Universities have traditionally stood as bastions of academic freedom and forums for open discourse and free expression. In recent years, however, this role has been questioned in instances where university administrators have, either directly or complicity, denied students the opportunity to express certain viewpoints they deem “controversial”. This research paper explores whether a university, or its delegates, should be allowed to deny students access to campus facilities and resources solely on the basis of ideological viewpoint. The relevance of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, statutory human rights provisions, and common law doctrines to the student-university relationship are explored in turn. It is argued that, notwithstanding the fact that universities may be “private” actors to whom the Charter does not directly apply, they are institutions invested with a public interest, and as such ought to be subject to special duties of non-discrimination.

The aim of this thesis is to provide an analytic framework for the governance of suspended declarations of invalidity in Canadian constitutional law. A suspended declaration is a remedial device by which a court strikes down a constitutionally invalid law, but suspends the effect of its order such that the law retains force for a temporary period. While introduced to Canadian law under circumstances of exigency, suspended declarations have grown to be used liberally by the courts, and the principles that previously confined them have been abandoned. As a result, constitutional rights have sometimes been suspended without just basis. I propose a means to reverse this trend: by adopting proportionality, a core feature of the analytic method used to adjudicate limitations on Charter rights, as a remedial principle guiding the use of suspended declarations. I review the jurisprudence of South Africa’s Constitutional Court to illustrate the merits of this approach.

This paper examines the Attorney General’s obligation, in Canada and New Zealand, to report on inconsistencies in proposed legislation with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Although the obligations are similar, the Canadian and New Zealand Attorneys General have developed very different reporting cultures. The Canadian Attorney General has never issued a report; the New Zealand Attorney General has issued many. This paper’s thesis is that the different reporting cultures are attributable to the different constitutional structure in each jurisdiction and different understandings of the independence of the Attorney General. Under this analysis, the usefulness of comparative analysis between the two jurisdictions is limited: constitutional differences cannot be ignored. The paper evaluates proposed changes to the reporting obligation in each jurisdiction in light of this analysis.

The aim of this thesis is to provide an analytic framework for the governance of suspended declarations of invalidity in Canadian constitutional law. A suspended declaration is a remedial device by which a court strikes down a constitutionally invalid law, but suspends the effect of its order such that the law retains force for a temporary period. While introduced to Canadian law under circumstances of exigency, suspended declarations have grown to be used liberally by the courts, and the principles that previously confined them have been abandoned. As a result, constitutional rights have sometimes been suspended without just basis. I propose a means to reverse this trend: by adopting proportionality, a core feature of the analytic method used to adjudicate limitations on Charter rights, as a remedial principle guiding the use of suspended declarations. I review the jurisprudence of South Africa’s Constitutional Court to illustrate the merits of this approach.

This paper examines the Attorney General’s obligation, in Canada and New Zealand, to report on inconsistencies in proposed legislation with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Although the obligations are similar, the Canadian and New Zealand Attorneys General have developed very different reporting cultures. The Canadian Attorney General has never issued a report; the New Zealand Attorney General has issued many. This paper’s thesis is that the different reporting cultures are attributable to the different constitutional structure in each jurisdiction and different understandings of the independence of the Attorney General. Under this analysis, the usefulness of comparative analysis between the two jurisdictions is limited: constitutional differences cannot be ignored. The paper evaluates proposed changes to the reporting obligation in each jurisdiction in light of this analysis.

Universities have traditionally stood as bastions of academic freedom and forums for open discourse and free expression. In recent years, however, this role has been questioned in instances where university administrators have, either directly or complicity, denied students the opportunity to express certain viewpoints they deem “controversial”. This research paper explores whether a university, or its delegates, should be allowed to deny students access to campus facilities and resources solely on the basis of ideological viewpoint. The relevance of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, statutory human rights provisions, and common law doctrines to the student-university relationship are explored in turn. It is argued that, notwithstanding the fact that universities may be “private” actors to whom the Charter does not directly apply, they are institutions invested with a public interest, and as such ought to be subject to special duties of non-discrimination.

In this thesis I address the question of sympathetic action - action by one group of workers designed to aid another group of workers in their struggle with an employer, manifested most obviously through refusals by workers to cross a picket line - through the lens of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As the law currently stands in Canada, undertaking sympathetic action collectively is invariably illegal as it is considered an illegal "strike" under Canadian labour legislation. Further, workers who undertake sympathetic action - whether collectively or individually - can be subject to discipline or discharge by their employer. I argue that workers who undertake sympathetic action can have numerous motivations, ranging from economic self-interest to deeply-held political or moral beliefs (the latter manifested through the concept of "solidarity"), and that when those motivations include expressive or conscientious interests, sympathetic action should be entitled to protection by the fundamental freedoms of conscience, expression, and association found in section 2 of the Charter. I further argue that a each of these freedoms represents a different aspect of the inherent dignity and worth of an individual, and that a right to sympathetic action promotes both those freedoms and Charter values. Finally, I argue that a constitutional right to sympathetic action is a free-standing right that can exist even in the absence of a constitutional right to strike. This thesis reviews the current and historical state of Canadian law (in both the statutory labour relations regimes and in common law) regarding sympathetic action, the potential application of the Charter freedoms of conscience, expression, and association to sympathetic action, and finally options for reform that reduce or eliminate restrictions on sympathetic action and therefore make our labour relations system more in keeping with Charter values.

This thesis examines the Safe Third Country Agreement between Canada and the United States from the perspective of Canada's obligations vis-a-vis asylum seekers under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Safe Third Country Agreement requires asylum seekers to lodge their refugee claims in the first country of arrival, as between Canada and the United States. Asylum seekers on the United States side of the border who are seeking to enter Canada for the purpose of claiming refugee status will be deflected to the United States to lodge their claims there. By deflecting asylum seekers in this manner, Canada effectively conscripts the United States to carry out its obligations under the Charter to furnish procedural and substantive protections to asylum seekers. This thesis examines certain features of the United States asylum system to which asylum seekers deflected under the Safe Third Country Agreement would be subjected, in order to determine whether, according to relevant Charter jurisprudence, deflection constitutes a deprivation of security of the person under section 7 of the Charter and whether such deprivation can be justified under section 1.

Data matching is the automated process permitting the comparison of significant amounts of personal data from two or more different databanks in order to produce new information. Its use by governments implicates many rights and freedoms, including the protection against unreasonable search and seizure under section 8 of the Canadian Charter. / In the author's opinion, a governmental data matching program will probably constitute a search or seizure under section 8 when a positive answer is given to two questions. First, is there a use or transfer of information which implicates constitutionally protected information? Generally, section 8 will only protect biographical personal information, as described in the Plant case. Second, one must determine if a reasonable expectation of privacy exists as to the purpose for which the information will be used. In other words, one must determine if the two governmental databanks are separate on the constitutional level. / However, a positive answer to both of theses questions does not mean that the matching program necessarily infringes section 8. It will not be considered unreasonable if it is authorised by law, if the law itself is reasonable, and if the execution of the program is reasonable. Presuming that the program is authorised by law, it is probable that a matching program aimed to detect individuals collecting illegally social benefits will not be considered unreasonable.

This thesis explores the meaning and content of s. 41 of the Official Languages Act of Canada, which imposes certain duties on all federal institutions towards French- and English-language minority communities. While vitally important as a component of Canada's language rights archictecture, the nature and content of s. 41 as a legal norm remain woefully unclear. The immediate aim is to determine: (1) whether s. 41 confers a right to specific measures in particular cases; (2) whether such rights are individual or collective; and (3) if collective, what sort of interests are protected. Section 41 presents a number of interpretive challenges. First, it uses terminology which is undefined in the Act and yet has no self-evident meaning. Thus, the nature of the primary legal subject, 'linguistic minority communities' (LMCs), is unclear, as are the nature of the protected interests, 'vitality' and 'development'. Second, the interpretive principles developed by the case-law for official language rights rely on a conceptual framework that is vague and under-theorized. Key components of that framework, like the concept of a necessary link between language and culture, have yet to be fully explored, either in the case-law or in legal scholarship. This presents an acute problem in the case of s. 41, where the content of these concepts will likely prove dispositive. In order to grapple with these challenges, this thesis develops an account of language rights as collective rights. Drawing on the philosophical literature and existing case-law, I argue that LMCs should be conceived of as collectivities rather than mere aggregates of individuals, and that a number of language rights, such as s. 41 of the OLA, and ss. 16.1 and 23 of the Charter, aim to protect the collective interests of these collectivities. I then define some of these interests from both an empirical and a normative perspective. I conclude by arguing that s. 41 of the OLA protects an 'autonomy interest', which both prohibits federal institutions from interfering with existing LMC autonomy, and provides a basis for claiming enhancements to that autonomy, within the confines of the statutory mandate of the institution in question.