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This thesis is a genealogy of the Thai conception of détente in the long 1970s (1968-1980), largely based on newly declassified documents in Thailand. It argues that Thai détente marked a history of rupture in Thai foreign policy narrative that was fundamentally different from the hegemonic discourse of anticommunism. By the late 1960s, the latter had become seriously challenged by the deteriorating situation in the Vietnam War and exacerbated by the concomitant prospect of American retrenchment. This sequence of events resulted in discursive anxiety in Thailand and the idea of 'flexible diplomacy' was initiated by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to cope with the changed environment. Since then, détente emerged as a new diplomatic discourse to normalize relations with the Communist powers in general, and specifically, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The thesis closely examines three episodes of Thai détente, including that of Thanat Khoman (1968-1971), M.R. Kukrit Pramoj and Chatichai Choonhavan (1975-1976), and General Kriangsak Chomanan (1977-1980). It argues that each episode, epitomized by varying concepts of 'flexible diplomacy' and 'equidistance', developed out of discursive struggles between détente proponents and Cold Warriors. These struggles precipitated attempts to sustain the anticommunist discursive hegemony, which culminated in the military coups in November 1971 and October 1976. The thesis demonstrates how these coups can be interpreted as events born out of foreign policy, and specifically to deter, or at least temper, the course of détente. The thesis also asserts that, throughout the long 1970s, détente in general transformed Thai foreign relations with the Soviet Union and the PRC from the discourses of 'enemy' towards 'friend'. This diplomatic transformation was represented in numerous diplomatic practices, such as ping-pong or sports diplomacy, petro-diplomacy, trade, cultural diplomacy, the establishment of diplomatic relations, and normal state visits. Despite its decline in the early 1980s, the détente discourse remained intact and determined Thai diplomacy toward the Communist powers. Finally, the thesis interrogates the so-called bamboo or bending-with-the-wind diplomacy, which is often treated as an ahistorical 'tradition' of Thai diplomacy, and argues that bamboo diplomacy emerged as a new narrative or knowledge only in the early 1970s. It aimed at not only legitimizing Thailand's changing diplomatic practices, namely détente, but also constituting the metanarrative that could explain and evaluate (the success or failure of) Thai diplomacy in the past. This narrative was then an invented tradition, which was socially and epistemically constructed as a result of the transformative practices of détente in Thailand. By tracing the birth of bamboo diplomacy, the thesis constitutes a history of the present.

Thesis (doctoral)--Stockholms universitet, 1984. / Summary in English. Includes bibliographical references (p. 416-438).

The fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 was called by many observers of international affairs the end of the Cold War. However, fifteen years earlier, commentators such as Alistair Buchan had also declared the end of the Cold War. Was this just an premature error on Buchan's part or is there a link between the events of the early 1970s, which is referred to as the era of detente and those leading up to the collapse of the Berlin Wall. It is the intention of this thesis to argue that these periods are integrally related mainly by the fact that they were each periods when one of the two superpowers was forced to reevaluate their foreign policies. The re-evaluations were brought about by changes in the international arena, most importantly a change in the nature of military power. Because the two superpowers were to recognize the change in the nature of military power at different times, it was not until both the United States and the Soviet Union had re-evaluated and altered their foreign policies was the Cold War really over. This thesis will firstly discuss the theoretical approaches to International Relations and the issue of power. It will then identify and define this change in the nature of military power by tracing the evolution of war and conflict in the past century. The thesis then trace the development of both US and Soviet foreign policy from the origin of the Cold War, through its various stages until the fall of the Berlin Wall. Through materials obtained from both US and Soviet archives, as well as interviews, this thesis will argue that this change in the nature of power was a central factor in altering the thinking of American and Soviet leaders at the time they brought drastic change to their foreign policies. Finally, this thesis will briefly look at the future role of military power as the world moves into the twenty-first century.

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This study attempts to ascertain the nature of détente by clarifying the term, identifying common elements working for and against détente, and considering whether the history of various periods of détente suggests a cyclical or progressive pattern. First, détente is defined as a process - not a condition, policy or historical period. More specifically, it is the process of easing tension between states whose interests are so radically divergent that the possibilities of reconciliation are inherently limited. Second, by examining the post-war Soviet-American relationship and focusing individually on the four periods of détente that occurred during this time ('spirit of Geneva' 1955; 'spirit of Camp David' 1959; Post- Missile Crisis détente 1963-4; Moscow détente 1972-5), those common elements influencing the rise and fall of détente emerge. They include the influence of individual leaders, the fear of nuclear war, the self-perceived strength of the superpowers, the convergence of superpower special interests, the changing perceptions of détente and the national interest, and the difficulties in reaching a common code of détente. Finally, the character of détente is found to be progressive due to the legacy left by each period.

A partir de 1965, l’URSS cherche à profiter de la politique de « détente, entente, coopération » lancée par le général de Gaulle auprès des pays du pacte de Varsovie pour obtenir, via une conférence sur la sécurité européenne, le gel de l’ensemble des frontières du continent et la reconnaissance de la mainmise soviétique sur l’Europe de l’Est. Sauf que la France, partisane au contraire d’une détente censée aboutir au dépassement de l’ordre bipolaire issu de la guerre froide, n’entend pas entériner le statu quo politique et territorial européen. Dès 1969, la France décide peu à peu de se servir du projet de conférence pour promouvoir sa vision de l’Europe : la Conférence sur la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe doit d’une part favoriser le rapprochement entre tous les peuples du continent et d’autre part encourager chaque nation à s’exprimer en son nom propre, en dehors des alliances militaires.Lorsque trente-trois Etats européens, les Etats-Unis et le Canada se réunissent, de 1972 à 1975, pour négocier le contenu du futur Acte final de la CSCE, les Français tentent, avec leurs partenaires de la Communauté européenne, de faire de la conférence le prolongement multilatéral de la politique gaullienne de détente. Dans cette optique, ils veillent d’abord à ce que les frontières puissent être modifiées de façon pacifique : il s’agit de permettre à l’Allemagne d’être un jour réunifiée. Ils œuvrent également pour que la conférence facilite la coopération culturelle et la circulation des personnes entre l’Est et l’Ouest, le but étant, selon le président Pompidou, de transmettre aux pays communistes le « virus de la liberté » et d’enfoncer un coin dans le système des blocs. / From 1965, the USSR sought to take advantage of the French policy of détente launched by General de Gaulle towards the Warsaw Pact’s countries to set the borders in Europe and to obtain Western acknowledgment of the Soviet control over Eastern Europe. But France was in favour of a détente which would lead to overcome bipolarity created by the Cold War ; it did want to confirm the European political and territorial status quo. From 1969, France gradually decided to use the conference project to point out its vision of Europe: the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe had to promote the coming together of peoples of the whole continent and to encourage each nation to speak with its own particular voice, outside military alliances.When thirty-three European countries, the United States and Canada met, from 1972 to 1975, in order to negociate the Final Act’s content, the French and their European Community partners tried to make the conference a multilateral continuation of the Gaullist policy of détente.From this perspective, they first made sure that borders could be changed by peaceful means: it was crucial to reserve the German people’s right to be reunified. They also acted to make the CSCE facilitate cultural cooperation and movement of persons between East and West. According to President Georges Pompidou, the main goals were to transmit the « freedom virus » to the communist countries and to drive a wedge into the bipolar system.

The purpose of my dissertation was to examine the competition between the U.S.-led Western bloc and the Soviet bloc in the less developed world during Détente. I assessed whether or not the Soviet bloc pushed for strategic gains in the less developed world in the middle-to-late 1970’s and whether this contributed to the U.S. decision to abandon Détente in 1979. I made the attempt to test the international relations theory of balance of threat realism (Walt, 1992). I accomplished the test in two ways. First, I measured the foreign aid allocations (military and economic) made by each respective bloc towards the Third World by using a quantitative approach. Second, I examined U.S. archives using the process-tracing/historical method. The U.S. archives gave me the ability to evaluate how U.S. decision-makers and U.S. intelligence agencies interpreted the actions of the Soviet bloc. They also gave me the chance to examine the U.S. response as we evaluated the policies that were pushed by key U.S. decision-makers and intelligence agencies. On the question of whether or not the Soviet bloc was aggressive, the quantitative evidence suggested that it was not. Instead, the evidence found the Western-bloc to have been more aggressive in the less developed world. The U.S. archives also showed Soviet actions to have been defensive. Key U.S. decision-makers and intelligence agencies attested to this. Finally, the archives show that U.S. officials pushed for aggressive actions against the Third World during the final years of Détente. Thus, balance of threat realism produced an incorrect assessment that U.S. aggression in the late 1970’s was a response to Soviet aggression during Détente. The evidence suggests structural Marxism and domestic politics can better explain U.S./Western actions. The aggressive foreign aid allocations of the West, coupled with evidence of U.S. decision-makers/agencies vehemently concerned about the long-term prospects of the West, strengthened structural Marxism. Domestic politics can also claim to explain the actions of U.S. decision-makers. I found extensive archival evidence of bureaucratic inter-agency conflict between the State Department and other intelligence agencies in areas of strategic concern to the U.S.

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No description available.