Dr. Robert A. Pape gav 1996 ut sin bok Bombing to Win – Airpower and Coercion in War där han presenterar sin teori om hur luftmakt bäst ska användas för att påtvinga sin vilja över en motståndares. Genom empiriska studier argumenterar han för att strategisk bombning inte fungerar utan luftstridskrafterna ska istället användas till att bekämpa fiendens militära strategi.Detta självständiga arbete presenterar kärnan ur Pape's teori, samt tar ut tre centrala kriterier som verkar sammanfattande för teorin och undersöker sedan om det går att urskilja dessa inom Nato's nyttjandet av luftmakt under Operation Deliberate Force i Bosnien 1995. Luftkampanjen användes som ett politiskt instrument för att få slut på ett krig som präglades av etniska rensningar och territoriella dispyter. Stödet från världssamfundet att genomföra Deliberate Force var skört, vilket gjorde att utrymmet för misstag var litet.Slutsatsen är att Pape's resonemang kring lokal luftöverlägsenhet delvis går att urskilja, medan den nekande operationskonsten samt hammare och städ-taktiken tydligt går att urskilja. En slutsats är även att luftkampanjen var en avgörande faktor vid upphävandet av belägringen i Sarajevo, och hade stor påverkan på de strider som utspelade sig på marken, som sedan skulle bli avgörande för att Dayton-avtalet skrevs.

The strategic air offensive against Germany during World War II formed a major part of Britain�s wartime military effort and it has subsequently attracted the attention of historians. Despite the attention, historians have paid little attention to the impact of the strategic air offensive on Britain. This thesis attempts to redress this situation by providing an examination of the economic impact on Britain of the offensive. The work puts the economic cost of the offensive into its historical context by describing the strategic air offensive and its intellectual underpinnings. Following this preliminary step, the economic costs are described and quantified across a range of activities using accrual accounting methods. The areas of activity examined include the expansion of the aircraft industry, the cost of individual aircraft types, the cost of constructing airfields, the manufacture and delivery of armaments, petrol and oil, and the recruitment, training and maintenance of the necessary manpower. The findings are that the strategic air offensive cost Britain �2.78 billion, equating to an average cost of �2,911.00 for every operational sortie flown by Bomber Command or �5,914.00 for every Germany civilian killed by aerial bombing. The conclusion reached is the damage inflicted upon Germany by the strategic air offensive imposed a very heavy financial burden on Britain that she could not afford and this burden was a major contributor to Britain�s post-war impoverishment.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Sydney, 2004. / Title from title screen (viewed 6 May 2008). Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Dept. of History, Faculty of Arts. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print form.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Canterbury, 2008. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (p. 156-160).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2005. / Document formatted into pages; contains xiii, 680 p. Includes bibliographical references. Abstract available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center; full text release delayed at author's request until 2006 April 22.

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Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI)

This thesis is a historiographical study concerning the strategic bombing campaign of Germany during World War II. The study questions how effective the campaign was in comparing the prewar theories to wartime practices. Secondly, it questions the morality of the bombings and how and why bombing techniques changed throughout the course of the war. Lastly, the study looks at a recent topic in the historic community, which is the question of remembrance and Germans as victims of the war. This study concludes that the strategic bombing campaign of Germany was a success but not in the sense that prewar planners had anticipated. The moral implications of the bombings were horrific, but given the severity of the war they were fighting, were a necessity. The question of Germans as victims will be open to debate for some time, especially because Germans and Americans have opposing viewpoints on the matter.

On July 18, 1994, the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA), the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, was bombed in what has been called the worst terrorist attack on Argentina in history. The bombing killed an estimated 86 people and wounded over 200. The Argentine government began a judicial investigation and vowed to bring the perpetrators to justice. Twenty years later, the case remains unresolved. The investigation has been marked by inefficiency and allegations of corruption. The recent, suspicious death of the lead prosecutor of the case has further called into question the legitimacy of Argentina’s government and justice system. This thesis examines the Argentine government’s response to the AMIA bombing in the context of Argentine politics. This thesis discusses Argentina’s democratic stability, political performance, history of corruption, and economic situation as key factors in understanding the government’s response to the AMIA attack and investigation. Argentina’s response does not fit within the established models of a democracy’s response to terrorism. Argentina’s response, or lack thereof, to this terrorist attack is perplexing, but this surprising outcome may be explained by the country’s political problems. The findings of this thesis support the conclusion that the Argentine government’s response to the AMIA case can be attributed to its functioning but flawed democracy and faulty political performance. Argentina has a history of political and police corruption and a weak judicial branch, which has hindered the effectiveness of the justice system and complicated the AMIA investigation. The extent to which these factors have allowed corruption and economic interests to derail the investigation is still debated and offers an area for future research.

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