This dissertation argues that through a secret backchannel, US National Security Adviser and later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to the US Anatoly Dobrynin formed a relationship which provided the empathy needed to bridge many of the ideological differences between their two countries. It examines transcripts of their telephone conversations from 1969-1977 when the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in detente, or a relaxation of tensions, during the Cold War. The dissertation concludes that the Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel serves as a case study of the effectiveness of back channels in international diplomacy.

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This thesis examines Britain’s role in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Based on multi-archival research and interviews with key diplomats, it presents the first in-depth study of Britain’s involvement in the negotiations leading up to the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975. It draws on Marc Trachtenberg’s notion of the ‘constructed peace’, and Alexander Wendt’s concept of ‘cultures of anarchy’ to elucidate how the rapprochement process at once stabilised and transformed the East-West conflict. This forms the theoretical framework of the thesis. The thesis revises the interpretation of détente as a status quo project driven by the imperatives of ‘Realpolitik’. Rather, different conceptions of stability and change challenged each other during the Helsinki talks. British diplomacy and the Final Act to which it contributed in fact linked the consolidation of the status quo to an ultimately transformative agenda that was infused with liberal ideas such as human rights. Realpolitik blended with Moralpolitik. To develop this argument, the thesis’ narrative first assesses Britain’s role in the early days of détente politics in the 1950s and 1960s. It then traces Britain’s role in the three main phases of the Helsinki process: the transition from bilateral to multilateral détente (1970-1972); preliminary talks (1972-1973); official negotiations (1973-1975). The British were defensive détente sceptics at the beginning of this process, but became ambitious and positive contributors over the course of the talks. The thesis thus argues that London played a significant part in the CSCE. British foreign policymakers were initially architects of the Cold War, but then early and active proponents of détente until the mid-1960s, when their continental partners adopted a more proactive approach. London was to return to the forefront of détente diplomacy when the CSCE process got under way. Its involvement in the CSCE also marked an important step in Britain’s own transformation into a European middle power. The multilateralisation of détente coincided with Britain’s integration into the European Community, providing a propitious environment in which London’s negotiators acted with determination and skill, thus reasserting their country’s influence despite its continuing relative decline.

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This dissertation seeks to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the political pressure group the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), which formed in 1976. The group's establishment, attainment of credibility, and influence in critical national security debates during the late 1970s has not yet been given sufficient attention. The Committee on the Present Danger has often been interpreted as a disingenuous propaganda group that dishonestly compiled an alarmist message to deceive politicians and journalists of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. However, the dissertation argues that the Committee's alarmism was genuine. The fact that CPD board members themselves became so fearful of the Soviet threat is the most striking aspect of the group's first four years of operation, and is the primary focus of this study. An examination of the group's formation and activities from 1976 to 1980 permits a more sophisticated appreciation of the group's goals, the promotion of its views, and the effects of its campaign on national security debates during this period. The dissertation adopts a chronological approach that recognises the creeping alarmism of the CPD over these years: warning of the dangers of détente gave way to prophesising an imminent Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Keeping the CPD as the focus of study in this period permits one to argue that the Committee's members, as a private citizens' group without government oversight and a shared worst-case methodology for assessing national security risks, sincerely came to believe in the veracity of their analysis of imminent Soviet military expansion. Committee experts generated and publicised a number of metrics that purported to demonstrate a military imbalance between the Soviet Union and the United States. Over time, and seemingly confirmed by alleged Soviet global aggression, the Committee came to believe that their worst-case estimates reflected reality.

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