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Thesis--Harvard University. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [247]-255).

The Cuban Missile Crisis has been considered by political scientists and historians as one of the most critical point in U.S. – Soviet relations during the Cold War and probably the only case of the possibility of the nuclear exchange was on highest level. The Cuban Missile Crisis was considered to be a part of continued political game of the ideological struggle between the leaders of United States and Soviet Union. However, the fact of the existence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba created situation for U.S. government to decide what course of actions should be taken and not escalate a further confrontation, which could lead to a mutual nuclear exchange. The suggestions to such course of actions were coming from different members of the Executive Committee of the National Council or EXCOMM, which did make impact on U.S. president’s decision making in relation to Soviet installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba in October 1962.  The focus of this study relied on outcome of the decisions taken on secret meetings within the Executive Committee of the National Security Council or EXCOMM (included U.S. president as member of this committee) during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. The results of this study show if inter – and intragroup conflicts within EXCOOM made such impact on decision making outcome.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of North Carolina Wilmington, 2009. / Title from PDF title page (January 12, 2010). Includes bibliographical references (p. 97-107).

Robert S. McNamara served as U.S. Secretary of Defense (SOD) for Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. McNamara participated in the Cuban Missile Crisis negotiations in 1961 and became a key formulator of Vietnam policy. This thesis challenges scholarship that characterizes McNamara as a fierce hawk who relentlessly executed military escalation in Vietnam. By drawing parallels between McNamara’s role in the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War, and by exploring how McNamara’s concept of loyalty to the presidency influenced his decisions, this thesis argues that the SOD was willing to escalate the situation militarily as a form of political communication with the adversary. To McNamara, military pressure was a means to create avenues for diplomacy. McNamara became increasingly uncomfortable – and ultimately resigned in 1968 - when the Johnson administration pursued military escalation without an organized campaign towards negotiations. He was therefore not as hawkish as other scholars have claimed. / Includes bibliography. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2020. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

Decision-making during crises is an important task that many elected officials face during their time in office. This thesis seeks to identify principles that make up a sound policy decision-making process and may lead to more positive outcomes. The analysis here is a comparative case study of three national security crises that faced the John F. Kennedy administration: the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Vietnam conflict. Each case is examined for the presence of indicators of groupthink. I hypothesize that the relative absence of groupthink is related to a positive outcome. That hypothesis is examined by reviewing each case; the cases that contained higher levels of the indicators of groupthink tended to have a poorer quality process than those with less evidence of groupthink. / Master of Arts

Regarding the existence of nuclear weapons, which were never used all over atomic bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima as a tool of war against civilian or military targets during the Cold War, I try to give an explanation of "armed peace". I consider the question of why the two superpowers (the USA and the USSR) didn't start a "hot war" that would have been more likely nuclear. As an example of the most critical event will serve me Cuban Missile Crisis, with which can be the description of it understood in broader context. The paper points to the interrelations of opposing ideologies that related to atomic weapons have often drawn the same conclusions. I examine the military-strategic value of the atomic bombs which have shaped international relations troughtout the second half of the twentieth century. Besides the military aspects I also mention economic interpretation of the nuclear arms race and economic potential of the USSR and the USA. Why have in the first instance occured one-sided and than gradually overall disarment, reducing the number of nuclear warheads? I try to documented the explanation out of historical events also by using teoretical models.

This thesis analyzes key moments from the tenures of Harold Macmillan as British Prime Minister and John Fitzgerald Kennedy as President of the United States. The United Kingdom and the United States had a Special Relationship between them, which was based upon their close political cooperation. Macmillan and Kennedy deepend this relation by their personal friendship, which played a major role in the course of finding solutions to the conflicts they had to face in the context of the Cold War, when there was a real possibility of nuclear annihilation. The analysis shows that the Special Relationship in the years 1957-1963 went through several dynamic developments, however it never lost its unique status. Despite initial distrust between the two countries immediately following the Suez Crisis, both politicians always managed to find a compromise solution. Thanks to their friendship and deep personal respect, they managed to always unite, even during times of gravest peril. A typical example of the personal relationship is the Cuban Missile Crisis, when Kennedy kept in touch via telephone with Macmillan and often asked him for advice. By virtue of this contact, Macmillan became one of the President's principal advisors in the course of the crisis. The Special Relationship between the two countries did...

This study of political decision-making stressing the process of decision-making in a group setting is, in part, a reaction against traditional approaches of political analysis. The study of international relations is overburdened with historical studies of the interaction between states. The classic approach to the study of a given decision by one government affecting another might be called the “rational actor model”. This model treats the state as the entity reaching the decision. The decision itself is seen as behavior that reflects a rational purpose or intent. The central concepts of the model center around the calculated weighing of goals, alternatives, consequences, and choices. The “rational actor model” is the dominant method of current political analysis. I will implicitly contend in this paper that the concept of foreign policy as a rational process of gathering information, setting alternatives, and making decisions is not an adequate tool of understanding. In fact, the “rational actor model” does not make sense out of much political phenomenon. I will directly contend in this paper that a process model of political decision-making provides an adequate and helpful tool for the understanding of political decisions.

This dissertation offers a novel quantitative method for assessing an actor's subjective temporal orientation. Our method involves the use of supervised machine learning techniques in concert with natural language processing tools and linguistic principles. We suggest our method may offer a clandestine technique for extracting aspects of an actor’s temporal orientations from right behind their back. This capacity occurs because of the unique ways time references are reflected in language syntax. This reflection does not simply occur in face-to-face spoken interactions, but also resides in recorded vocal transcripts and within textual documents articulated by speakers for a social audience (e.g., political speeches). . From a social theory point of view, we argue that our technique can help objectify some of the major links theorists have long made between the temporal features of mind, subjective meaning, and social processes. Temporal orientation has long been defined as a tripartite mental process. Edmund Husserl famously defined this process as involving retention (a mental focus on past), presentation (a mental focus on the present) or protention (a mental envisioning of the future). From a pure phenomenology perspective, Husserl’s innovation was to link this mental interlocking process with meaning-making. For Husserl, it was directly through an actor’s temporal orientation that meaning became variably constituted and the problem of subjectivity emerged. From a sociological point of view, it is primarily through Alfred Schutz’s formulation of social phenomenology that Husserl’s tripartite system was opened to accommodate the influence of the social in meaning-making. This opening has possessed a long-standing contradiction. For Schutz, endogenous social structure could affect where an actor temporally orients. The resulting implication is that social structure could have a direct effect on how actors assign specific meanings in social systems. Even more, social structure could facilitate shared temporal orientations among actors. However, Schutz also promoted the idea that different temporal orientations could explain how different meanings could be assigned to the same social object by disparate actors. This possibility served as the centerpiece of Schutz’s well-known methodological critique of Max Weber’s direct linkage between subjective meaning, motive, and empathetic based interpretations of social action. To carry out our efforts to quantify how the subjective processes of temporal orientation appear to be influenced by endogenous social processes, we employed our algorithm on three different text-based data sets. We suggest these datasets possess strong reflections of the social world. The first dataset entails a collection of matched twitter tweets that correspond to Trump’s reelection bid and Biden’s challenge during the 2020 period. In this dataset, our method illustrates how both candidates appear to have different temporal orientations despite being bounded by a similar social event. We suggest this finding may reflect the relationship between what Schütz called inner duration and the influence of external stocks of knowledge (i.e., external structures.) The second dataset corresponds to a recorded conversational transcript of the Cuban missile crisis, taken from President Kennedy’s Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) on the 6th of October in 1962. Using our algorithm, we offer objective measures of homogenous temporal orientations of committee members that are consistent with meso-group conformity. We suggest that our method may offer a novel way of measuring group conformity in general. The third dataset consists of the State of the Union Corpora (SOU). In this dataset, we apply our algorithm to identify changes in temporal orientation occurring among a single President’s entire collection of SOU speeches. Furthermore, we compare the average temporal orientation of the Presidents in relation to various social categories, such as party affiliation and societal events. The scope of the Presidents inventoried for temporal orientation is restricted from Eisenhower to Biden.