This thesis examines and critiques the American political discourse on the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The event itself is past, yet words used to describe and explain the missile crisis capture and give meaning to the experience. The meaning of the crisis begins in a basic sense, then, with the discourse. The increasing availability of material evidence has reinvigorated the discourse on the missive crisis. Where relevant, recent evidence will be employed to critique previous and recent interpretations of the this seminal event. Consensus and debate are both to be found in the discourse on the Cuban crisis. First, there is a large body of shared understanding, or conventional wisdom, on the crisis. Secondly, there is disagreement as to the meaning of the crisis in recent manifestations of the discourse. The essay will use a propaganda model lo examine the politically necessary mythology embodied in the conventional wisdom. This thesis will use a tendency analysis approach to organize the debate on the missile crisis, along the lines of ideological schools of thought, and within the context of a larger American nuclear debate. The propaganda and the tendency analyse models complement the general approach of discourse. These models have been developed specifically for the study of politics, yet the methodology of each is statement analysis; as such these models are rooted in language, ana so conform with the general discourse approach. Security is the common referent of both the conventional wisdom and the current debate. In particular, the President, as the custodian of nuclear weapons, is the principle actor responsible for national security. The powerful image of the President dominates the conventional wisdom, and retains significance in the contemporary ideological debate on the lessons of the missile crisis. The nuclear arsenal at the disposal of the President endows him with great, but double-edged power. The paper concludes with some general observations on the special significance of Presidential leadership as represented in the discourse on the missile crisis, and as necessitated in confronting crises in general. First, in crisis, there is little time for the President to make difficult decisions. Secondly, there may be greater devolution of authority to the military forces deployed to convey the credibility of American deterrence. As such, the subordination of force to policy must remain sound. The image of the President is, of necessity, an image which combines prudence and strength. Manufactured images are not enough however. Policy must be tested in terms of its alleged purpose. Likewise, doctrine must be evaluated in terms the purpose of the policy it is designed to support. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

One of the most significant events in the Cold War-dominated years of the 1950's and early1960's was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. It not only has been reputed by most authorities as a major turning point in the Soviet Union-American struggle, but it dramatically illustrated the critical dimension of thermo-nuclear weapons in international relations. In addition, and of particular interest to one directly involved, it showed that firmness in policy and proper application of military power are key factors in obtaining favorable and peaceful settlements of international disputes.

The emplacement of Soviet missiles in Cuba in October of 1962 and the American response to this action thrust the world into its first major nuclear crisis. Because this American-Soviet confrontation seemed to propel the antagonists to the brink of nuclear holocaust, at least in appearance if not also in fact, a vast amount of history has been written on this brief but crucial episode in the Cold War. The purpose of this study is to examine the development of the various historiographical perspectives of the Cuban missile crisis.The traditionalists view President John F. Kennedy as responding by necessity to a Soviet threat to alter the balance of power via the Russian missiles in Cuba. The American response in the form of a quarantine was superb as President Kennedy successfully terminated the crisis by compelling Nikita S. Khrushchev-to withdraw the Soviet missiles from Cuba. The traditionalists praise the President for his exceptional skills in crisis management and for his superb leadership which ultimately resulted in a victory for America as a period of detente ensued between the United States and the Soviet Union.The right wing revisionists accuse President Kennedy encounters with the Soviet Union. They also accuse the President of seeking conciliation with the Russians during the crisis rather than seeking a military victory in the confrontation. According to the right wing perspective, the President suffered a defeat .in the aftermath of the crisis, for his policy of accommodation allowed Castro to continue his dictatorship over Cuba and permitted communism to become entrenched firmly in the Western Hemisphere.The left wing revisionists accuse President Kennedy of rejecting a diplomatic approach to the crisis and initiating the confrontation. For the sake of personal prestige and political expediency, the President arbitrarily transformed an international political problem into an international military crisis. According to the left wing perspective, the aftermath of the crisis instilled in Americans an arrogance of power and resulted in the advancement of the nuclear arms race.The Sovietologists' perspective differs from the other interpretations in that it neither praises nor condemns President Kennedy. The Sovietologists are concerned primarily with the Soviet motives for emplacing missiles in Cuba and for eventually withdrawing them. The Sovietologists ascribe multiple motives to the Russians for their decisions both to of contributing to the instigation his ineptness and lack of decisive of the crisis situation by leadership in previousemplace and to withdraw the missiles in Cuba.The concluding interpretation accuses both Khrushchey and Kennedy of initially acting irresponsibly, the former creating a situation subject to crisis and the latter by creating a needless confrontation. Once the crisis was initiated, the two leaders generally behaved responsibly and cautiously as they attempted to control the crisis. Yet, despite the efforts of Khrushchev and Kennedy, the nuclear confrontation was terminated successfully without armed conflict or catastrophic consequences as much by fortune as by human design.

The Cuban Missile Crisis has been considered by political scientists and historians as one of the most critical point in U.S. – Soviet relations during the Cold War and probably the only case of the possibility of the nuclear exchange was on highest level. The Cuban Missile Crisis was considered to be a part of continued political game of the ideological struggle between the leaders of United States and Soviet Union. However, the fact of the existence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba created situation for U.S. government to decide what course of actions should be taken and not escalate a further confrontation, which could lead to a mutual nuclear exchange. The suggestions to such course of actions were coming from different members of the Executive Committee of the National Council or EXCOMM, which did make impact on U.S. president’s decision making in relation to Soviet installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba in October 1962.  The focus of this study relied on outcome of the decisions taken on secret meetings within the Executive Committee of the National Security Council or EXCOMM (included U.S. president as member of this committee) during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. The results of this study show if inter – and intragroup conflicts within EXCOOM made such impact on decision making outcome.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Carolina Wilmington, 2009. / Title from PDF title page (January 12, 2010). Includes bibliographical references (p. 97-107).

Robert S. McNamara served as U.S. Secretary of Defense (SOD) for Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. McNamara participated in the Cuban Missile Crisis negotiations in 1961 and became a key formulator of Vietnam policy. This thesis challenges scholarship that characterizes McNamara as a fierce hawk who relentlessly executed military escalation in Vietnam. By drawing parallels between McNamara’s role in the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War, and by exploring how McNamara’s concept of loyalty to the presidency influenced his decisions, this thesis argues that the SOD was willing to escalate the situation militarily as a form of political communication with the adversary. To McNamara, military pressure was a means to create avenues for diplomacy. McNamara became increasingly uncomfortable – and ultimately resigned in 1968 - when the Johnson administration pursued military escalation without an organized campaign towards negotiations. He was therefore not as hawkish as other scholars have claimed. / Includes bibliography. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2020. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

Decision-making during crises is an important task that many elected officials face during their time in office. This thesis seeks to identify principles that make up a sound policy decision-making process and may lead to more positive outcomes. The analysis here is a comparative case study of three national security crises that faced the John F. Kennedy administration: the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Vietnam conflict. Each case is examined for the presence of indicators of groupthink. I hypothesize that the relative absence of groupthink is related to a positive outcome. That hypothesis is examined by reviewing each case; the cases that contained higher levels of the indicators of groupthink tended to have a poorer quality process than those with less evidence of groupthink. / Master of Arts

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 2, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Regarding the existence of nuclear weapons, which were never used all over atomic bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima as a tool of war against civilian or military targets during the Cold War, I try to give an explanation of "armed peace". I consider the question of why the two superpowers (the USA and the USSR) didn't start a "hot war" that would have been more likely nuclear. As an example of the most critical event will serve me Cuban Missile Crisis, with which can be the description of it understood in broader context. The paper points to the interrelations of opposing ideologies that related to atomic weapons have often drawn the same conclusions. I examine the military-strategic value of the atomic bombs which have shaped international relations troughtout the second half of the twentieth century. Besides the military aspects I also mention economic interpretation of the nuclear arms race and economic potential of the USSR and the USA. Why have in the first instance occured one-sided and than gradually overall disarment, reducing the number of nuclear warheads? I try to documented the explanation out of historical events also by using teoretical models.

This thesis analyzes key moments from the tenures of Harold Macmillan as British Prime Minister and John Fitzgerald Kennedy as President of the United States. The United Kingdom and the United States had a Special Relationship between them, which was based upon their close political cooperation. Macmillan and Kennedy deepend this relation by their personal friendship, which played a major role in the course of finding solutions to the conflicts they had to face in the context of the Cold War, when there was a real possibility of nuclear annihilation. The analysis shows that the Special Relationship in the years 1957-1963 went through several dynamic developments, however it never lost its unique status. Despite initial distrust between the two countries immediately following the Suez Crisis, both politicians always managed to find a compromise solution. Thanks to their friendship and deep personal respect, they managed to always unite, even during times of gravest peril. A typical example of the personal relationship is the Cuban Missile Crisis, when Kennedy kept in touch via telephone with Macmillan and often asked him for advice. By virtue of this contact, Macmillan became one of the President's principal advisors in the course of the crisis. The Special Relationship between the two countries did...