Jürgen Habermas is widely considered one of the most influential living philosophers and social theorists, whose work has spanned sixty years of academic writing. In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, he began to engage more explicitly with questions of religion in his work, helping to popularize the term “post-secularism,” and offered leading analysis on the problem of religion in the public sphere, expanding and innovating John Rawls’s idea of the “public use of reason.” While this shift in Habermas’s work is significant, he has long been interested in questions relating to religion, dating back to his doctoral dissertation in 1954. To date, very few scholars have traced the idea of religion in Habermas’s work as a whole, and none have developed an analysis of how his conception of religion changes in relation to shifts in his broader theoretical ideas, and to significant changes in politics, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. My dissertation thus offers the first English-language critical investigation of the social construction of Habermas’s theory of religion. More specifically, I provide a critique of his theory based on ideas generated within the critical study of religions, and revisit the controversy between “deconstruction” and “rational reconstruction” in contemporary critical theory. Ultimately, I aim to expand Habermas’s model of reason and rationality to include elements of myth, ritual, and symbols, along with their various iterations in contexts of interaction, and as they are expressed in cultural narratives about religion within the public sphere.

This thesis is about the reasonable agreement principle, a principle which holds that the exercise of political power must be acceptable to all reasonable citizens in order to be morally legitimate. Though this principle has become popular in contemporary political philosophy, it has been formulated and defended in a variety of often conflicting ways. I argue first that a successful defence of the principle will have to meet three conditions. First, it must explain who reasonable citizens are. Second, it must offer a compelling a rationale for tying the legitimacy of the exercise of political power to what these citizens accept. Third, it must show that the rules or principles that would be acceptable to reasonable citizens are not implausible. In the first part of the thesis, I examine some of the most significant ways in which the principle has been formulated and defended, and argue that none meets these three conditions. In the second part of the thesis, I develop an account of the reasonable agreement principle which can meet these three conditions. I argue that reasonable citizens should be understood as agents in circumstances where their powers of moral judgment operate free of distortions, offer an account of what these circumstances consist in, and suggest that a compelling rationale for the principle can be given when they are understood in this way. I then go on to consider what citizens in such circumstances would accept, arguing that they would accept principles of political morality that express a commitment to the fact that they are fallible choosers of their final ends.

<p>A fundamental problem in political philosophy is how the freedom and equality of persons can be reconciled with the authority of social morality or law. The Kantian solution is to hold that the exercise of authority can be legitimate if and only if it is freely endorsed by the subjects of its exercise; thereby allowing persons to act as both subject and legislator. However, the fact of reasonable pluralism makes this approach problematic. A recent attempt to solve this conflict between authority and the free and equal idea, while also accounting for the fact of reasonable pluralism, is the theory of public reason liberalism developed by Gerald Gaus. The aim of this thesis is to give a critical evaluation of how successful Gaus is in solving this fundamental problem, while also situating public reason liberalism within the larger debate. The first chapter gives an overview of Gaus's theory and introduces some preliminary worries about the possibility of successfully converging on a workable set of socio-moral rules under public reason liberalism. Chapter two goes further, developing an internal critique of Gaussean public reason liberalism, and showing how this critique could play out using real-world examples. Chapter three explores alternative approaches to realizing the free and equal ideal in an attempt to situate Gaus's theory within the larger debate; finally concluding that Gaussean public reason liberalism is deeply problematic, both on a theoretical and a practical level, yet still offers important insights into the relationship between social-morality and the freedom and equality of persons.</p> / Master of Philosophy (MA)

Habermas’s work since the turn of the millennium is characterized by an increased interest in the role of religion in politics. One of the most significant theses of this so-called “religious turn” is captured by Habermas’s institutional translation proviso, which calls on citizens to participate in translating religious contributions to public dialogue into a secular language purportedly accessible to all. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the translation proviso with a view both to the political inclusion of religious citizens and to the renewal of the normative resources required for democratic self-determination. By way of a critical engagement with the work of Immanuel Kant and Charles Taylor, I argue that, despite being limited as a solution to both problems, Habermas’s institutional translation proviso is nonetheless preferable to available alternatives. To that extent, I maintain that it is an indispensable feature of democratic politics in pluralist societies.

Thesis advisor: David Rasmussen / When is political power legitimate? Public reasons liberals argue that political power is legitimate only when it is supported by reasons drawn from principles of justice that each citizen could endorse. The most well known model for identifying whether a principle satisfies this requirement is John Rawls’ idea of an overlapping consensus. Typical interpretations of the idea of overlapping consensus hold that it expresses a necessary conceptual condition of any reasonable conception of justice. Against this ahistorical view, my analysis shows that Rawls’ mature account of overlapping consensus rests on a particular historicist thesis that liberal institutions are necessary for social cooperation given the presumption of moral and religious pluralism. The authority of public reasoning ultimately rests on a widespread consensus about the necessity of liberal institutions, rather than on a consensus on any particular conception of justice. The limits of public reason, on my analysis, are fixed first and foremost by liberal institutions. Given the prominent historical role of classical liberalism in specifying and defending liberal institutions, one might suppose that classical liberal conceptions of justice would have a central place in any consensus that defines the boundaries of public reasoning. I argue that this appearance is misleading. The work of scholars in disability studies show that conceptions of justice must be sufficiently sensitive to the unique needs and interests of citizens with disabilities. I argue that applying these insights to the idea of public reason shows that classical liberalism can satisfy the requirements of public reason only by unjustly ignoring the perspective of disabled citizens I show that Rawls’ model of public reason rests on a nuanced and historically grounded view of the consensus circumscribing public reason. Further, it shows that a historically conditioned concept of public reason and political legitimacy need not imply a drastic retreat from central egalitarian commitments, despite initial appearances to the contrary. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2018. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

The minority rights paradox is articulated at the level of political theory, is deployed by liberal democratic institutions, and can be observed in the political discourse of mass communications. Minority groups, it is argued, are paradoxically claiming purported rights that are unsupported by the values upon which the claimants base their claim. On the one hand, minority claims are made on the basis of rights secured by a liberal democracy; on the other hand, the claims undermine the legitimacy of liberal reasoning—the same reasoning that legitimizes the rights on which the claims are made. The self-referential implications of this paradox are as follows: Either the minority claim negates its own justification or the underlying justification renders the claim moot. In either case, the charge of paradox effectively puts an end to the conversation by dismissing minority rights claims before they are properly understood. My aim is to first, come to terms with political dialogues in which the charge of paradox occurs and second, to overcome the stultifying effects of the minority rights paradox through a deliberative approach to negotiating the concept and content of minority rights claims. Evaluating the claims of minorities, I will argue, requires a dialogue that can adapt to the participants in the dialogue—an inclusive deliberative process that gives formal, procedural and substantive recognition to the worldviews of minority cultures in political decision-making.

Political philosophers widely assume that public reason liberalism is hostile to religious contributions to liberal politics. My dissertation argues that this assumption is a mistake. Properly understood, public reason liberalism does not privilege religious or secular reasoning; a compelling conception of public reason liberalism can balance the claims of secular citizens and citizens of faith. I develop a framework that can resolve the tensions between liberalism and faith not only at a theoretical level but in the practical matters of dialogue, public policy, institutional design and constitutional law.

A democracia é, atualmente, o modelo preeminente de organização e de exercício da autoridade política. No entanto, os regimes políticos democráticos existentes ao redor do mundo nem sempre satisfazem critérios de justiça substantiva. Isto é, a democracia política pode existir, e perdurar ao longo do tempo, mesmo que se verifiquem violações claras de exigências normalmente associadas à justiça política e social. A partir dessa constatação, a questão substantiva desta dissertação é o exame da maneira pela qual considerações de justiça política e social são tratadas pela literatura da teoria democrática. O ponto de partida é o exame da teoria democrática minimalista. A despeito da acurácia e parcimônia analítica dessa teoria, as respostas que ela oferece à questão substantiva aqui examinada podem não ser satisfatórias. Portanto, são analisadas as formas de lidar com a nossa questão substantiva também no campo da teoria política normativa. Nesta análise, a principal alternativa teórica examinada é o liberalismo político de John Rawls, com o objetivo de desvendar em que medida o conteúdo normativo dessa teoria é menos ou mais compatível com as dimensões que são enfatizadas pela teoria democrática minimalista e que a tornam atraente. / Democracy currently is the most prominent model of organization and of exercising political power. However, democratic political regimes existing around the world do not always satisfy criteria of substantive justice. In other words, political democracy may exist and endure for long periods, even alongside with clear violations of requirements normally associated with political and social justice. In the face of this fact, the substantive question of this dissertation is the examination of the way how the literature on democratic theory deals with considerations of political and social justice. The starting point is the examination of the minimalist democratic theory. In spite of the accuracy and analytic parsimony of this theory, its answers to the substantive question, here examined, may not be satisfactory. Therefore, the ways in which the normative political theory deals with our substantive question are also analyzed. In the present analysis, John Rawls political liberalism is the main theoretical alternative examined, according to the objective of discovering in to what extent the normative content of Rawls theory is less or more compatible with the dimensions emphasized by the minimalist democratic theory, and that make it attractive.

A democracia é, atualmente, o modelo preeminente de organização e de exercício da autoridade política. No entanto, os regimes políticos democráticos existentes ao redor do mundo nem sempre satisfazem critérios de justiça substantiva. Isto é, a democracia política pode existir, e perdurar ao longo do tempo, mesmo que se verifiquem violações claras de exigências normalmente associadas à justiça política e social. A partir dessa constatação, a questão substantiva desta dissertação é o exame da maneira pela qual considerações de justiça política e social são tratadas pela literatura da teoria democrática. O ponto de partida é o exame da teoria democrática minimalista. A despeito da acurácia e parcimônia analítica dessa teoria, as respostas que ela oferece à questão substantiva aqui examinada podem não ser satisfatórias. Portanto, são analisadas as formas de lidar com a nossa questão substantiva também no campo da teoria política normativa. Nesta análise, a principal alternativa teórica examinada é o liberalismo político de John Rawls, com o objetivo de desvendar em que medida o conteúdo normativo dessa teoria é menos ou mais compatível com as dimensões que são enfatizadas pela teoria democrática minimalista e que a tornam atraente. / Democracy currently is the most prominent model of organization and of exercising political power. However, democratic political regimes existing around the world do not always satisfy criteria of substantive justice. In other words, political democracy may exist and endure for long periods, even alongside with clear violations of requirements normally associated with political and social justice. In the face of this fact, the substantive question of this dissertation is the examination of the way how the literature on democratic theory deals with considerations of political and social justice. The starting point is the examination of the minimalist democratic theory. In spite of the accuracy and analytic parsimony of this theory, its answers to the substantive question, here examined, may not be satisfactory. Therefore, the ways in which the normative political theory deals with our substantive question are also analyzed. In the present analysis, John Rawls political liberalism is the main theoretical alternative examined, according to the objective of discovering in to what extent the normative content of Rawls theory is less or more compatible with the dimensions emphasized by the minimalist democratic theory, and that make it attractive.

A tese examina a relação entre justiça e bem nos trabalhos tardios de John Rawls e, em especial, no livro O Liberalismo Político (1991). É argumentado que as mudanças nos trabalhos tardios de Rawls podem ser compreendidas como resultado de uma reorientação em seu pensamento. Rawls redesenhou alguns aspectos de sua filosofia para que ela cumpra um conjunto específico de papéis na cultura política pública das sociedades democráticas. Apesar das mudanças, os trabalhos tardios carregam consigo uma estrutura da relação entre justiça e bem que possui implicações importantes sobre o modo como os cidadãos, ao aceitar princípios políticos liberais, concebem suas doutrinas religiosas, filosóficas e morais a respeito do bem. A tese examina, portanto, como essas mudanças podem ser explicadas como resultado de uma reorientação que carrega consigo consequências relevantes para a relação entre justiça e bem. / This thesis examines the relationship between justice and good in the late works of John Rawls and, especially, in the book Political Liberalism (1991). It is argued that the changes in Rawls\' late work can be understood as as a result of a reorientation in his thinking. Rawls has redesigned some aspects of his philosophy so that it fulfills a specific set of roles in the public political culture of democratic societies. Despite the changes, late work carries with it a structure of the relationship between justice and well which has important implications for the way in which citizens, in accepting liberal political principles, conceive of their religious, philosophical and moral doctrines of good. The thesis examines, therefore, how these changes can be explained as a result of a reorientation that carries with it relevant consequences for the relationship between justice and good.