os conselheiros de administra????o est??o seguindo pr??ticas recomendadas de governan??a corporativa durante o exerc??cio de suas fun????es. Foi realizada uma pesquisa de campo junto a 143 conselheiros de administra????o via question??rio estruturado desenvolvido especificamente para atender aos objetivos do estudo. A popula????o considerada foi os conselheiros de administra????o vinculados ao IBGC, sendo que este elenco re??ne profissionais das principais corpora????es de capital aberto atuantes no Brasil. Os principais resultados do trabalho deixam claro que h?? a necessidade do aperfei??oamento profissional entre os atuais ocupantes da fun????o.

Globalization has brought people together from different countries with different aspects of life. Thus, the increase of globalization has brought different diversity topics in light both in era of researchers’ as well as an important political question regarding Board of Directors. However, research on diversity in the corporate world is something that exists and has been a topic of many researchers throughout the years. Nevertheless, many questions have not been entirely answered. The purpose of this dissertation is to explain how diversity in Boards of Directors mediated by board process influences organizational outcomes in public sector. We used six different diversity variables namely, age, gender, culture, tenure, education, and experience in order to see how they affect board process which in turn affects organizational outcome. A positivistic research philosophy has been used, with a deductive approach and a quantitative research, adding a pilot study to further strengthen the value of the dissertation. In addition, this study is based on assumptions stated in Non-profit governance, New Public management, Corporate Governance with Agency theory, Behavioural theory and Resource dependency. Due to the limited research on diversity in public sector with board process as a mediator in Sweden and on Swedish organizations, this dissertation attempts to fill this gap. This study is conducted on Swedish universities that are listed by the Swedish government. Several ways were used to measure our six diversity variables in Boards of Directors. Although board process is a broad term, decision-making was defined as board process in this dissertation. Furthermore, six different outcome variables were used to define organizational outcome in public sector. Our seven hypotheses were all based on earlier research from both the private and the public sector. Similarly to earlier research our results were mixed. Four of our seven hypotheses was not supported due to no significant relationship regarding decision-making and outcome whilst three of them were supported. This research may be of value for Swedish government and the public sector due to the increasing globalization.