This dissertation is a collection of three essays on misallocation and firm regulations. The first chapter investigates how size-dependent firm regulation policies can mitigate misallocation. The second chapter uses the same framework as the first to explore the intuition of a theoretically more subtle concept of misallocation. The third chapter analyzes a more specific firm regulation that targets at financial dealers. In chapter 1, I study the welfare implications of size-dependent firm regulation policies (SDPs) in the presence of entrepreneurial risks. Although SDP has been considered a source of misallocation, I show that, once entrepreneurial risks are taken into account, SDP might improve efficiency. Quantitatively, I show that, based on French data, removing the SDP leads to output and welfare loss by 1.5% and 1.3%, respectively, in opposition to the output gain reported by the previous literature that abstracts from risks. Qualitatively, I solve an optimal non-linear SDP problem and show that the observed SDP shares certain features with the optimal SDP. The analysis uncovers a novel trade-off between the inefficiencies of the intensive and extensive margins. In extension, it is shown that (1) whether SDPs improve efficiency depends on the level of financial development and (2) capital accumulation and consumption-smoothing motive further justify SDPs. In chapter 2, which is a joint work with Misaki Matsumura, we use the same competitive entrepreneurship model to investigate the economic intuition of constrained inefficiency caused by uninsurable risks. Although the constrained efficiency of various models has been studied in the literature, the economic intuition of why the constrained planner's intervention yields an improvement is usually not available. The competitive entrepreneurship model is particularly suitable for seeing the logic of constrained inefficiency since the structure of the market equilibrium is characterized by the indifference condition instead of the marginal condition. To illustrate this point, we contrast the competitive entrepreneurship model with simple versions of the Aiyagari model and the Krebs model. In chapter 3, which is also a joint work with Misaki Matsumura, we build a general equilibrium model to analyze the impact of the Volcker rule, a dealer regulation imposed after the financial crisis, on price quality (informativeness and volatility) and its implications on the welfare of market participants. We argue that although price informativeness, volatility and the dealer's profitability all deteriorate, against conventional wisdom, other market participants are better off due to the dealer's risk-shifting motive. A static model is used to clarify the main intuition, and the robustness of the welfare results as well as the fragility of the conventional wisdom about price quality are discussed by incorporating dynamics and endogenizing information acquisition.

published_or_final_version / Asian Studies / Master / Master of Arts

No description available.

"April 2004" / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 138-143) / xii, 143 leaves : ill. (col.) ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2004

The initiative entitled the Federal Government 8(a) Program was developed to serve as a training intervention to assist minority-owned businesses in gaining access to Federal contracting dollars. Minority-owned firms complete a certification process rendering them eligible to compete for up to nine years in a sheltered environment for specific contracting set-aside opportunities. However, of the approximately 4,848 8(a) certified businesses nationally, only a limited number ever secure a contract through the program. This research identified learning and policy performance barriers experienced by 8(a) business owners related to securing a Federal contract. Three research questions were addressed: 1. What potential barriers does an 8(a) business face when competing for a contract? 2. What capabilities are required to compete successfully for Government contracts? 3. What do 8(a) business owners perceive their learning needs are related to securing a contract? These research questions were addressed using a multi-method research approach combining the use of secondary qUalitative research and primary qualitative case studies. One hundred eighty-six responses to a letter sent by Small Business Administration (S.B.A.) Administrator, Erskine Bowles, to all 8(a) certified businesses to solicit opinions, suggestions, and comments related to the program were analyzed to inform the three research questions. During the second phase of the research, case study analysis were conducted with a Federal Contracting Officer, a S.B.A. Business Opportunity Specialist, and an 8(a) business owner, three parties critical to the success of the 8(a) business. Six barriers were identified: 8(a) Certification Process; Access to Federal Contracting Opportunities; Federal Government Procurement Personnel; Lack of Financing; Use of Wrong Performance Measures; S.B.A. Staff, Processes and Policies. Each performance barrier had both learning and policy implications. Overall, findings indicate that success in the 8(a) program requires an in depth understanding of the 8(a) procurement process, previous Federal Agency contacts, adequate working capital or access to lines of credit, and a sophisticated marketing structure. Additionally, the findings indicate that the S.B.A. 's process of certification, performance evaluation and graduation is bureaucratic, difficult to maneuver and does not provide adequate technical assistance particularly in the area of marketing. / Ed. D.

published_or_final_version / abstract / toc / China Area Studies / Master / Master of Arts

Government is constantly attempting to balance the competing interests within society, and is itself active in a variety of different roles. The conflict between these roles becomes particularly clear when an attempt is made to implement a "regulatory market" - that is a market that exists only because of government action- such as an electricity or environmental market - to implement some policy objective, since it is the nature of markets to candidly reveal weaknesses that in a non-market management framework may have remained hidden for some time. This thesis examines the difficulty that government has in setting market rules that implement an efficient market design for such markets. After examining the history and development of the Australian Electricity Industry market reform process, we examine more closely some of the electricity related environmental markets developed specifically to drive a policy outcome in Australia -- in particular the Australian Mandatory Renewable Energy Target Market (MRET) and the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme. By comparing these environmental markets with established financial markets, and using the techniques of experimental economics, we show that these environmental markets have significant inefficiencies in their design. We argue that these come about because lessons from the financial markets have not be learned by those implementing environmental markets, that stakeholders are lobbying for market design characteristics that are not in fact in their own best interests, and that governments struggle to manage the divergent pressure upon them. For example, in MRET we show experimentally that one of the market design characteristics most fought for by generators (the ability to create renewable energy certificates from qualifying energy without declaring the certificates to the market until a later time of the creator's choosing) in fact leads to market volatility, and ultimately inefficiently low prices. We also examine the impact on the overall MRET market of simple rule changes upon market performance. Key conclusions of this thesis are that it is more difficult than has been appreciated to successfully use a market to implement public policy and that important lessons have not yet been learned from the existing financial markets.

Government is constantly attempting to balance the competing interests within society, and is itself active in a variety of different roles. The conflict between these roles becomes particularly clear when an attempt is made to implement a "regulatory market" - that is a market that exists only because of government action- such as an electricity or environmental market - to implement some policy objective, since it is the nature of markets to candidly reveal weaknesses that in a non-market management framework may have remained hidden for some time. This thesis examines the difficulty that government has in setting market rules that implement an efficient market design for such markets. After examining the history and development of the Australian Electricity Industry market reform process, we examine more closely some of the electricity related environmental markets developed specifically to drive a policy outcome in Australia -- in particular the Australian Mandatory Renewable Energy Target Market (MRET) and the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme. By comparing these environmental markets with established financial markets, and using the techniques of experimental economics, we show that these environmental markets have significant inefficiencies in their design. We argue that these come about because lessons from the financial markets have not be learned by those implementing environmental markets, that stakeholders are lobbying for market design characteristics that are not in fact in their own best interests, and that governments struggle to manage the divergent pressure upon them. For example, in MRET we show experimentally that one of the market design characteristics most fought for by generators (the ability to create renewable energy certificates from qualifying energy without declaring the certificates to the market until a later time of the creator's choosing) in fact leads to market volatility, and ultimately inefficiently low prices. We also examine the impact on the overall MRET market of simple rule changes upon market performance. Key conclusions of this thesis are that it is more difficult than has been appreciated to successfully use a market to implement public policy and that important lessons have not yet been learned from the existing financial markets.

As the economic reform deepened, private sector became the major force in the industrial expansion and collective sector diminished dramatically. Previous researches on the role of local government have been challenged. Instead of "local government as industrial firms" put forward by Andrew Walder, this dissertation proposes a new explanation "local government as agents". Local government has withdrawn from the direct intervention in firms' internal management. It turns to offer public services, as well as help firms to achieve institutional innovation and obtain scarce institutional resources. The firms will pay back to the local government in the forms of tax and other non-financial income. There are mutual selections between "agents" and "star" firms. Horizontal competitions between different governments always exist, and the "star" firms make use of these competitions to bargain with government to obtain more favorable policies. / Based on a case study of a privately-owned automobile enterprise (Geely Holding Group) in China, this study aims at exploring the interactions between institutional environment, local government and individual enterprises, as well as answering these two questions: Under an ambiguous institutional environment, (1) how can the private automobile enterprise deal with various institutional barriers and be able to survive and develop? (2) what role does local government play in this process? Informed by the work of Victor Nee, here in this thesis I put forward an integrated theoretical framework of institutions, local government, enterprises and social network in order to analyze the issues raised above. Qualitative research methods, such as participant observation, in-depth interview and archival research, were employed to collect data in the field. / Institutional ambiguity increases the cost of implementing rules and regulations on the local level, which makes local government more powerful in explaining and executing policies. Thus, local government has many chances to "filter" or "purify" institutional factors which are inconsistent with local interests, and share the profit with enterprises in its jurisdiction by helping them break through the institutional barriers. Based on the interaction between institution, local government and enterprises, cooperative alliance between enterprises and local government has been established, while the relationship between the central and local governments is covered non-cooperative. / It is found that institutional ambiguity is not only an obstacle but also an opportunity for organizational growth. Institutional ambiguity may create grey zones in the economic fields, where enterprises have chances to break through the administrative barriers with the help of local government. Economic and technical barriers can be partially lowered by administrative barriers. On the other hand, institutional ambiguity does increase the indeterminacy of economic actions; so the enterprises incline to rely on social network and establish legitimacy to reduce the risk. / 蔣怡. / Adviser: Tai-lok Lui. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 71-01, Section: A, page: 0351. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 204-210). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest Information and Learning Company, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Jiang Yi.

The significant role of multinational corporations (MNCs) in the international political economy necessitates innovative ways to study their activities and relationships with states. This study, therefore, analyses the foreign policy of the South African government in Africa during President Thabo Mbeki’s administration – 1999 to 2008 – juxtaposed with the corporate diplomatic strategies of selected retail MNCs. The MNCs – Shoprite Holdings Limited, Massmart Holdings Limited, Woolworths Holdings Limited and Pick n Pay Holdings Limited – are treated as actors. The study uncovers the nature and extent of coalescences and divergences of strategies between the government and the MNCs. It also finds divergences between government’s policy pronouncements and interests. For example, the government’s plan to craft a code of good business practice is found to be in conflicts with its support for multilateralism. The study lays the basis for a new model to study diplomatic strategies of firms and governments. / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)