Thesis (M.A.)--Carleton University, 1992. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître en droit (LL.M.)" / Est-ce que la décision de ne pas intégrer un élève handicapé sur le plan intellectuel dans une classe régulière est un acte discriminatoire au sens où elle viole les droits à l'égalité garantis par l'article 10 de la Charte québécoise et par l'article 15 de la Charte canadienne? L'hypothèse formulée en réponse à cette question est: oui, cette décision est discriminatoire parce qu'elle est fondée sur un motif illicite, à savoir le handicap. Une fois établi le cadre conceptuel de cette recherche en précisant le sens des concepts de discrimination, de handicap et d'intégration, l'étude de quelques décisions de la Cour d'appel du Québec révèle que, pour cette Cour, la norme d'égalité n'est pas la classe régulière, ce qui met en sourdine la conception de l'intégration comme droit objectif garantissant l'égalité. Ensuite, l'analyse de l'arrêt Eaton de la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario montre comment cette décision a suscité l'enthousiasme de ceux qui croyaient avoir trouvé dans le droit à l'égalité garanti par l'article 15 de la Charte canadienne un appui ferme pour l'intégration. Toutefois, la position de la Cour suprême dans l'arrêt Eaton a refroidi cet enthousiasme en rejetant toute présomption en faveur de l'intégration, lui préférant le critère du meilleur intérêt de l'enfant comme garant du droit à l'égalité pour les élèves intellectuellement handicapés. Ainsi, pour la Cour, le fait de ne pas intégrer ces élèves ne constitue pas en soi une forme de discrimination. / Does the decision not to integrate an intellectually disabled student in a regular c1ass constitute a discriminatory action in the sense that it violates equality rights guaranteed by section 10 of the Quebec Charter and by section 15 of the Canadian Charter ? The hypothesis formulated as an answer to that question is : yes, that decision is discriminatory because it is based on a forbidden ground, namely disability. The conceptual framework of this research is established by defining the concepts of discrimination, disability and integration. Then, the study of sorne Quebec Court of Appeal's decisions shows that in this Court's view the equality standard is not the regular c1ass, a position that underscores the conception of integration as an objective right ensuring equality. Next, the analysis of the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in Eaton shows how that decision has aroused the enthusiasm of those who thought that they had found a firm support for integration in the equality rights guaranteed by section 15 of the Canadian Charter. However, the Supreme Court's ruling in Eaton has dampened that enthusiasm by rejecting any presumption in favor of integration, and rather adopting the child's best interest criterion as ensuring equality rights for intellectually disabled students. Thus, in the Court' s view, the fact of non integrating those students does not by itself constitute a form of discrimination.

No description available.

Liberals claim that the exercise of state power must be justified on terms that all citizens can reasonably accept. They also support democracy. The challenge is to bring these two desideratum in line-- to ensure that democratic deliberations are somehow predicated on claims that all citizens can reasonably accept. Put differently, the challenge is to set the terms of public reason. Liberal philosophers advance grand theories of political justice towards this end. They claim that a reasonable argument in the political sphere is one that conforms to theory x. The difficulty is that there will be those who reasonably reject theory x, preferring theory y or z, or eschewing theory altogether. Pessimism at the prospect of agreement on higher-order theories of justice leads some to advocate simple majority rule. The thesis argues that convergence on higher order theory is not essential to public reason. The Supreme Court of Canada’s method of adjudication under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is used as a model. Where basic rights are engaged, or are alleged to be engaged, the Court examines the reasonableness of law and policy using a series of open-ended tests. These tests discipline their deliberations by focusing attention on generally accepted facts and values (notably, the values expressed by the Charter). The thesis contends that the Court’s open-ended, contextual approach can serve as a model for broader public reasoning. The thesis then explores the role of religious arguments within this model. In a polity committed above all to Charter values, what is the place of religion in the justification of law? It is argued that religion is understood to be private and inscrutable under the Charter. This is what justifies the Court’s generous reading of the right to religious freedom. It also justifies our forbidding state coercion in the name of religion. With the preceding ideas in mind, the thesis examines Canadian law and public discourse on the issues of therapeutic cloning (ch.4) and same sex marriage (ch.5).

Liberals claim that the exercise of state power must be justified on terms that all citizens can reasonably accept. They also support democracy. The challenge is to bring these two desideratum in line-- to ensure that democratic deliberations are somehow predicated on claims that all citizens can reasonably accept. Put differently, the challenge is to set the terms of public reason. Liberal philosophers advance grand theories of political justice towards this end. They claim that a reasonable argument in the political sphere is one that conforms to theory x. The difficulty is that there will be those who reasonably reject theory x, preferring theory y or z, or eschewing theory altogether. Pessimism at the prospect of agreement on higher-order theories of justice leads some to advocate simple majority rule. The thesis argues that convergence on higher order theory is not essential to public reason. The Supreme Court of Canada’s method of adjudication under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is used as a model. Where basic rights are engaged, or are alleged to be engaged, the Court examines the reasonableness of law and policy using a series of open-ended tests. These tests discipline their deliberations by focusing attention on generally accepted facts and values (notably, the values expressed by the Charter). The thesis contends that the Court’s open-ended, contextual approach can serve as a model for broader public reasoning. The thesis then explores the role of religious arguments within this model. In a polity committed above all to Charter values, what is the place of religion in the justification of law? It is argued that religion is understood to be private and inscrutable under the Charter. This is what justifies the Court’s generous reading of the right to religious freedom. It also justifies our forbidding state coercion in the name of religion. With the preceding ideas in mind, the thesis examines Canadian law and public discourse on the issues of therapeutic cloning (ch.4) and same sex marriage (ch.5).

This study explores the political impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the Supreme Court of Canada. This influence is contrasted with the judiciary's historic reluctance to recognize civil liberties, commencing with the position taken by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the cautious reaction of the Supreme Court to the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights. / The treatment of civil liberties under the Charter is considered through a survey of some of the Charter cases addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada. The political consequences of the Court's decisions are examined. Alternative possibilities for the Court's role in Canadian society are considered, including the prospects for entrenchment under the Meech Lake Accord and other recently proposed reforms. / The criticism that too much power is being vested in the "least democratic branch" is addressed and the suggestion that the Charter should be located in the "communitarian tradition of Canadian politics" is appraised. This study reflects upon the theoretical assumptions which underlie the existence of the Charter, as it evaluates the political theory behind differing conceptions of judicial interpretation. This thesis concludes by determining that the Supreme Court has made a positive political contribution to Canadian society.

As with many other disciplines, the study of medicine is being influenced by the change in the cultural make-up of our country. On occasion, conflicts may develop between the personal beliefs of medical students and the training they must undertake in order to become competent and caring physicians. What are the implications for medical school training in terms of the increasing diversity of the individuals applying to, and being accepted into, medical schools across this country? How much should we allow the personal beliefs and values of physicians-in-training to modify the medical education experience as it currently exists? Do we need to accommodate these individual student differences (religious and cultural) when designing and modifying the medical school curriculum? This thesis looks at the requirement for accommodation (as established in human rights legislation) and the rights of individuals entering into medical school training (as guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) and attempts to balance these individual rights against the goal of a medical school to develop a generic physician who is prepared, at completion of medical school training, to enter into many different post-graduate training programs. Medical school training involves a number of different types of learning including: knowledge acquisition, procedural competence, and the ability to interact in an intimate, yet wholly professional, manner with complete strangers. Current accreditation requirements demand that each medical student achieves a requisite level of knowledge, and the ability to perform certain physical examinations and associated procedures, by the completion of medical school training. Three distinct examples of possible requests for accommodation are examined during this thesis in order to determine if, and when, accommodation is reasonable and achievable. Although it is possible to allow some degree of modification of the medical school training process in order to accommodate religious or cultural beliefs of particular students, this accommodation is currently not possible if bona fide educational requirements are undermined during this accommodation or if accommodation of students would require undue hardship on the part of the particular medical school, staff or other students involved in the training process. Creating a standard process whereby students can request a modification of their involvement in the medical school curriculum (in order to accommodate religious or cultural differences) will facilitate unbiased and reasonable decision-making. This will allow students and faculty to have reasonable expectations about the ability of each individual to be successfully integrated into the medical school training program. It would also be useful and responsible to make it clear to students applying to be admitted to medical school where the limits are with respect to what degree of modification of medical school training is possible. The knowledge and clinical abilities that a student will be expected to master, within a Canadian medical school curriculum, must be consistent with the expectation of non-discrimination, as identified by provincial and national human rights legislation, and with the rights and freedoms as guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.