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In sy resensie van Die jogger (1997), lê Conradie (1997:31) ‘n verband tussen drie belangrike hoekstene van Afrikanerskap wanneer hy die hoofkarakter, Kilian, soos volg karakteriseer: Die verwikkeldheid van die karakter Kilian word versinnebeeld deur die relaas van grondbesitter, bywonerskap en uiteindelik amptenaar van die staat. Die siening word ook gehuldig dat bogenoemde elemente vir ‘n tyd lank die goue draad van Afrikanerskap verteenwoordig. Onderliggend aan al drie karakteriserings is die element van mag, asook die (geïmpliseerde) verband tussen mag en identiteit. In Brink se Die jogger word identiteitsmites veral die fokus van die dramatiese inhoud. Hierdie mites, wat hoofsaaklik verband hou met “mag”, “godsdiens” en “seksualiteit”, is vooropgestelde elemente in die drama. Soos Wasserman (1997:4) opmerk, is Kilian ‘n verteenwoordiger van ‘n bepaalde groep mans “met gesinne, kerkgangers, omies wat Saterdae langs jou gesit en rugby kyk het”, maar ook in die naam van ‘n politieke bestel bepaalde wreedhede gepleeg het. Van dié wreedhede word in herinnering geroep tydens Kilian se gedagtevlugte in die psigiatriese hospitaal. Binne die konteks van die drama, kan aangevoer word dat “mag”, “godsdiens” en “seksualiteit” sekerlik dié belangrikste identiteitsmerkers van die Afrikaner is. Die wyse waarop bepaalde identiteitsmites binne die dramatiese handelingsverloop van Die jogger gedemitologiseer word, lê hierdie studie ten grondslag. Kilian word in hierdie drama ‘n eksemplaar van ’n karakter wie se mag verbrokkel en waardeur die mites van die man – en magsgesentreerde bestaan - geproblematiseer word. Die probleemstelling vir hierdie studie kan dus omlyn word as die ontmitologisering van die gestalte van die man ná politieke transformasie in Suid-Afrika. As gewese kolonel in die Veiligheidspolisie, is Kilian ‘n voorbeeld van ‘n Afrikaner(man) wie se mag vanweë grootskaalse politieke magsverskuiwing gestroop is. / Dr. M.P. Beukes

Hierdie studie ondersoek aspekte van die prosa-oeuvre van die Suid-Afrikaanse outeur André P. Brink, met spesifieke verwysing na sy eerste post-apartheid roman Sandkastele (1995). Hierdie teks se feministiese hersiening van en alternatief tot die manlikgedomineerde en -gedokumenteerde amptelike geskiedenis van Suider-Afrika staan sentraal in die postmodernistiese, postkoloniale fase waarin die Brink prosa-oeuvre die verlede heroorweeg. Die pre-koloniale en koloniale verlede van die landstreek word herkaart deur die vertelling van stories van vroue van die verlede in 'n unieke vertelsituasie wat 'n her-verbeelde, tekstuele vrouegeskiedenis registreer. Die konsep "reimagination" wat ontwikkel in Brink se kritiese en literêr-teoretiese werke vanaf die publikasie van die essay "Imagining the real" in Mapmakers (1983) en Elleke Boehmer se konseptualisering van die tekstuele gevolge van dekolonisasie (1995) word ontgin. Spore van die magiese realisme, die postkolonialisme, die poststrukturalistiese postmodernisme en leeswyses en denkrigtings wat in die feminisme en genderstudies aandag geniet, word in Sandkastele se vertelling, narratiewe figure en ruimte ondersoek. Hierdie leesstrategie akkommodeer die Brink-oeuvre se voortdurende heroorweging en ontdekking van nuwe tekstuele moontlikhede, 'n proses wat gekenmerk word deur 'n reeks tematiese of konseptuele ontwikkelinge en die uit-en deurwerk van belangstellings van vorige Brinktekste. ABSTRACT: This study investigates aspects of the prose oeuvre of the South African author André P. Brink, with specific reference to his first post-apartheid novel Imaginings of Sand (1995). The feminist revisioning of the text as an alternative to the male-dominated and -documented official history of Southern Africa is central to the postmodernist, postcolonial phase of the Brink oeuvre in which the past is reconsidered. The pre-colonial and colonial past of the country is remapped through the stories of women of the past in a narrative construction which registers a re-imagined textual women's history. The concept "reimagination" which develops in Brink's critical and literary theoretical works from the publication of the essay "Imagining the real" in Mapmakers (1983) and Elleke Boehmer's conceptualisation of the textual effects of decolonisation (1995) is utilised. Traces of the magical realism, postcolonialism, poststructuralist postmodernism and approaches which are explored in feminism and gender studies are explored in Sandkastele's narrative construction, characters and space. This reading strategy accommodates the Brink oeuvre's continual re-evaluation and uncovering of new textual possibilities, a process that is characterised by a series of thematic or conceptual developments and the deployment of themes from previous Brink prose texts.

This thesis will explain in detail two closely related but jointly defensible moral realist positions. I show how each position responds to the initial dilemma of whether moral judgments are propositions. Following this discussion, I defend this combined position against an objection that the position is inherently contradictory. I conclude that one can coherently maintain both positions without a contradiction.

In Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, David Brink defends a version of moral realism that makes use of a coherentist epistemology. I argue that we have good reasons to prefer a coherentist epistemology in ethics, and that common arguments in favor of foundationalism and against coherentism fail. I conclude that only the multiple coherent systems (MCS) objection poses a serious threat to coherentism, and that there is a way of meeting this objection as it is traditionally construed. Doing so requires adding an explanatory requirement to coherentism: a coherent system must not only be coherent, but explain why it is coherent. Though I argue that the MCS objection fails as traditionally construed, I propose variants of the objection which apply specifically to coherentist moral realism. Based on the social intuitionist model of moral decision-making, I point to evidence which indicates that intuitive moral judgments are the cause of reasoned moral judgments. This raises two problems: "the problem of intransigence" and the "limited problem of intransigence." These two problems constitute MCS objections to coherentist moral realism. The first problem claims that coherentism itself might not be possible for actual human beings, and that even if people are capable of forming coherent systems of belief, these systems are necessarily radically divergent as a result of various cultural and sociological factors. The second problem is that the coherentist moral realist should not expect a single moral system to result from moral reasoning (even ideally), because all such systems will include intuitions which are immune to reasoning. I argue that these MCS objections must be overcome if coherentist moral realism is to be a viable option.

Texte remanié de: Thesis--Sydney--University of New South Wales. / Bibliogr. p. 229-253.