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No description available.

This study explores some of the urban visions inherent in Japanese colonial modernity in Manchuria and how they represented important aspects of the self-consciously modernizing Japanese state. Perceiving the northeastern Chinese city of Changchun as a tabula rasa upon which to erect new and sweeping conceptions of the built environment, Japanese used the city as a practical laboratory to create two distinct and idealized urban milieus, each appropriate to a particular era. From 1905 to 1932 Changchun served as a key railway town through which the Japanese orchestrated informal empire; between 1932 and 1945 the city became home to a grandiose, new Asian capital. Yet while the facades the town and later the capital—as well as the attitudes of the state they upheld—contrasted markedly, the shifting styles of planning and architecture consistently attempted to represent Japanese rule as progressive, beneficent, and modern. More than an attempt to legitimize empire through paternalistic care, however, Japanese perceptions of these built environments demonstrate deeper significance. Although Japanese intended Changchun's two built environments to appeal to subject populations, more fundamentally they were designed to appeal to Japanese sensibilities in order to effect change in Japan itself. Imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries involved policies of dominance and exploitation that included a range of endeavors central to the creation of contemporary societies. It is in part because Japanese believed they were acting progressively in places like Changchun that many Japanese in the postwar era have had difficulty acknowledging the entirety of Japanese activities on the mainland in the first half of the twentieth century.

This thesis has explored two basic themes in post-Cold War international relations. The first is the transformation of the global and regional security environments leading to a projected decline in the importance of traditional realist-style security problems. The second is the supposed shift in state behavior with conflictual strategies giving way to accommodation. These presumed trends are explored in the context of Southeast Asia and, more specifically, China's security strategies and relations in the region. This study argues that conventional security problems have declined in Southeast Asia in the short term but still remain prominent. In terms of policies, while China's goals remained partly revisionist with regard to territorial issues and status/power relationships, its approaches became more accommodative in coping with disputed issues in the region. This was manifested above all in its gradual acceptance of a multilateral framework for dialogue on regional security issues and in its willingness to undertake some confidence building measures in the military area. This shift can be explained partly in terms of China's external political concerns at both the global and regional levels. The more fundamental explanation, however, lies in China's drive for economic modernization with an accommodative regional strategy intended to ensure the flow of external resources required for this purpose.

The core of the thesis is, taking Chinese and Taiwanese identities in the contemporary Taiwanese society as cases, to discover how people perceive, formulate, and interact with identities. The research implements the grounded theory and in-depth interview research method, conducting 108 interviews in different regions of Taiwan from 2010 to 2013. The main argument is that identity in and of itself is merely a generic label, which does not cause emotions or behaviours - people know they are ascribed to certain categories, but they lack of motivations to take actions for the categorical groups. Only those identities articulated with 'emotion- or value-oriented discourses' can gain the capacity of provoking people's feelings and mobilising people to act. My research identifies and gives explicit discussions on two types of emotion-oriented discourses - imagined nostalgia and ethical narrative (which is also a value-oriented discourse), and three kinds of value-oriented discourses. They are: (1) Ethical narrative sets moral values for its audience; (2) cultural hierarchy defines socio-cultural values in society; and (3) political ideology signifies core political values of its audience. By treating identity as emotion- or value- oriented discourse, the thesis challenges traditional stereotypes of Taiwanese and Chinese identities in the society - such as identifying as Taiwanese means desiring independence, or all waishengren group would claim Chinese identity - and offers adequate theories to explain why it is not the case. The thesis emphasises that there is no determinant identity in the society, and it is possible for people to have a certain degree of free will choosing to accept or to reject the operation of an identity. The thesis takes critical views on identity politics, deeming it as a risky, double-edged sword in the contemporary politics, which should be carefully examined and substituted with another ideology capable to achieve political emancipation.

This thesis discusses the British government's decision to maintain colonial rule in Hong Kong beyond 1997 between 1967 and 1979. After the 1967 riots, the Labour and Conservative governments started considering the negotiation of Hong Kong's future in the 1980s. Their views on Hong Kong's future evolved from the Labour's uncertainty, to Conservative's optimism, and finally to Labour's attempts to erase the 1997 deadline and to retain Hong Kong as a colony permanently. Factors taken into their considerations included Cold War, decolonisation, China's policies on Hong Kong, and Britain-Hong Kong relations. Both Labour and Conservative insisted on preserving British sovereignty over disputed colonies such as Hong Kong, the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar regardless of the worldwide decolonisation. Besides, their eagerness to contain Communism and maintain Britain's international status, and Hong Kong's strategic and psychological value in Cold War outweighed the deficiencies of Britain-Hong Kong relations and China's unpredictable policies. Therefore, Labour and Conservative governments intended to run Hong Kong as a colony perpetually rather than decolonise it as did in other colonies. To achieve this goal, the British government adopted a reform-oriented colonialism. It empowered the Hong Kong government to deliver social reforms to improve the colony's living standard, which were used to prepare a colony's decolonisation. After the 1967 riots, although Governor David Trench implemented this colonial idea regarding Hong Kong's future, he remained as a housekeeper and only looked for the short term. Succeeding Trench in 1971, Murray MacLehose established a responsive colonial administration and delivered the Conservative's long-term strategy--to widen the living standard between Hong Kong and China--to deter China from recovering the territory. Notable reforms were on government-people relations, housing, education, social welfare and medical and health services. By 1974, the Labour government followed and modified this strategy to justify British colonial rule in Hong Kong domestically and internationally. In this process, Hong Kong was able to design its social reforms, to counter Britain's interests and to reshape its relations with Britain into a partnership. Yet Britain delegated Hong Kong to do so only to remain ultimate control rather than decolonised it. In other words, delegation of power and improvement of living standard were Britain's tools to retain its colonial rule in Hong Kong perpetually. Colonialism and decolonisation were thus interrelated.

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No description available.

This thesis compares Thailand',s relations with the United States and China from 196541975, The realist as-sumes that the structure of power in the internationall system determines overall relations between states' First, this study describes the power situation in southeast Asia in 1965, The next steps are concerned with the study of Thai-U, S. relations and Thai-Chinese relations, The thesis finds that Thailand's relations with the United States and China are determined by the structure of power. When a major power like the United States changes its policies to accommodate China, Thailand, which is a small country, turns to be more friendly with China, These attitudes correlate with the realist assumption,.

On November 26, 1945, the Ambassador to China, Patrick J. Hurley, announced his resignation to the American press. In doing so, he leveled charges against the State Department and a number of its Foreign Service officers—charges which questioned the integrity of many, in their relation with what Hurley termed the “Imperialist” and communist nations in China. Those charges were the beginning of two and one-half decades of ideological crusading in America by many who developed the theory that those men charged by Hurley had been responsible for America’s “loss of China” Hurley was sent to China in 1944 as President Roosevelt’s personal representatives to Chiang Kai-shek. His directive was to promote efficient and harmonious relations between Chiang Kai-shek and General Stilwell, Commander of American Forces, China Theatre. Hurley was, further, to facilitate Stilwell’s exercise of command over the Chinese armies, which, it was hoped, would soon be placed under him. Failing in this mission, Hurley was ultimately appointed to the rank of Ambassador after the resignation of Clarence T. Gauss. Hurley had by this time, taken on the responsibility of promoting negotiations between the Kuomintang Government of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communist Party, headquartered in Yenan. Rather than simply offering his “good offices” in the negotiations, Hurley became personally involved, interjecting his personal, ideological beliefs into the proposals of each side. Through his involvement, Hurley became personally committed to unification on his terms and eventually gave the Kuomintang Party and Chiang Kai-shek the impression that the United States was permanently committed to support of the Central Government. Hurley soon came into conflict with a number of Foreign Service officers and the Department of State, below the level of the Secretary of State, over opposing interpretations of American policy in China. Hurley became intransigent in his overwhelming support of the National Government, while members of the State department believed that the United States should remain flexible in its approach to the problems in China to avoid supporting the losing side in what was seen as an inevitable civil war. Hurley came to see criticism of Chiang Kai-shek’s government and suggestions for alterations in policy, as personal criticism directed to him. In the face of this perceived threat to himself, he had a number of Foreign Service officers re-called or transferred, only to discover that they had been reassigned to positions which he thought were superior to his. In the face of these events and rising criticism, in addition to eventual failure to bring the two Chinese factions together and impending civil war. Hurley submitted his resignation to the Secretary of State, after first announcing his reasons to the press. Experiencing one of the few failures of his life , the man who had risen from the coal mines of Oklahoma to become a millionaire twice over, Secretary of Defense und0er President Hoover, and Ambassador to China under Roosevelt, turned the blame for his failure to those with whom he had come into conflict, the Department of State being the principal culprit. This study of Hurley’s experience in China is based upon several secondary accounts of the period, recently published Department of State papers (Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers), Hurley’s several testimonials before Congressional Committees, and interviews with Mr. John Stewart Service, upon whom attention was focused in numerous loyalty investigations subsequent to Hurley’s resignation.