The purpose of this thesis is to understand why the Arab-Israeli conflict has remained irreconcilable for sixty-one years. While the details and forms of the conflict have changed over time, the central factors dividing Zionists and Arabs in the Middle East have altered little. In this thesis I examine what these factors are and why they have been so effective in frustrating every peace effort. To understand the fundamental factors which keep the dispute alive I have conducted a comparative study of the two major peace initiatives which frame it diplomatically. The first formal peace conference between Israel and her Arab adversaries took place in Lausanne in 1949. The issues of borders, Jerusalem and refugees would not be seriously engaged with again until the last peace effort to date, the Camp David talks of 2000. Through a detailed comparative analysis of both conferences I seek to understand the positions taken by the warring parties towards these issues and the broader motivating factors separating them and preventing them from achieving peace. As the most important third party and supposed ??honest broker?? in both talks, I also closely examine the behaviour and policy of the US at each case. I find that the positions taken towards each issue by Israel, on the one hand, and the Arab party, on the other, were remarkably consistent in 1949 and 2000. Israel was not fully committed to peace in either instance, while the Arabs twice refused to sign what amounted to documents of surrender. These consistent positions starkly contrasted with that of the US, which completely changed its positions in ways which, by 2000, had almost wholly aligned it with Zionist demands. I conclude that future peace will rest on the ability of each party to re-examine its past in order to produce a spirit of reconciliation. For Israel, this will mean honestly revisiting Zionism in order to confront what its triumph meant for the Palestinian inhabitants of the land. The Arabs must also seek a broader understanding of their role in the dispute and demonstrate forcefully to Israelis that they seek peace rather than retribution. Above all, if the US is to retain its role as mediator it must abandon its ??special relationship?? with Israel and return to a more genuinely?? even handed alignment with the broader international consensus on the dispute. As it stands, the US??s more or less unconditional support of Israel has the effect of leading Israelis and Palestinians ever further from peace even as an ever more empty ??peace process?? is rhetorically trumpeted abroad.

The purpose of this thesis is to understand why the Arab-Israeli conflict has remained irreconcilable for sixty-one years. While the details and forms of the conflict have changed over time, the central factors dividing Zionists and Arabs in the Middle East have altered little. In this thesis I examine what these factors are and why they have been so effective in frustrating every peace effort. To understand the fundamental factors which keep the dispute alive I have conducted a comparative study of the two major peace initiatives which frame it diplomatically. The first formal peace conference between Israel and her Arab adversaries took place in Lausanne in 1949. The issues of borders, Jerusalem and refugees would not be seriously engaged with again until the last peace effort to date, the Camp David talks of 2000. Through a detailed comparative analysis of both conferences I seek to understand the positions taken by the warring parties towards these issues and the broader motivating factors separating them and preventing them from achieving peace. As the most important third party and supposed ??honest broker?? in both talks, I also closely examine the behaviour and policy of the US at each case. I find that the positions taken towards each issue by Israel, on the one hand, and the Arab party, on the other, were remarkably consistent in 1949 and 2000. Israel was not fully committed to peace in either instance, while the Arabs twice refused to sign what amounted to documents of surrender. These consistent positions starkly contrasted with that of the US, which completely changed its positions in ways which, by 2000, had almost wholly aligned it with Zionist demands. I conclude that future peace will rest on the ability of each party to re-examine its past in order to produce a spirit of reconciliation. For Israel, this will mean honestly revisiting Zionism in order to confront what its triumph meant for the Palestinian inhabitants of the land. The Arabs must also seek a broader understanding of their role in the dispute and demonstrate forcefully to Israelis that they seek peace rather than retribution. Above all, if the US is to retain its role as mediator it must abandon its ??special relationship?? with Israel and return to a more genuinely?? even handed alignment with the broader international consensus on the dispute. As it stands, the US??s more or less unconditional support of Israel has the effect of leading Israelis and Palestinians ever further from peace even as an ever more empty ??peace process?? is rhetorically trumpeted abroad.

Thesis advisor: Seth Jacobs / U.S. President Jimmy Carter's handling of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East can only be properly understood in the context of his religious beliefs. Carter pursued what amounted to a faith-based foreign policy. Guided by the Christian concepts of justice, forgiveness, humility, and an emphasis on the importance of individuals, Carter attempted to make policy conform to the standards set by his faith. Viewing the Arab-Israeli conflict through this lens, he committed to advancing the Middle East peace process out of a Christian sense of duty. Religious belief caused Carter to champion the Palestinians' cause since he believed that the Palestinian people were suffering grave injustices under the Israeli occupation of the West Banka and Gaza. Ultimately, his faith-based approach proved unable to resolve the many diplomatic challenges facing his administration in the region. Fearing that any chance for peace might be lost, he invited Prime Minister Menachem Begin of Israel and President Anwar Sadat of Egypt to Camp David for substantive talks in September 1978. Only when Carter abandoned his religiously grounded policy orientation and embraced a coldly calculating approach did he succeed in getting the Israelis and Egyptians to agree to a deal. With the conclusion of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty in March 1979, Carter effectively removed himself from any further involvement in the process. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2012. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: History.

This dissertation examines the emergence of the 1978 Camp David Accords and the consequences for Israel, the Palestinians, and the wider Middle East. Utilizing archival sources and oral history interviews from across Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, the United States, and the United Kingdom, Camp David’s Shadow recasts the early history of the peace process. It explains how a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict with provisions for a resolution of the Palestinian question gave way to the facilitation of bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel. As recently declassified sources reveal, the completion of the Camp David Accords—via intensive American efforts— actually enabled Israeli expansion across the Green Line, undermining the possibility of Palestinian sovereignty in the occupied territories. By examining how both the concept and diplomatic practice of autonomy were utilized to address the Palestinian question, and the implications of the subsequent Israeli and U.S. military intervention in Lebanon, the dissertation explains how and why the Camp David process and its aftermath adversely shaped the prospects of a negotiated settlement between Israelis and Palestinians in the 1990s. In linking the developments of the late 1970s and 1980s with the Madrid Conference and Oslo Accords in the decade that followed, the dissertation charts the role played by American, Middle Eastern, international, and domestic actors in curtailing the possibility of Palestinian self-determination.

abstract: Time magazine called 1976 "the year of the evangelical" partly in response to the rapid political ascent of the previously little-known Georgia governor Jimmy Carter. A Sunday school teacher and deacon in his local church, Carter emphasized the important role of faith in his life in a way that no presidential candidate had done in recent memory. However, scholarly assessments of Carter's foreign policy have primarily focused on his management style or the bureaucratic politics in his administration. This study adds to the growing literature in American diplomatic history analyzing religion and foreign policy by focusing on how Carter's Christian beliefs and worldview shaped his policymaking and how his religious convictions affected his advisors. To better demonstrate this connection, this dissertation primarily discusses Carter's foreign policy vis-à-vis religious nationalist groups of the three Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, Islam). By drawing on archival materials from the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Carter's own voluminous writings, and memoirs of other administration officials, this dissertation argues that Carter's religious values factored into policymaking decisions, although sometimes in a subtle fashion due to his strong Baptist doctrinal commitment to the separation of church and state. Moreover, Carter's initial success in using his religious beliefs in the Camp David negotiations raised expectations among administration officials and others when crises arose, such as the hostage taking in Iran and the electoral threat of the Christian Right. Despite his success at Camp David, invoking religious values can complicate situations already fraught with sacred symbolism. Ultimately, this dissertation points to the benefits and limits of foreign policy shaped by a president with strong public religious convictions as well as the advantages and pitfalls of scholars examining the impact of religion on presidential decision making. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. History 2013

This constructivist grounded theory study will explore the possibility that early socio-cultural experience in concert with innate cognitive mechanisms are essential components of a dual process of decision-making. Each element may influence conflict actors toward predictable predispositional behaviors manifest as bias. Specifically, we are concerned that these biases will influence the perceived and actual neutrality of the principle mediator thus compromising a mediation success. The presence of these predispositions in both mediators and conflict stakeholder challenges the validity of the conclusions in other research that does not consider the true impact of cultural dissonance on more than a superficial insinuation of social facts. This will be accomplished through interrogating data yielded through content analysis of the actors’ use of language both spoken and written utilizing the techniques used in grounded theory studies.

This research seeks to understand the reasons for failures of Bill Clinton, Yasser Arafat, and Ehud Barak's Camp David Summit that was held in July, 2000. The Summit was arranged to complete the last phase of Oslo Peace Process. Numerous researches have attempted to reveal the facts of the summit but, so far, they have failed to present the complete details of what happened before, during, and after the summit. This research explores all aspects of the problem including the various variables that would have had effected the breakdown of the Middle East peace process. Finally, the researcher determines the parameters needed to maintain a substantial peace in the Middle East and what proposed strategies might be followed in order to avoid the previous mistakes in future peace negotiations.

This thesis analyses the conflict resolution process between Israel and Egypt and provides a new angle for explaining the signing of the first Arab-Israeli peace treaty. Author uses a case study research method that facilitates an in-depth analysis of the topic and answers to three selected research questions: Why did long-lasting hostile countries engage in the negotiations to resolve their conflict?, How did Jimmy Carter mediate the Camp David Summit? and What persuaded Israel and Egypt to finalize the peace treaty?. The thesis is divided into two main analytical parts, according to the theoretical model used for its examination of the research questions. The first part makes use of William I. Zartman's theory of ripeness and its concept of a "mutually hurting stalemate" to explain why two opposing parties might become gradually open towards finding a "way out" from their protracted conflict. By analysing these conditions to reach a "ripe moment", the third-party may produce substantial proposals to resolve their dispute. The second part of this thesis focuses on the mediation process of the U.S. President Jimmy Carter between September 1978 and March 1979. The umbrella theory of third-party mediation is employed to elucidate the mediation strategies, potential biases and leverage of Jimmy...

Il progetto si è proposto di dimostrare l’evoluzione della valenza strategica nella relazione bilaterale tra Stati Uniti ed Egitto durante le presidenze di Anwar al-Sadat e Hosni Mubarak. Sebbene si sia a lungo contraddistinta per un marcato rapporto di reciprocità e di stabilità locale e trans-regionale, da alcuni decenni a questa parte la relazione vive un particolare momento di riconsiderazione a causa della compresenza di più fattori che ne hanno limitato il valore complessivo, necessitando quindi di nuovi fondamenti e obiettivi per essere rivitalizzata. Riprova di ciò sono proprio gli accordi di Camp David, cuore pulsante delle strategie comuni di Stati Uniti ed Egitto, nonché centro nevralgico delle dinamiche di cooperazione, per lo più di sicurezza, tra statunitensi, egiziani e israeliani. Analizzando gli elementi caratterizzanti la politica estera egiziana in relazione, anche e non soltanto, alle interazioni con Stati Uniti e Israele, prendendo come riferimento una prospettiva storico-diacronica che tenesse conto delle evoluzioni politiche dentro e fuori il Paese arabo, all’interno di un più ampio panorama geopolitico e strategico regionale e internazionale, il presente lavoro ha pertanto puntato a far emergere il carattere tattico del rapporto stesso, il quale è stato fortemente influenzato dal perseguimento di un interesse nazionale da entrambe le parti. / The thesis analyses the evolution and impact of U.S.-Egypt relations under the Sadat and Mubarak’s tenure in terms of geopolitical and strategic attitudes through a historical-diachronic perspective. Although it has been characterized for decades by a marked reciprocity in terms of local and (trans-)regional dynamics, for about twenty years this link has been experiencing a particular moment of reconsideration due to the presence of several factors that have limited its overall significance. The bilateral relationship needs new foundations and objectives. In fact, the thesis argues that the Camp David agreements, the beating heart of the common strategies of the United States and Egypt, as well as the political core of several dynamics (mostly in security dimension) between the Americans, Egyptians and Israelis, it is the key element to understand the interconnection between Egyptian domestic state and its regional state autonomy. In this respect, the thesis highlights these factors characterizing the Egyptian foreign policy in connection, even and not only, with United States and Israel, as enabling factors both in the national political developments and the evolution in the Arab stage, within a wider geo-political and strategic regional and international panorama. In conclusion, this work aim to bring out the tactical nature of the bilateral relationship between Egypt and the United States, which was heavily influenced by the pursuit of a different perception of national interest. Therefore, the biggest challenge between Washington and Cairo consists in managing a much less special and complex relationship than in the recent past, which essentially sees the overcoming of Camp David, while maintaining the stability of the region as a cornerstone on both sides.

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