A partir de 1965, l’URSS cherche à profiter de la politique de « détente, entente, coopération » lancée par le général de Gaulle auprès des pays du pacte de Varsovie pour obtenir, via une conférence sur la sécurité européenne, le gel de l’ensemble des frontières du continent et la reconnaissance de la mainmise soviétique sur l’Europe de l’Est. Sauf que la France, partisane au contraire d’une détente censée aboutir au dépassement de l’ordre bipolaire issu de la guerre froide, n’entend pas entériner le statu quo politique et territorial européen. Dès 1969, la France décide peu à peu de se servir du projet de conférence pour promouvoir sa vision de l’Europe : la Conférence sur la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe doit d’une part favoriser le rapprochement entre tous les peuples du continent et d’autre part encourager chaque nation à s’exprimer en son nom propre, en dehors des alliances militaires.Lorsque trente-trois Etats européens, les Etats-Unis et le Canada se réunissent, de 1972 à 1975, pour négocier le contenu du futur Acte final de la CSCE, les Français tentent, avec leurs partenaires de la Communauté européenne, de faire de la conférence le prolongement multilatéral de la politique gaullienne de détente. Dans cette optique, ils veillent d’abord à ce que les frontières puissent être modifiées de façon pacifique : il s’agit de permettre à l’Allemagne d’être un jour réunifiée. Ils œuvrent également pour que la conférence facilite la coopération culturelle et la circulation des personnes entre l’Est et l’Ouest, le but étant, selon le président Pompidou, de transmettre aux pays communistes le « virus de la liberté » et d’enfoncer un coin dans le système des blocs. / From 1965, the USSR sought to take advantage of the French policy of détente launched by General de Gaulle towards the Warsaw Pact’s countries to set the borders in Europe and to obtain Western acknowledgment of the Soviet control over Eastern Europe. But France was in favour of a détente which would lead to overcome bipolarity created by the Cold War ; it did want to confirm the European political and territorial status quo. From 1969, France gradually decided to use the conference project to point out its vision of Europe: the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe had to promote the coming together of peoples of the whole continent and to encourage each nation to speak with its own particular voice, outside military alliances.When thirty-three European countries, the United States and Canada met, from 1972 to 1975, in order to negociate the Final Act’s content, the French and their European Community partners tried to make the conference a multilateral continuation of the Gaullist policy of détente.From this perspective, they first made sure that borders could be changed by peaceful means: it was crucial to reserve the German people’s right to be reunified. They also acted to make the CSCE facilitate cultural cooperation and movement of persons between East and West. According to President Georges Pompidou, the main goals were to transmit the « freedom virus » to the communist countries and to drive a wedge into the bipolar system.

La tesi esamina la partecipazione della Santa Sede alla Conferenza per la Sicurezza e la Cooperazione in Europa (ora Organizzazione per la Sicurezza e la Cooperazione in Europa), concentrandosi sui documenti riguardanti la libertà religiosa. Premesse le circostanze geo-politiche che hanno portato alla convocazione della Conferenza e la posizione vaticana antecedente ad essa, vengono analizzati i lavori della Conferenza di Helsinki nonché delle Riunioni sui Seguiti di Belgrado, Madrid e Vienna. Inoltre, viene illustrata la trasformazione ed istituzionalizzazione della Conferenza e, quindi, l'attività dell'OSCE nell'ambito della dimensione umana dell'OSCE, esaminando le procedure e i meccanismi istituiti per la verifica degli impegni. Infine, viene preso in considerazione il programma promosso dall'OSCE sulla tolleranza e la non discriminazione verso gli appartenenti alle confessioni religiose. / The thesis investigates the Holy See's participation in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (now Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe), focusing on documents about religious freedom. After a brief description of the geo-politic scenery that brought to the Conference and the Holy See's position, the thesis analyzes the Helsinki Conference's works and thereafter the Follow-up Meetings of Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna. The thesis examines also the Conference's transformation and institutionalization and, then, the OSCE activity in the human dimension, focusing on procedures and mechanisms provided for the commitments' implementation. Finally, the thesis investigates the OSCE program for tolerance and non discrimination to religions' members.

Nel corso della sua lunga storia la Santa Sede è sempre stata protagonista attiva delle relazioni tra popoli, regni, Stati e nazioni. Un ruolo importante viene da essa svolto anche nel '900, specialmente a partire dalla Prima Guerra Mondiale, nell'ambito del tentativo di costruire un nuovo ordine internazionale fondato più sulla forza del diritto che sul diritto della forza. L'Enciclica Pacem in Terris ed il Concilio Vaticano II segnano l'inizio di un più deciso appoggio alla diplomazia multilaterale ed alle organizzazioni internazionali, specialmente ONU e CSCE-OSCE, come si può vedere nel caso della Prima Crisi del Golfo (1990-1991) e della dissoluzione della ex Jugoslavia (1991-1999). La Santa Sede elabora così, progressivamente, un proprio concetto di nuovo ordine internazionale, fondato sul diritto, sulla parità giuridica, sulla uguaglianza sostanziale degli Stati, dotato di un'Autorità centrale imparziale, a carattere democratico, in grado di imporre il rispetto di determinati principi fondamentali per una pace duratura, nella piena osservanza del principio di sussidiarietà. Un ideale ancora lontano dall'essere raggiunto. / Along his long history the Holy See has always played an important role in the relations between kingdoms, States and nations. This role remains important also in the 20th century, especially from World War One, in the pursuit of a new international order based more on the force of right than on the right of force. The Encyclical Pacem in terris and the II Vatican Council are the beginning of a deeper support to multilateral diplomacy and international organisations, particularly UNO and CSCE-OSCE, as it may be noticed during the First Gulf War (1990-1991) and the dissolution of former Yugoslavia (1991-1999). Thus, the Holy See has gradually developed a concept of new international order based on human rights and international law, juridical equality of all States, and on a central, impartial Authority capable of enforcing the respect of a given set of fundamental principles which are essential for the maintenance of peace, in the respect of the principle of subsidiarity. An ideal still far from reality.

A partir de 1965, l'URSS cherche à profiter de la politique de " détente, entente, coopération " lancée par le général de Gaulle auprès des pays du pacte de Varsovie pour obtenir, via une conférence sur la sécurité européenne, le gel de l'ensemble des frontières du continent et la reconnaissance de la mainmise soviétique sur l'Europe de l'Est. Sauf que la France, partisane au contraire d'une détente censée aboutir au dépassement de l'ordre bipolaire issu de la guerre froide, n'entend pas entériner le statu quo politique et territorial européen. Dès 1969, la France décide peu à peu de se servir du projet de conférence pour promouvoir sa vision de l'Europe : la Conférence sur la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe doit d'une part favoriser le rapprochement entre tous les peuples du continent et d'autre part encourager chaque nation à s'exprimer en son nom propre, en dehors des alliances militaires.Lorsque trente-trois Etats européens, les Etats-Unis et le Canada se réunissent, de 1972 à 1975, pour négocier le contenu du futur Acte final de la CSCE, les Français tentent, avec leurs partenaires de la Communauté européenne, de faire de la conférence le prolongement multilatéral de la politique gaullienne de détente. Dans cette optique, ils veillent d'abord à ce que les frontières puissent être modifiées de façon pacifique : il s'agit de permettre à l'Allemagne d'être un jour réunifiée. Ils œuvrent également pour que la conférence facilite la coopération culturelle et la circulation des personnes entre l'Est et l'Ouest, le but étant, selon le président Pompidou, de transmettre aux pays communistes le " virus de la liberté " et d'enfoncer un coin dans le système des blocs.

This thesis examines Britain’s role in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Based on multi-archival research and interviews with key diplomats, it presents the first in-depth study of Britain’s involvement in the negotiations leading up to the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975. It draws on Marc Trachtenberg’s notion of the ‘constructed peace’, and Alexander Wendt’s concept of ‘cultures of anarchy’ to elucidate how the rapprochement process at once stabilised and transformed the East-West conflict. This forms the theoretical framework of the thesis. The thesis revises the interpretation of détente as a status quo project driven by the imperatives of ‘Realpolitik’. Rather, different conceptions of stability and change challenged each other during the Helsinki talks. British diplomacy and the Final Act to which it contributed in fact linked the consolidation of the status quo to an ultimately transformative agenda that was infused with liberal ideas such as human rights. Realpolitik blended with Moralpolitik. To develop this argument, the thesis’ narrative first assesses Britain’s role in the early days of détente politics in the 1950s and 1960s. It then traces Britain’s role in the three main phases of the Helsinki process: the transition from bilateral to multilateral détente (1970-1972); preliminary talks (1972-1973); official negotiations (1973-1975). The British were defensive détente sceptics at the beginning of this process, but became ambitious and positive contributors over the course of the talks. The thesis thus argues that London played a significant part in the CSCE. British foreign policymakers were initially architects of the Cold War, but then early and active proponents of détente until the mid-1960s, when their continental partners adopted a more proactive approach. London was to return to the forefront of détente diplomacy when the CSCE process got under way. Its involvement in the CSCE also marked an important step in Britain’s own transformation into a European middle power. The multilateralisation of détente coincided with Britain’s integration into the European Community, providing a propitious environment in which London’s negotiators acted with determination and skill, thus reasserting their country’s influence despite its continuing relative decline.

The diploma thesis deals with the contemporary position of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in the European security architecture and, in particular, it is devoted to the assessment of the reform possibilities of this organization whose efficiency and relevance are being questioned these days. The thesis concentrates on the unique features of the OSCE as well as on the analysis of its strong and weak points and of the interests of the key players too. Previous attempts of the OSCE's reform including the most recent initiatives and proposals in a wide European security negotiations framework are also profoundly discussed. On the basis of preceding findings, summarizing conclusions are finally drawn and the thesis predicts probable scenarios concerning the future of OSCE and its reform process.

京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(法学) / 甲第24370号 / 法博第293号 / 新制||法||179(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院法学研究科法政理論専攻 / (主査)教授 中西 寛, 教授 唐渡 晃弘, 教授 島田 幸典 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Laws / Kyoto University / DGAM

This Thesis is to examine the topic of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which took place in 1973-1975. The proposals to convene the Security Conference date back to the fifties, when the Soviet Union called on the European countries to attend the Conference in order to resolve the security situation in Europe. During my research, I asked what motives were behind the invitation to convene the Conference and what caused the failure of these initiatives. I prove that the ultimate goal of the Soviet Union was not the conclusion of the collective agreement, but rather to weaken the West. In chronologic order I follow the development of the relations between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO in the sixties, which eventually led to the start of the Conference in 1973. I also describe interests of groups of countries during the Conference and analyze their role in the adoption of the Final Act.

Si la France n’est plus qu’une puissance moyenne en déclin relatif, la RFA est dans une phase de take off économique et amorce un rayonnement international. Dès son investiture, Brandt lance l’émancipation de l’Allemagne. L’Ostpolitik pourrait-elle avoir la priorité pour le gouvernement fédéral sur la politique communautaire ? La menace soviétique sur l’Allemagne est à prendre très au sérieux pour Pompidou. Réunification ; Neutralisation. Face à cette situation pluriellement très préoccupante, Pompidou a besoin de l’Europe ; mais en 1969, la construction européenne est dans l’impasse. 1971, Pompidou lance son modèle de construction de l’Union Européenne : le ‘gaullisme européen’. Son atout, Edward Heath, un ‘Européen sincère’. « On œuvre en commun, même avec l’Allemagne », affirme le Président. Le traité de l’Elysée : essentialité majeure dans l’apprentissage de l’autre ; embrayage du moteur franco-allemand ; banalisation des relations franco-allemandes. Ses enjeux : Pôle monétaire européen ; Coopération politique extérieure commune (Moyen-Orient) ; Programme ambitieux de la Conférence de Paris ; Identité Européenne ; Politique extérieure commune franco-allemande face à Moscou. Mais une politique autonome européenne pouvait-elle exister pour Washington ? Nixon et Kissinger manœuvrent pour imposer le partnership atlantique aux Européens. Crises du dollar (1971, 1973) ; Condominium américano-soviétique ; Conférence sur l’énergie. Bonn s’évertue en vain à œuvrer comme médiatrice entre Paris et Washington. / While France is only a middle power in relative decline, the FRG is in a phase of economic take off and begins an international influence. Upon his nomination, Brandt launches the emancipation of Germany. Could Ostpolitik have priority for the federal government over European Community policy? The Soviet threat to Germany is to be taken very seriously for Pompidou. Reunification; Neutralization. Faced with this plurially worrying situation, Pompidou needs Europe; but in 1969, the construction of Europe is deadlocked. 1971, Pompidou launches its construction model of the European Union: 'European Gaullism'. His asset, Edward Heath, a 'sincere European'. "We work jointly, even with Germany," says the President. The Elysée Treaty: major essentiality in the learning of the other; clutch of the Franco-German engine; normalization of Franco-German relations. Its challenges: European Monetary Pole; Common foreign policy cooperation (Middle East); Ambitious program of the Paris Conference; European identity ; Franco-German Common Foreign Policy against Moscow. But could an autonomous European policy exist for Washington? Nixon and Kissinger maneuvered to impose Atlantic partnership on Europeans. Dollar crises (1971, 1973); US-Soviet Condominium; Conference on Energy. Bonn strives in vain to work as a mediator between Paris and Washington.

The diploma thesis Comparison of the Exile Press's View of Events in Czechoslovakia Using Národní politika and České slovo As Examples analyses the content of exile periodicals relating to the events in Czechoslovakia from the late 1960s until 1989. The analysis focuses on four events which can be seen as key moments in the period in question. The first event covered in the work is the Prague Spring, commencing with the first flashes of change to the occupation by the Warsaw Pact forces and its consequences. The analysis then explores the Helsinki Conference and the related civil initiative of Charter 77. The last even analysed is the Velvet Revolution and the period immediately preceding it. The first part of the thesis gives a historical overview of the development of the situation in Czechoslovakia during the period in question with an emphasis on the aforementioned events in Czechoslovak history. The second part analyses and compares selected periodicals' view of these events and their reaction to the development of the situation in Czechoslovakia. Emphasis is also placed on how exiles saw their role in the events in Czechoslovakia. The thesis also focus on the second wave of emigration, often referred to as the post-August emigration, which brought a series of new challenges, including dealing...