Canada’s foreign intelligence community as a whole has not received significant attention by the government and the public, and as a result it is still largely arranged to deal with the Cold War-era rather than the challenges of the 21st century. This thesis examines the issue by assessing Canada’s current foreign intelligence community regarding intelligence collection, analysis, and accountability. It argues that the structure of Canada’s foreign intelligence analysis is relatively disorganized and that a new foreign intelligence analysis organization would improve overall effectiveness, as well as potentially solve many issues the community faces. Canada’s lack of a dedicated foreign human intelligence agency is also addressed, but this thesis argues that before such an initiative could be feasible, let alone needed, it must first be supported by greater oversight and accountability measures alongside a better-organized intelligence analysis and assessment capability.

Canada’s foreign intelligence community as a whole has not received significant attention by the government and the public, and as a result it is still largely arranged to deal with the Cold War-era rather than the challenges of the 21st century. This thesis examines the issue by assessing Canada’s current foreign intelligence community regarding intelligence collection, analysis, and accountability. It argues that the structure of Canada’s foreign intelligence analysis is relatively disorganized and that a new foreign intelligence analysis organization would improve overall effectiveness, as well as potentially solve many issues the community faces. Canada’s lack of a dedicated foreign human intelligence agency is also addressed, but this thesis argues that before such an initiative could be feasible, let alone needed, it must first be supported by greater oversight and accountability measures alongside a better-organized intelligence analysis and assessment capability.

Countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development have experienced a decline in citizens' trust in government in the last few decades. In response, public administration shifted from traditional public administration to New Public Management (NPM) with the goal of increasing trust in government by trying to make government more responsive, work better, and cost less. An important element of NPM is the reliance on managerialism's application of private sector solutions such as performance management whose assumed strength is that it can deliver on efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability. An underlining basis of private sector imports into the public sector environment is that they are based on universalism – the existence of general laws irrespective of the situation or circumstance. Often, referred to as a 'one-size-fits-all' approach. However, after a few decades of implementing performance management based on universalistic principles the evidence suggests that performance management has not fully met expectations. Contrasting universalism is particularism - meaning that different rules and applications will depend on the situation, in other words, context matters. In short, 'no best way'. To explore the universalism vs particularism debate, this research uses the Management Accountability Framework (MAF) which is a Canadian government's long-standing performance management tool. The MAF serves as a proxy for a one-size-fits-all approach to performance management. With regards to particularism, this research employs a contingency approach as the theoretical basis to explore performance management. The contingency approach is premised on three core concepts: external contingent factors, internal contingent factors, and fit. The Canadian Intelligence Community (IC) is used as the case study to explore the primary question of whether a universalism-based or a particularism-based approach is better suited for performance management in the public sector? In seeking an answer to this question, two additional sub-questions are explored. First, what makes the IC different from the other policy domains? Second, what is the fit between the MAF and the IC's contingent factors? To answer these questions, data collection consisted of content analysis of documents as well as interviews with senior officials. Findings from this exploratory study reveal that universalism-based approaches to performance management should at the very least be complemented by particularism considerations. The IC was found to be different from other policy domains in terms of both external and internal contingent factors. The former consists of the threat environment, the legislative framework, and the external expectations of the IC. The latter consists of the intelligence process, the intelligence product, intelligence and secrecy, and the IC as a high reliability organization. It was found that there was more misfit than fit between the MAF and the IC's contingency factors. In exploring these questions, this research contributes concurrently to the public administration and intelligence studies literature in a number of ways. For instance, evidence that universalism-based approach to performance management does not always deliver what it promises, being able to intersect intelligence studies and public administration which is currently lacking, examining the 'hidden' parts of the public sector (i.e., the IC) that tends to be ignored in public administration, peering into the 'black box' of public sector organizations' management tools, the exploration of how practitioners use management tools, analyzing public sector organizations operating in a complex environment, adding to a limited non-historical contemporary Canadian IC literature, looking at the IC's performance-related issues that goes beyond the overwhelming intelligence failure literature. In addition to contributing to knowledge, the research highlights the importance of performance management and intelligence in relation to society.

Studies on Canadian Army military intelligence remain sparse in Canadian military historiography. This study is unique in that it focuses on the development, doctrine, and influence of intelligence within the I Canadian Corps throughout the Liri Valley battles during the Italian Campaign. It will be argued that I Canadian Corps intelligence achieved notable overall success in helping to break the Hitler Line by providing comprehensive and relatively up-to-date information on enemy dispositions and strengths which helped commanders and staff planners properly prepare for the operation. This success was attributable to three main factors: excellent intelligence personnel selection and training; the successful mentorship of I Canadian Corps intelligence by Eighth Army's intelligence cadre; and the overall effectiveness of 1st Canadian Infantry Division's intelligence organization which had been in the Mediterranean theatre since July 1943. Notwithstanding these successes, a number of faults within the Canadian Corps intelligence system must also be explained, including the poor performance of 5th Canadian Armoured Division's intelligence organization during the pursuit up the Liri–Sacco Valleys, and the mediocre execution of Corps counter-battery and counter-mortar operations. This study will demonstrate how an effective intelligence organization must augment existing army doctrine and how it can mitigate, though not completely eliminate, battlefield uncertainty. Further, it will also demonstrate that a comprehensive lessons-learned process must be undertaken to continually refine existing intelligence doctrine and procedures, with frequent training programs inculcating personnel in this doctrine. Taken as a whole, this study is unique as it is one of only several studies devoted solely to developing a greater understanding of a little-understood, and often forgotten, staff function within the Canadian Army during the Second World War.

Studies on Canadian Army military intelligence remain sparse in Canadian military historiography. This study is unique in that it focuses on the development, doctrine, and influence of intelligence within the I Canadian Corps throughout the Liri Valley battles during the Italian Campaign. It will be argued that I Canadian Corps intelligence achieved notable overall success in helping to break the Hitler Line by providing comprehensive and relatively up-to-date information on enemy dispositions and strengths which helped commanders and staff planners properly prepare for the operation. This success was attributable to three main factors: excellent intelligence personnel selection and training; the successful mentorship of I Canadian Corps intelligence by Eighth Army's intelligence cadre; and the overall effectiveness of 1st Canadian Infantry Division's intelligence organization which had been in the Mediterranean theatre since July 1943. Notwithstanding these successes, a number of faults within the Canadian Corps intelligence system must also be explained, including the poor performance of 5th Canadian Armoured Division's intelligence organization during the pursuit up the Liri–Sacco Valleys, and the mediocre execution of Corps counter-battery and counter-mortar operations. This study will demonstrate how an effective intelligence organization must augment existing army doctrine and how it can mitigate, though not completely eliminate, battlefield uncertainty. Further, it will also demonstrate that a comprehensive lessons-learned process must be undertaken to continually refine existing intelligence doctrine and procedures, with frequent training programs inculcating personnel in this doctrine. Taken as a whole, this study is unique as it is one of only several studies devoted solely to developing a greater understanding of a little-understood, and often forgotten, staff function within the Canadian Army during the Second World War.

Studies on Canadian Army military intelligence remain sparse in Canadian military historiography. This study is unique in that it focuses on the development, doctrine, and influence of intelligence within the I Canadian Corps throughout the Liri Valley battles during the Italian Campaign. It will be argued that I Canadian Corps intelligence achieved notable overall success in helping to break the Hitler Line by providing comprehensive and relatively up-to-date information on enemy dispositions and strengths which helped commanders and staff planners properly prepare for the operation. This success was attributable to three main factors: excellent intelligence personnel selection and training; the successful mentorship of I Canadian Corps intelligence by Eighth Army's intelligence cadre; and the overall effectiveness of 1st Canadian Infantry Division's intelligence organization which had been in the Mediterranean theatre since July 1943. Notwithstanding these successes, a number of faults within the Canadian Corps intelligence system must also be explained, including the poor performance of 5th Canadian Armoured Division's intelligence organization during the pursuit up the Liri–Sacco Valleys, and the mediocre execution of Corps counter-battery and counter-mortar operations. This study will demonstrate how an effective intelligence organization must augment existing army doctrine and how it can mitigate, though not completely eliminate, battlefield uncertainty. Further, it will also demonstrate that a comprehensive lessons-learned process must be undertaken to continually refine existing intelligence doctrine and procedures, with frequent training programs inculcating personnel in this doctrine. Taken as a whole, this study is unique as it is one of only several studies devoted solely to developing a greater understanding of a little-understood, and often forgotten, staff function within the Canadian Army during the Second World War.