Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2004. / Thesis directed by W. David Solomon for the Department of Philosophy. "May 2004." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 234-239).

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Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis has two aims. The first is to assess the cogency of the three most influential theories of intention – namely those of Elizabeth Anscombe, Donald Davidson and Michael Bratman. I identify five requirements that a convincing account of intention must fulfil, and then assess each of these theories in light of these five requirements. In the course of this analysis, I demonstrate that, while each of these theories contributes to our understanding of intention, none of them meet all the specified requirements. This leads to the second aim of this thesis, which is to develop an account of intention capable of overcoming the problems inherent in the foregoing theories of intention and hence fulfilling the specified requirements. This account is built around the definition of intention as a complex mental entity, consisting of two components: a revisable pro-attitude and a belief that the agent will try to fulfil this pro-attitude. It must further be possible for the agent to reflexively reconstruct the belief component without external information. I begin by setting out the five requirements for a convincing account of intention. In each case, I explain why it is necessary for a theory of intention to meet the relevant requirement, and elaborate on what is needed for an account of intention to fulfil this requirement. The five requirements for a convincing account of intention are: 1) It must explain the unity of the three seemingly irreconcilable uses of intention; 2) it must explain the epistemic requirements for intention; 3) it must clarify the relationship between intention and motivation, intention and causes, and intention and reasons; 4) it must explain the relationship between intention and practical reasoning, and 5) it must clarify the relationship between intention and moral responsibility. Together, these five requirements form the yardstick against which I evaluate the different theories of intention. With this yardstick in mind, I am then able to assess each of the influential theories of intention developed by Anscombe, Davidson, and Bratman. In each case, I examine how the relevant theory of intention fares in meeting each of the five requirements. This analysis shows that, while each theory provides a number of important insights, none of them succeeds in meeting all five requirements. Such analysis further enables me to identify the specific difficulties that have stymied the attempts of all three thinkers to develop a convincing account of intention. Having identified the strengths and weaknesses of the three preceding accounts of intention, I then try to work out an alternative account of intention that would not fall prey to the same complications. Following the same modus operandi as before, I evaluate my proposed account against the five requirements for a convincing theory of intention. In each case, I show that my account not only succeeds in meeting the specified criterion, but also, crucially, that it is able to overcome the difficulties that have plagued previous attempts to fulfil this criterion. I conclude that, while this account is not necessarily conclusive, it does meet the conditions for a convincing account of intention and thereby casts some light into the conceptual darkness surrounding intention that Anscombe identified more than half a century ago. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis het twee oogmerke. Die eerste is om die oortuigingskrag van die drie mees invloedryke teorieë van intensie te beoordeel – naamlik die van Elizabeth Anscombe, Donald Davidson en Michael Bratman. Ek identifiseer vyf vereistes waaraan ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie moet voldoen en beoordeel dan elk van hierdie teorieë aan die hand van hierdie vyf vereistes. In die loop van hierdie analise wys ek dat, alhoewel elkeen van hierdie teorieë tot ons verstaan van intensie bydra, geeneen aan al die gespesifiseerde vereistes voldoen nie. Dit lei tot die tweede oogmerk van die tesis, wat die ontwikkeling van ‘n teorie van intensie behels wat daartoe in staat is om die probleme wat inherent aan die voorgenoemde teorieë is, te oorkom en wat dus aan die gespesifiseerde vereistes voldoen. Hierdie teorie berus op die definisie van intensie as ‘n komplekse mentale entiteit wat uit twee komponente bestaan: ‘n wysigbare pro-houding en ‘n oortuiging dat die agent hierdie pro-houding sal probeer vervul. Dit moet verder ook vir die agent moontlik wees om die oortuigingskomponent refleksief te rekonstrueer sonder eksterne inligting. Ek begin deur die vyf vereistes vir ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie uiteen te sit. In elke geval verduidelik ek hoekom dit nodig is vir ‘n teorie van intensie om aan die relevante vereiste te voldoen en werk ek uit wat nodig is vir ‘n verklaring van intensie om aan hierdie vereiste te voldoen. Die vyf vereistes vir ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie is: 1) Dit moet die ooreenstemming tussen die drie skynbaar onversoenbare gebruike van intensie verduidelik; 2) dit moet die epistemiese vereistes vir intensie verduidelik; 3) dit moet die verhouding tussen intensie en motivering, intensie en oorsake, en intensie en redes verhelder; 4) dit moet die verhouding tussen intensie en praktiese redenering verhelder; en 5) dit moet die verhouding tussen intensie en morele verantwoordelikheid verhelder. Gesamentlik vorm hierdie vyf vereistes die maatstaf waarvolgens ek die verskillende teorieë van intensie evalueer. Met hierdie maatstaf in gedagte is ek dan in staat daartoe om elkeen van die invloedryke teorieë van intensie, wat ontwikkel is deur Anscombe, Davidson en Bratman, te beoordeel. In elke geval ondersoek ek hoe die relevante teorie van intensie vaar in die voldoening aan elkeen van hierdie vyf vereistes. Hierdie analise wys dat, alhoewel elke teorie ‘n aantal belangrike insigte bied, geen van hul daarin slaag om aan al vyf vereistes te voldoen nie. So ‘n analise stel my verder in staat om die spesifieke probleme te identifiseer waardeur die pogings van al drie denkers om ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie te ontwikkel, gestuit is. Nadat ek die sterk en swakpunte van die drie voorafgaande verklarings van intensie geïdentifiseer het, probeer ek dan om ‘n alternatiewe teorie van intensie uit te werk wat nie aan hierdie selfde komplikasies onderhewig is nie. Deur dieselfde modus operandi as voorheen te volg, evalueer ek my voorgestelde verklaring aan die hand van die vyf vereistes vir ‘n oortuigende teorie van intensie. In elke geval wys ek dat my verklaring nie bloot daaraan slaag om aan die gespesifiseerde kriterium te voldoen nie, maar ook, van deurslaggewende belang, dat dit in staat daartoe is om die probleme te oorkom waardeur vorige pogings om die kriterium te vervul, geteister is. Ek kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat, alhoewel hierdie teorie nie noodwendig afdoende is nie, dit wel die voorwaardes vir ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie vervul en hierdeur lig werp op die konseptuele duisternis waarin intensie gehul is en wat meer as ‘n halfeeu gelede deur Anscombe geïdentifiseer is.

Η “καθιερωμένη θεώρηση για την πράξη”, όντας δεσμευμένη σε ένα ευρύτερο νατουραλιστικό μοντέλο, κατανοεί την πράξη ως “επιμέρους συμβάν”, το οποίο προκαλείται αιτιακά από συγκεκριμένες νοητικές καταστάσεις. Σ’ αυτό το πλαίσιο, η αιτιακή επίδραση της πρόθεσης υπάγεται στο σύνηθες χιουμιανό μοντέλο της αιτιότητας μεταξύ συμβάντων. Ωστόσο, η εν λόγω θεώρηση αποτυγχάνει ουσιωδώς να ερμηνεύσει τις πράξεις στην εξέλιξή τους, πριν δηλαδή να διαμορφωθεί το απαιτούμενο (από το χιουμιανό μοντέλο) εξατομικευμένο συμβάν. Το γεγονός αυτό έχει ευρύτερες επιπτώσεις για τον τρόπο με τον οποίο αντιλαμβάνεται η εν λόγω προσέγγιση τόσο την έννοια της πρόθεσης, όσο και κατ’ επέκταση το ρόλο του δρώντος. Στην παρούσα εργασία και με αφορμή κυρίως πρόσφατες εργασίες από τους Hornsby και Crowther, επιχειρηματολογώ σχετικά με το ότι μπορούμε να υιοθετήσουμε μια εναλλακτική προσέγγιση, τόσο για την οντολογία της πράξης, όσο και για την πρόθεση, η οποία δίνει ικανοποιητικότερες απαντήσεις στις ανωτέρω προκλήσεις. Κεντρική θέση στα πλαίσια αυτής της προσέγγισης είναι η αναγνώριση της “δραστηριότητας” ως συγκροτησιακού στοιχείου της πράξης, κατά τη διάρκεια της οποίας η αιτιακή συμβολή του δρώντος παραμένει συνεχής, σε συμφωνία με μια αριστοτελικού τύπου προσέγγιση της αιτιότητας. Όι παραδοχές αυτές οδηγούν σε μια θεώρηση της πρόθεσης ως καθοδηγητικής της πράξης καθόλη τη διάρκεια εξέλιξής της. / The “standard story of action” being committed to a broader naturalistic model, understands action as a “particular event”, which is caused by certain mental states. In this context, the causal efficacy of intention is covered by the standard humean model of causality between events. Nevertheless, the story in question substantially fails to give an account for actions as they develop, that is, before the required (by the humean model) individuated event has been formed. That fact has broader effects on the way that the approach in question understands the concept of intention, and ultimately the role of the agent. In this thesis, following mainly on recent papers by Hornsby and Crowther, I argue that we can endorse an alternate approach regarding the ontology of action, as well as intention, that gives more adequate answers to the challenges mentioned above. The main thesis in this context is to recognize “activity” as a constitutional element of action, during which the causal efficacy of the agent remains ongoing, in accordance with an aristotelian type of approach to causality. These commitments result in recognizing intention as guiding action throughout the whole of its development.