As China's economic miracle does not show signs to stop soon, international relations theorists keep on asking what implications this tremendous growth will have on the regional and international security. Significant gap between China and Vietnam has become a prominent feature of various asymmetric dyads. The dissertation investigates how Vietnam could maintain an enduring asymmetric relationship with China in the context of a growing disparity between two countries since 1991.;The evolution of Sino-Vietnamese relationship is so complicated that it defies the application of a single theory. The current literature on the Sino-Vietnamese relationship primarily focuses on the bilateral ties but ignores the effects of China's power on Vietnam's foreign policy. To advance understanding in Vietnam's responses to a rising China, I formulated a theoretical paradigm based on asymmetry theory by Brantly Womack. The dissertation finds that perceptions of power asymmetry have played a crucial role in Vietnam's relationship with China over the last three decades and continued to define the trajectory of the bilateral relations in the coming years. The dissertation has covered an extended chronology of bilateral relations, which allows a better understanding of Vietnam's numerous conflicting dynamics and dramatic shifts in its strategies towards China before and after 1991 in order to analyze the enduring asymmetric relationship. It demonstrates that Vietnam learnt many harsh lessons in the Cold War era and knew how to adapt to a rising China.;Since two countries normalized relationship in 1991, Vietnam's reaction to the increasing power disparity caused by China's fast growth has been a strategy of deference, which consists of political and economic engagement of China, hedged by internal and external balancing. In otherwords, hedging is the preferred policy that Vietnam is embracing to manage the asymmetric gap. The complex relationship between China and Vietnam explains the recent reinforcement of deferential behaviors from Vietnamese leadership meanwhile boosting cooperation with the U.S.;The dissertation also attempts to address the crucial question of how the Vietnamese leadership has employed hedging to manage an increasingly assertive Chinese behavior in the South China Sea, which puts lots of pressures on the Vietnamese Communist Party's legitimacy as well as the national territorial integrity. Finally, the study argues that the future of Sino-Vietnamese relations will also rely on the broader policy battles that are being, and will be, laid out in the Chinese government. Vietnam is still unlikely to be viewed more important by the top Chinese leadership due to the power asymmetry. Hence, the best strategy for Vietnam is to maximize it hedging capabilities to actively pre-empt or minimize any unwanted consequences or contingencies.

published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Philosophy

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities / Department of Government and Public Administration

Despite Australia enjoying good relations with both the United States and China at the moment, the long-term prospects are uncertain due to US-China strategic rivalry. The aim of this thesis is to examine Australia’s ability to continue strong relations with both countries over the long-term. The thesis concludes that Australia may be able to maintain good relations with the US and China in the long run despite US-China strategic rivalry. The strategic competition only increases the prospect of conflict; it does not mean a US-China conflict is bound to happen. Although the risks of a US-China military confrontation over Taiwan are real, the chances are small due to America’s continued strategic presence in the region and its military preponderance. If a Sino-US conflict were to occur, Australia would most likely side with the US despite China being economically significant to Australia. The United States is also critically important to Australia’s economic interests and, ultimately, Australia’s national security depends on its alliance with the US. Survival is the foremost goal for a state in the anarchical international system and security interests outweigh economic interests in importance in a time of crisis.

Despite Australia enjoying good relations with both the United States and China at the moment, the long-term prospects are uncertain due to US-China strategic rivalry. The aim of this thesis is to examine Australia’s ability to continue strong relations with both countries over the long-term. The thesis concludes that Australia may be able to maintain good relations with the US and China in the long run despite US-China strategic rivalry. The strategic competition only increases the prospect of conflict; it does not mean a US-China conflict is bound to happen. Although the risks of a US-China military confrontation over Taiwan are real, the chances are small due to America’s continued strategic presence in the region and its military preponderance. If a Sino-US conflict were to occur, Australia would most likely side with the US despite China being economically significant to Australia. The United States is also critically important to Australia’s economic interests and, ultimately, Australia’s national security depends on its alliance with the US. Survival is the foremost goal for a state in the anarchical international system and security interests outweigh economic interests in importance in a time of crisis.

No description available.

This thesis explores China's relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, from 1991 to 2005, contributing to the body of knowledge by arguing that China's relations with post-Soviet Central Asia were shaped by security and economic imperatives in Xinjiang, home to Muslim Turkic nationalities who have historically challenged Beijing's jurisdiction. / As discussed in Chapter One, after 1949, the Communist Party sought to bring Xinjiang firmly within Beijing's orbit, ending a 150-year long period during which Beijing's hold over Xinjiang periodically faltered. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, coupled with instability in Afghanistan, led to new challenges to Beijing's authority. / Chapter Two examines China's relations with Central Asia from 1992 to 1996. In the post-Cold War order characterized by US primacy, China envisioned Central Asia as an arena of cooperation between China, Russia, and the independent republics. However, the republics became fertile ground for transnational Islamist movements. China feared spillover into Xinjiang; consequently, China extended economic cooperation to the impoverished republics with the understanding that they would suppress emigre Uighur organizations. Bilateral economic cooperation was also important for Xinjiang, which benefited from cross-border trade. / Chapter Three examines Sino-Central Asian relations from 1996 to 2001, exploring the development of the Shanghai Five mechanism in 1996 between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, which initially addressed confidence building, but after 1998, focused on regional security. This was important for China, since in 1996/1997, Xinjiang experienced instability that was exacerbated by the independence of Central Asia. Competition over the region's energy is also examined, which contributed to international rivalry. / Chapter Four examines Sino-Central Asian relations from 2001 to 2005. In June 2001, the Shanghai Accord signatories, and Uzbekistan, established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). While envisioned as a forum for wide-ranging cooperation, combating "terrorism, separatism, and extremism," was an immediate priority. Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States sought a military presence in Central Asia that temporarily undermined China's influence, heightening China's concerns over energy security. China's response was to gradually deepen relations with the republics in the energy and security fields.

A thesis submitted to the department of international relations, Faculty of Arts, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. February 1998. / The rationale of this study is 10 examine the Republic of China (ROC)-on-Taiwan':; foreign policy of "pragmatic diplomacy". The thesis is designed to contribute to the understanding of the developm ent and progression of the ROC-on- Taiwan's foreign policy development, from that of authoritarian to democratic state. This is to be viewed in the context of the international environment in which the ROC government has had to operate - one of growing political isolation. The foreign policy of pragmatic diplomacy had both domestic and international origins - domestic in the domain of Taiwan's internal political development and internatiorul in the realm of Taiwan's international political pariah status. The principal objective of this doctoral thesis is to trace pragmatic diplomacy's political roots, examine its policies, and assess its prospects. Pragmatic diplomacy was officially adopted as a foreign policy by the ROC following the appointment of Lee Teng-hui as president in January 1988. However, rather than marking a distinct change in policy, pragmatic diplomacy was a continuance of the foreign policy track which had been started by Chiang Ching-kuo who had assumed the presidential office from his father Chiang Kai-shek in April 1975. The increasing international isolation of the ROC required a radical foreign policv response from Taipei. The ROC's expulsion from the United Nations in 1971 and subsequent incremental diplomatic de-recognition by its poll 'ical allies necessitated policy reform by the KMT government. This was not forthcoming .inder Chiang Kai-shek, Signs of pragmatism in policy-making began to arise under tile Chiang Ching-kuo administration. This trend continued and was formalised under Lee Teng-hui, Pragmatic diplomacy was designated as an official foreign policy under the Lee Tenghui presidency. Providing an historical background to pragmatic diplomacy, this study will pursue Taiwan's foreign policy progression and account for its development since 1949. The primary focus of the study is, however, on the period 1988 to 1996, from the official beginning of pragmatic diplomacy to the end of the process of democratic transition with the ROC-on- Taiwan's first direct presidential election in 1996. This was the "honeymoon" period of Taiwan's move away from an authoritarian system of government. It was during this eight-year period that Taipei's foreign policy underwent a dramatic shift in focus, one which cast off the restrictions placed upon it by domestic authoritarian politics to one which became accountable to the populace under the island's democratic transformation. For the purposes of this study, the fcreign policy of the ROC will be examined from 1949 with the removal of the ROC's seat of government from the mainland to Taipei, Taiwan. This came as a direct result of the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) forces to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Chinese civil war. Following its expulsion from the mainland by the Chinese Communists, the island of Taiwan became the refuge of the ROC government under the control of the KMT. The post World War II legal status of Taiwan had previously been set out in the November 1943 Cairo Declaraticn which stated that "all territories Japan had stolen from the Chinese, such as Maner.aria, Formosa [Taiwan}, and the Pescadores, shall be returned to the Republic of China. " In July 1945, the heads of government of the United States (US), Great Britain, and the ROC further declared in the Potsdam Declaration that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out. "This was later adhered 10 by the Soviet Union, France, and Japan. Shortly thereafter, Chinese troops occupied Taiwan with the territory being declared a province of China. In 1949, the government of the ROC was moved from Nanking to Taipei! while the CCP created a new regime, the People's Republic of China (PRe), in Beijing.' The result was two rival governments both claiming to be the sale legal representative of the Chinese state, each wanting to reunify the country in its own image. Since the claim to legitimacy was mutual, the "one China principle" whereby each claimed to be the rightful and legal representative of the state of China, was paramount in the internal and international politics of each regime. This was of particular importance to the ROC which was the apparent weaker regime having been exiled to Taiwan, losing the vast majority of its territory, population, and resources in the process. Beijing and Taipei held steadfast to the doctrine of a single Chinese state and as such refused to recognise each others' political existence. Thus the Chinese civil war did not end in 1949 with the expulsion of the KMT from the mainland - it merely continued from a distance. After withdrawing to Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek proclaimed that one day he would, "counterattack and recover the mainland ." 3 This position formed the rhetorical mainstay of the ROC's polic. for the following three decades. Almost five decades later, this ideal has not been realised and the ROC is still rooted on Taiwan. Since this time, the ROC's reunification policy toward the PRC has shifted from one of military confrontation to one which stresses peaceful political reunification under Sun Yat-sen's ideology of the "Three Principles of the People"." The ROC's policy has become far less hostile over time. The tempering of ROC policy has coincided with Taiwan's economic development, industrial modernisation, and programme of political reform and democratisation. All of these factors have contributed to this change and will be emphasised in this study as having impacted upon Taiwan's foreign policy progression. A moot point of contention which requires clarification is the term "foreign policy" in the case of the ROC. Due to both the ROC and PRC's strict adherence to the one China principle, each side has, and still continues to, regard its policy toward the other as being domestic rather than foreign in nature. This creates difficulties in deh.ung Taipei's policy vis-a-vis the mainland. According to Wilkenfeld, foreign policy can be defined as, " ...those official actions which sovereign states initiate for the purpose 0/ altering or creaung a condition outside their territorial-sovereign boundaries ." 5 Accepting this definition, two questions are raised: firstly, what is the sovereign status of Taiwan?; and secondly, if sovereign, how far, both politically and physically, does the ROC's sovereignty extend? These thematic issues are central to the thesis. Suffice to say at this introductory stage, it is argued that the ROC's mainland (i.e. the PRe) policy was indeed a foreign and not a domestic policy. Since 1949, Taiwan has been ruled by a separate and distinct governmental authority controlled by the KMT. During this half-century period, Taiwan has possessed a different political, economic, and social structure to that which has existed on the mainland under CCP control. Therefore, in reality, and despite its own prior claims to the contrary, the ROC has operated as a distinct dejacto independent entity. Taiwan's policy toward the mainland was thus, to all intents and purposes, «foreign policy. This study will consider it as such. / GR2017

Kee Wai Man. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 145-155). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --- p.ii / ABSTRACT --- p.iii / 摘要 --- p.v / CONTENTS --- p.vi / LIST OF TABLES --- p.viii / LIST OF FIGURES --- p.viii / LIST OF ABBREVIATION --- p.ix / CHAPTER / Chapter 1 --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Research Significance --- p.1 / Research Objectives --- p.3 / Definitions --- p.5 / Greater Pearl River Delta --- p.5 / “cross-boundary´ح --- p.8 / Thesis Outline --- p.9 / Chapter 2 --- URBAN AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES --- p.11 / The Concept of Urban/Regional Governance and Its Development --- p.11 / Experiences in Cross-Border Regional Governance --- p.15 / Evolution of Regional Governance of the GPRD Region --- p.21 / The Cross-Boundary Infrastructure Development in the GPRD Region --- p.26 / Summary --- p.30 / Chapter 3 --- CROSS-BOUNDARY FLOW AND TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMENT --- p.34 / Introduction --- p.34 / The Economic and Social Development in the Past 25 Years --- p.36 / Economic Development --- p.36 / Social Development --- p.41 / The Transportation Development in the GPRD Region --- p.43 / Three Separated Transportation Systems --- p.44 / Cross-Boundary Transportation --- p.46 / Major Problems in the Transportation Development --- p.49 / The Future Development of Transportation --- p.52 / Summary --- p.55 / Chapter 4 --- THE DEVELOPMENT OF CROSS-BOUNDARY LINKAGE PROPOSALS --- p.57 / Introduction --- p.57 / Conceptual Framework and Research Methodology --- p.59 / Conceptual Framework --- p.59 / Research Methodology --- p.61 / Evolution of Cross-Boundary Linkage Proposals --- p.63 / Stage 1: 1983-1989 Incubation of Idea --- p.64 / Stage 2: 1989-1997 Great Leap Forward I --- p.67 / Stage 3: 1997-2002 Time with Various Focuses --- p.71 / Stage 4: 2002-2003 Great Leap Forward II --- p.79 / Stage 5: 2003-2004 Concrete Action --- p.85 / The Advantages and Disadvantages of Bridge Scenarios --- p.91 / The Debates on the Bridge and the Participation of Stakeholders --- p.95 / The Necessity of This Cross-Boundary Linkage in the Beginning Time --- p.95 / Debates on the Advantages and Disadvantages of the LDYB and the HZMB and the Better One for the Region --- p.97 / Argues About the Development of Container Port Next to the Bridge in Hong Kong --- p.99 / Arguments about the Possibility of Including a Railway on the Bridge (HZMB) --- p.99 / The Concern on the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the Bridge by NGOs Such as Green Groups --- p.101 / Summary --- p.102 / Chapter 5 --- A GOVERNMENT-LED REGIONAL GOVERNANCE NETWORK AND THE ROLE OF VARIOUS STAKEHOLDERS --- p.104 / Introduction --- p.104 / Governments in the Regional Governance Network --- p.106 / Lack of Good Cooperation and Joint Development Strategies in the Past --- p.108 / The Problem of the Allocation of Interests among Cities --- p.109 / The Strong Influence of the Political Leadership --- p.110 / The Strong Control Role of the Central Government --- p.112 / The Changing Roles of Governments --- p.115 / Private Sector in the Regional Governance Network --- p.117 / "Business Linkage, Business Expansion and Relationship in the Region ." --- p.118 / A Profitable Project --- p.119 / Civil Society in the Regional Governance Network --- p.121 / Academic and Professionals --- p.122 / The Media --- p.123 / Environmental Protection Groups --- p.124 / Discussion --- p.126 / Summary --- p.133 / Chapter 6 --- CONCLUSION --- p.135 / Context of the Study --- p.135 / Major Findings --- p.137 / Suggestions for Further Research --- p.142 / REFERENCES --- p.145

China obtains the best security environment ever as the Cold War ended. Its economy continues to grow. China¡¦s rise becomes a reality. Along with China's enhancement on economy and military strengths, Beijing shows more confidence in dealing with international affairs. Zhongnanhai leaders keep stressing that China will strive for an international environment in favor of peace and development, and expressing to the U.S. that China is willing to be cooperative on regional and international issues, which wins praise from President Bush. China and the U.S. both carry on some strategic adjustment. Moreover, President Bush becomes the first U.S. president who visited China three times in its two tenures in office. President Bush and Hu Jintao have gradually established personal friendship. Chinese leaders have long regarded the pursuing of country¡¦s unification as the most important and prior political goal. In China's leadership, both reformists and hardliners take ¡§Taiwan issue" as sovereignty matter, the core interest of China¡¦s national security. Jiang Zemin used to emphasize that ¡§Taiwan issue is the most sensitive and most crucial issue in Sino-U.S. relations.¡¨ Every time when Hu Jintao met with President Bush, Hu applauded the U.S.¡¦s commitments on ¡§One-China¡¨ policy, three Joint Communiques, and ¡§opposition¡¨ of Taiwan independence. Bush administration¡¦s policies toward Taiwan Strait security have also shifted from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity gradually. China-U.S. relationship has been promoted to its best status in second half of 2003 due to the intensification of international anti-terrorism cooperation and Beijing¡¦s role in hosting Six Party Talks. The atmosphere of Taiwan-U.S. relationship, however, has been not so good since President Chen Shui-bian¡¦s second term because Taiwan repeatedly pushes Washington D.C.¡¦s bottom lines. Bush administration made several friendly decisions toward Taiwan in its early stage after resuming powers, including providing better treatments for Taiwan senior leaders when they visited or transited the U.S. But when President Bush said he would do ¡§whatever it takes to defend Taiwan¡¨ in early 2001, the White House and U.S. State Department quickly repeated that the U.S. policies remain unchanged. It shows that the risks for military conflict in Taiwan Strait are high and that the U.S. does not want Taiwan to have too much expectation. Washington, D.C. would avoid getting into military conflicts in Taiwan Strait for its own interests. In addition, Bush administration continues to aware Taiwan that the U.S. and Taiwan could cooperate in some security affairs, but the U.S., out of its strategy consideration and moral responsibility, would be the sole country which could assist democratic Taiwan. This dissertation would mainly explore China¡¦s rise, and in this presupposition, the Bush Administration¡¦s Policies on Cross-Strait Relations. The dissertation comprises 7 chapters. Besides introduction and conclusion in the first and the seventh chapter respectively, the second chapter would study China¡¦s rise and its challenges to the U.S. and the U.S.¡¦s security strategies in Asia-Pacific region, while the third chapter discussing Bush administration¡¦s policies toward China, the fourth chapter analyzing China¡¦s policies toward Bush administration, the fifth chapter looking into the U.S. factors in China¡¦s policies toward Taiwan, and the sixth chapter reviewing cross-strait relations during Bush administration. To sum up, Bush administration emphasizes stability across the Taiwan Strait. Neither side of the Taiwan Strait can take unilateral actions to change the status quo, which is defined by the U.S., and the solution of cross-strait issues must be through peaceful ways. To respond of China¡¦s rise, the U.S. continues to underline its relationship with allies in Asia-Pacific. At the same time, Bush administration makes more concrete steps in strengthening U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation, while U.S.-China military exchanges in progress but with limitation.