The objective of this research is to gain a better understanding into the feasibility of establishing a monetary union in SADC in the context of the agreed targets set out by SADC and the African Union. Seven experts in the field of monetary integration within SADC participated in this research and their feedback was analysed and themes captured in terms of the five research questions posed. The questions posed as part of this research explores whether trading blocs are moving towards monetary union, whether the targets set out by SADC for monetary integration are being met, whether the time frame agreed by SADC is reasonable and whether there is political will from member countries for such a monetary union in SADC. The researcher has identified three main reasons why monetary union would be beneficial for the SADC region, and also identified the four pillars of monetary integration that is required for monetary integration to succeed. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

SMEs are conduits for the transformation of economies because they act as catalysts for private sector development. However, they face several constraints to accessing finances for their growth and development. Hence, by using a secondary dataset from the Central Bank of Eswatini that comprises 1,390 loan applicants, an empirical analysis was done using a binary logistic regression analysis to assess credit rationing factors preventing SMEs in the Kingdom of Eswatini to access DFIs loans for their growth and development. Thus, the objectives of the study are to examine the relationships between credit rationing factors and their effects on accessing DFI loans in the Kingdom of Eswatini. Descriptive analysis provided an explanation as to how these factors influence the financing of SMEs in the Kingdom of Eswatini. Pearson's correlation coefficient was, therefore, employed to determine the relationships between credit rationing factors and binary logistic regression analysis to examine the effect of these factors on DFIs loans accessibility. This method was used to determine the strength of the relationship between loan access and credit rationing factors. The findings show that the age of SMEs and loan amounts are some of the major negative factors impacting access to DFIs loans in the Kingdom of Eswatini. A mature SME is less constrained to access DFIs loan compared to start-ups and growing SMEs. Furthermore, SMEs that apply for sustainable loans are less constrained to access DFIs loans than those that apply for unsustainable and very high amounts. It is, therefore, concluded that DFIs in the Kingdom of Eswatini apply credit rationing in dispersing loans to SMEs. DFIs should link their loan amount to demands and to the period of existence, as only well established and matured SMEs have an added advantage in accessing DFIs loans. For these reasons, it is recommended that economic policy makers should devise loan access policies that suit start-ups and growing SME for their conducive development and growth. This policy is vital because SMEs have a pivotal role to play in the overall economic growth of the Kingdom of Eswatini.

This dissertation studies topics in financial economics. In the first chapter, Raising Bond Capital in Segmented Markets, I study the cost of bond capital. The cost of bond capital to firms that is determined at issuance often exceeds yields trading in secondary bond markets. I find that the difference between yields at issuance and in secondary markets, the ``issuance premium'', spikes in bad times, increasing firms' costs of capital. This suggests that the economics of the relatively understudied primary bond markets -- where firms sell new bonds via underwriters to investors -- are important for understanding firms' costs of capital and access to credit over the cycle. Leveraging new data on bond issuance, I estimate a model of primary markets that explains the issuance premium and its impact on bond issuance volume. Using high-frequency variation in bond supply as an instrument, I find that investors are more sensitive to issuance premiums than the remainder of credit spreads. As issuance premiums rise in bad times, the share of more price-elastic short-term investors endogenously increases, supporting bond volumes. The preferences of primary market investors therefore directly affect the transmission of shocks to firms' costs of capital and bond issuance volume, as well as the price impacts of corporate bond purchase policies. The second chapter, Bond Market Stimulus: Firm-Level Evidence from 2020-21, is co-authored with Olivier Darmouni. We use micro-data on corporate balance sheets to study firm behavior after the unprecedented policy support to corporate bond markets in 2020. We find that as bond yields fell, firms issued bonds to accumulate large and persistent amounts of liquid assets instead of investing. Conceptually, the benefits depend on how highly bond issuers valued this liquidity at the margin. We show they generally had access to bank liquidity that they chose not to use: many issuers left their credit lines untouched, while others used bonds to repay existing loans. Moreover, equity payouts remained high: almost half of issuers still repurchased shares in Spring 2020. In the third chapter, Global Demand Spillovers: the Role of Underwriting Networks, I study the role of underwriter networks in transmitting demand shocks across global jurisdictions. Using novel data and a difference-in-differences strategy, I find that central bank corporate bond purchases spill over to foreign jurisdictions through bond underwriting networks. The diff-in-diff exploits the European Central Bank's 2016 corporate sector purchase program. I compare U.S. firms connected to underwriters with more or less Eurozone clients. Firms connected with banks with more European clients had larger orderbooks and issued more at lower costs. Treated firms do not increase real investment, but rather increase equity payouts. I identify bond underwriting networks as a novel channel through which demand shocks spread across borders. These results matter for understanding the overall impact of corporate quantitative easing programs.

- Comparison of legal status and activities of the Czech and Slovak central banks This thesis describes and compares legal status and activities of two european banks, the National bank of Slovak republic (hereinafter "NBS"), which has became the member of euro area since 1. 1. 2009, and the Czech national bank (hereinafter "CNB"), which has not became the member of this monetary union. The aim of this thesis is to identify identical aspects and different elements in legal status of above mentioned banks and in activites they carry out. Hypothesis of this thesis says that CNB and NBS are very similar in the way of legal regulations but different in activities they carry out. Purpose is to verify this hypothesis and think about possible causes of these similarities and differences in legal status and activities of CNB and NBS. The first part of this thesis deals with the State bank of czechoslovakia which was form in 1950 and which operated in the area of ČSFR just before the establishment of two separate central banks, CNB and NBS. This part is focused on legal regulation which established the State bank of czechoslovakia and which has became an inspiration for these new rising central banks, CNB and NBS. The second part of this thesis targets on the constitutional and legal regulations of CNB and...

After decades of political and technical efforts to supranationalise prudential regulation at the EU level, a key step to bridge the gap between rule-making centralisation and its decentralised implementation has been the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). In spite of its major accomplishments, the SSM faces a key challenge: achieving supervisory consistency in essentially diversified euro area banking systems. This dissertation identifies the building blocks of supervisory consistency and the sources of diversity inherent in banking supervision; it also distinguishes internal from external dimensions of consistency, which correspond to national and banking diversities, respectively. Drawing on the qualitative analysis of official documents, speeches, public hearings, and interviews with national and supranational supervisors, banks, banks associations, and EU institutions, the research examines the relationships shaping the balance between consistency in integrated markets and diversity, by focusing on the SSM’s prudential and regulatory competences. It first traces and compares the evolution of supervisory governance through literature- and empirically-driven governance indicators and their conceptualisation. It then analyses the changing nature of the supervisory instruments beyond the hard-soft law dichotomy. The German and Italian cases are used to test the capacity of the supranational supervisor to accommodate diversity, and illustrate how different supervisory styles have emerged over time. This study argues that centralisation, methodological standardisation, and the development of non-binding policy documents are important for the achievement of consistent results. However, the effectiveness of supranational law and its enforcement by the European Central Bank involve fundamental trade-offs: a more limited local autonomy, institutional overlap, communication and transparency concerns from banks, and legitimacy issues arising from supervisory instruments, can compromise the system. Nonetheless, thanks to its resources and privileged Banking Union-wide position, the SSM is well-placed to strengthen sensitivity to diversity in order to manage the current transformation of traditional banking paradigms.

Detrás das ações levadas pela autoridade monetária, encontra-se uma estratégia sistemática impulsionada pelas preferências relativas à consecução de determinadas metas. Num regime de metas de inflação, apesar de um claro mandato voltado à estabilidade de preços, a autoridade monetária é menos explícito com seus outros objetivos de política monetária. O presente trabalho tem por objetivo identificar as preferências da autoridade monetária peruana sob o regime de metas de inflação através da derivação de regras monetárias ótimas. Para atingir a tal objetivo, empregou-se uma estratégia de calibração. Esta estratégia baseia-se na escolha dos valores dos parâmetros de preferências que minimizem o desvio quadrático entre a verdadeira taxa de juros e a taxa de juros ótima simulada. Os resultados evidenciaram que autoridade monetária tem aplicado um regime de metas de inflação flexível, priorizando a estabilização da inflação, mas sem ter desprezado o gradualismo da taxa de juros. Por outro lado, a preocupação pela estabilização do produto tem sido mínima, revelando que o hiato do produto tem sido importante porque ela contém informação sobre a inflação futura e não porque seja considerada como uma variável meta em si mesma. Finalmente, quando o suavizamento da taxa de câmbio nominal é considerado na função perda da autoridade monetária, a ordem de importância das preferências tem-se mantido e o suavizamento da taxa de câmbio apresentou um peso insignificante. Este último resultado tem sido consistente com o esquema de metas de inflação adotado pelo Peru, dissipando qualquer conflito de objetivos que finalmente coloquem em risco a credibilidade da autoridade monetária que é tão necessária para ancorar as expectativas inflacionarias. / Behind the actions taken by the monetary authority, is a systematic strategy driven by preferences for the achievement of certain goals. In a regime of inflation targeting, despite a clear mandate aimed at price stability, the monetary authority is less explicit with its other goals of monetary policy. This study aims to identify the preferences of the monetary authority in the Peruvian regime of inflation targeting through the derivation of optimal monetary rules. To achieve this goal, employed a strategy of calibration. This strategy is based on the choice of values of the parameters of preferences that minimize the square deviation between the true interest rate and interest rate optimal simulation. The results showed that the monetary authority has applied a system of flexible inflation targeting, prioritizing the stabilization of inflation, but without having despised gradualism in interest rates. On the other hand, concern for stabilizing output has been minimal, revealing that the output gap has been important because it contains information about future inflation and not because it is considered a variable goal in itself. Finally, when the smoothing of the nominal exchange rate is considered in the loss function of the monetary authority, the rank order of preferences has been maintained and the smoothing of the exchange rate showed insignificant. The latter result has been consistent with the scheme of inflation targets adopted by Peru, dispelling any conflict of objectives that ultimately jeopardize the credibility of the monetary authority that is so necessary to anchor inflationary expectations.

This thesis consists of three empirical papers on central bank institutional design.Chapter 1 contributes to the debate on the importance of central bank independence (CBI) in lowering inflation rates. It stresses the relevance of employing indices of central bank independence computed dynamically in two ways. First, it recomputes the evolution of the Grilli et al. (1991) index of CBI and shows that the timing of large legislative reforms is closely related to inflation rate dynamics. Using unit root tests with endogenous structural breaks, I find that reforms that modify the degree of CBI represent structural breaks in the inflation rate dynamics. Second, employing the dynamic Grilli et al. (1991) index of independence confirms the negative relationship between CBI and inflation in a sample of 10 advanced economies.Chapter 2 presents a new and comprehensive database of central bank institutional design for 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. This chapter describes in detail the sources of information and the coding rules used to create a new index of central bank independence. It also compares this new index with the classical measures of CBI and highlights the new aspects of central bank institutional design included in this database such as financial independence and accountability. An important innovation of this new index is its dynamic nature. This enables an investigation of the endogenous determination of the level of independence of central banks and suggests several instruments for the CBI index. Using an instrumental variable approach, this chapter provides strong support for a causal, negative CBI-inflation nexus.Chapter 3 uses a political economy framework to investigate the drivers of reforms in central bank institutional design. Using the new CBI index developed in Chapter 2, this Chapter investigates the determinants of central bank reforms in a sample of 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. The results obtained suggest that the incentives generated by initial reforms which increased the level of independence, as well as a regional convergence, represent important drivers of reforms in central bank design. At the same time, an external pressure to reform, such as obtaining an IMF loan or joining a monetary union, also increases the likelihood of reforms, while government changes or crises episodes have little impact. / This thesis consists of three empirical papers on central bank institutional design.Chapter 1 contributes to the debate on the importance of central bank independence (CBI) in lowering inflation rates. It stresses the relevance of employing indices of central bank independence computed dynamically in two ways. First, it recomputes the evolution of the Grilli et al. (1991) index of CBI and shows that the timing of large legislative reforms is closely related to inflation rate dynamics. Using unit root tests with endogenous structural breaks, I find that reforms that modify the degree of CBI represent structural breaks in the inflation rate dynamics. Second, employing the dynamic Grilli et al. (1991) index of independence confirms the negative relationship between CBI and inflation in a sample of 10 advanced economies.Chapter 2 presents a new and comprehensive database of central bank institutional design for 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. This chapter describes in detail the sources of information and the coding rules used to create a new index of central bank independence. It also compares this new index with the classical measures of CBI and highlights the new aspects of central bank institutional design included in this database such as financial independence and accountability. An important innovation of this new index is its dynamic nature. This enables an investigation of the endogenous determination of the level of independence of central banks and suggests several instruments for the CBI index. Using an instrumental variable approach, this chapter provides strong support for a causal, negative CBI-inflation nexus.Chapter 3 uses a political economy framework to investigate the drivers of reforms in central bank institutional design. Using the new CBI index developed in Chapter 2, this Chapter investigates the determinants of central bank reforms in a sample of 65 countries over the period 1972--2014. The results obtained suggest that the incentives generated by initial reforms which increased the level of independence, as well as a regional convergence, represent important drivers of reforms in central bank design. At the same time, an external pressure to reform, such as obtaining an IMF loan or joining a monetary union, also increases the likelihood of reforms, while government changes or crises episodes have little impact.

Detrás das ações levadas pela autoridade monetária, encontra-se uma estratégia sistemática impulsionada pelas preferências relativas à consecução de determinadas metas. Num regime de metas de inflação, apesar de um claro mandato voltado à estabilidade de preços, a autoridade monetária é menos explícito com seus outros objetivos de política monetária. O presente trabalho tem por objetivo identificar as preferências da autoridade monetária peruana sob o regime de metas de inflação através da derivação de regras monetárias ótimas. Para atingir a tal objetivo, empregou-se uma estratégia de calibração. Esta estratégia baseia-se na escolha dos valores dos parâmetros de preferências que minimizem o desvio quadrático entre a verdadeira taxa de juros e a taxa de juros ótima simulada. Os resultados evidenciaram que autoridade monetária tem aplicado um regime de metas de inflação flexível, priorizando a estabilização da inflação, mas sem ter desprezado o gradualismo da taxa de juros. Por outro lado, a preocupação pela estabilização do produto tem sido mínima, revelando que o hiato do produto tem sido importante porque ela contém informação sobre a inflação futura e não porque seja considerada como uma variável meta em si mesma. Finalmente, quando o suavizamento da taxa de câmbio nominal é considerado na função perda da autoridade monetária, a ordem de importância das preferências tem-se mantido e o suavizamento da taxa de câmbio apresentou um peso insignificante. Este último resultado tem sido consistente com o esquema de metas de inflação adotado pelo Peru, dissipando qualquer conflito de objetivos que finalmente coloquem em risco a credibilidade da autoridade monetária que é tão necessária para ancorar as expectativas inflacionarias. / Behind the actions taken by the monetary authority, is a systematic strategy driven by preferences for the achievement of certain goals. In a regime of inflation targeting, despite a clear mandate aimed at price stability, the monetary authority is less explicit with its other goals of monetary policy. This study aims to identify the preferences of the monetary authority in the Peruvian regime of inflation targeting through the derivation of optimal monetary rules. To achieve this goal, employed a strategy of calibration. This strategy is based on the choice of values of the parameters of preferences that minimize the square deviation between the true interest rate and interest rate optimal simulation. The results showed that the monetary authority has applied a system of flexible inflation targeting, prioritizing the stabilization of inflation, but without having despised gradualism in interest rates. On the other hand, concern for stabilizing output has been minimal, revealing that the output gap has been important because it contains information about future inflation and not because it is considered a variable goal in itself. Finally, when the smoothing of the nominal exchange rate is considered in the loss function of the monetary authority, the rank order of preferences has been maintained and the smoothing of the exchange rate showed insignificant. The latter result has been consistent with the scheme of inflation targets adopted by Peru, dispelling any conflict of objectives that ultimately jeopardize the credibility of the monetary authority that is so necessary to anchor inflationary expectations.

Detrás das ações levadas pela autoridade monetária, encontra-se uma estratégia sistemática impulsionada pelas preferências relativas à consecução de determinadas metas. Num regime de metas de inflação, apesar de um claro mandato voltado à estabilidade de preços, a autoridade monetária é menos explícito com seus outros objetivos de política monetária. O presente trabalho tem por objetivo identificar as preferências da autoridade monetária peruana sob o regime de metas de inflação através da derivação de regras monetárias ótimas. Para atingir a tal objetivo, empregou-se uma estratégia de calibração. Esta estratégia baseia-se na escolha dos valores dos parâmetros de preferências que minimizem o desvio quadrático entre a verdadeira taxa de juros e a taxa de juros ótima simulada. Os resultados evidenciaram que autoridade monetária tem aplicado um regime de metas de inflação flexível, priorizando a estabilização da inflação, mas sem ter desprezado o gradualismo da taxa de juros. Por outro lado, a preocupação pela estabilização do produto tem sido mínima, revelando que o hiato do produto tem sido importante porque ela contém informação sobre a inflação futura e não porque seja considerada como uma variável meta em si mesma. Finalmente, quando o suavizamento da taxa de câmbio nominal é considerado na função perda da autoridade monetária, a ordem de importância das preferências tem-se mantido e o suavizamento da taxa de câmbio apresentou um peso insignificante. Este último resultado tem sido consistente com o esquema de metas de inflação adotado pelo Peru, dissipando qualquer conflito de objetivos que finalmente coloquem em risco a credibilidade da autoridade monetária que é tão necessária para ancorar as expectativas inflacionarias. / Behind the actions taken by the monetary authority, is a systematic strategy driven by preferences for the achievement of certain goals. In a regime of inflation targeting, despite a clear mandate aimed at price stability, the monetary authority is less explicit with its other goals of monetary policy. This study aims to identify the preferences of the monetary authority in the Peruvian regime of inflation targeting through the derivation of optimal monetary rules. To achieve this goal, employed a strategy of calibration. This strategy is based on the choice of values of the parameters of preferences that minimize the square deviation between the true interest rate and interest rate optimal simulation. The results showed that the monetary authority has applied a system of flexible inflation targeting, prioritizing the stabilization of inflation, but without having despised gradualism in interest rates. On the other hand, concern for stabilizing output has been minimal, revealing that the output gap has been important because it contains information about future inflation and not because it is considered a variable goal in itself. Finally, when the smoothing of the nominal exchange rate is considered in the loss function of the monetary authority, the rank order of preferences has been maintained and the smoothing of the exchange rate showed insignificant. The latter result has been consistent with the scheme of inflation targets adopted by Peru, dispelling any conflict of objectives that ultimately jeopardize the credibility of the monetary authority that is so necessary to anchor inflationary expectations.

The thesis deals with relation between central bank independence and accountability. The relation is examined on example of quantitative easing implemented in the period 2005 - 2016 by the European central bank and the Federal Reserve System. From the theoretical and practical point of view the thesis proves that the relation between central bank independence and accountability are influenced by the specification of targets of monetary policy to a great extent. The thesis also proves that the specific definition of both central bank independence and accountability influenced the characteristics of quantitative resp. credit easing. Moreover, such monetary policy can potentially endanger the independence of both central banks in many ways. Thus, the implementation of quantitative easing itself and its potential consequences evidences that the contemporary conception of central bank independence and accountability is insufficient and needs to be reviewed.