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Yes / Professor Paul Rogers gives a brief overview of the present status of international legal prohibitions against both nuclear and chemical weapons. He then goes on to discuss the need to strengthen the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

Yes / Richard Guthrie describes the central pillars of the verification regime for the Chemical Weapons Convention and assesses the relevance of a similar verification architecture for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

A holistic arms control (HAC) analytical framework was employed to explore the full range of mechanisms that could potentially be utilised to effectively regulate the development, stockpiling, transfer or use of riot control agents (RCAs), incapacitants and related means of delivery. From this analysis it is clear that the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and its attendant regime are the most appropriate and probably the most receptive mechanisms, at least in the short term, for the discussion of these concerns and the development of appropriate policy responses. However, the response of CWC States Parties to these issues is by no means certain and parallel processes should be established to explore alternative regulatory mechanisms with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, UN drugs conventions, international and regional human rights instruments, international humanitarian law, and transfer controls potentially yielding positive results in the next five to ten year period. Other regimes that may well prove important in the longer term include: the international criminal court and other international criminal law entities; the UN Secretary General¿s investigation mechanism and other ad hoc UN investigatory mechanisms. A comprehensive HAC strategy for the regulation of RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery will also require active involvement of informed and activist civil society in societal verification; development and promotion of norms prohibiting the involvement of scientific and medical communities in weaponisation programmes intended for malign application; and far greater active engagement of such expert communities in relevant State and international policy development processes.

No / This article explores the implications for human rights and human security arising from the development and use of weapons employing certain toxic chemicals, termed incapacitating chemical agents (ICAs), ostensibly intended for law enforcement operations. Publicly accessible information clearly indicates that China, Israel and the Russian Federation have acquired or developed ICA weapons, and that such weapons are either in the possession, or have been used by law enforcement or security services, of those countries since the coming into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997. Although there is evidence of potentially applicable dual-use research in additional states, the full nature and purpose of such research, in certain states, is unclear as are the intended applications to which it will be put. Following a survey of state practice, existing obligations upon states derived from relevant international law are examined, specifically the CWC and applicable human rights instruments. Whilst existing international law certainly severely constrains and arguably prohibits the development, acquisition and use of such weapons for law enforcement, there are areas of contested interpretation, which need to be urgently addressed by the international community.

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