Thesis advisor: Stephen J. Pope / In the book Agape and Eros, Anders Nygren proposes a way to understand and analyze Christian love in four “dimensions.” He writes: Love expresses a relation between a subject who loves and an object that is loved. If we turn our attention to the object, and confine ourselves to personal objects, love will be seen to take four different forms, which we shall here describe as the ‘dimensions' of love. These are (1) God's love for man, (2) man's love for God, (3) man's love for his fellow-man, and (4) man's self-love. Throughout the course of her writing, Dorothy Day addresses each of these “dimensions of love” and proposes that none can exist properly in isolation from the other three. How did Dorothy Day understand the proper relationship between these four dimensions? Is her description of the integration of these four dimensions of love appropriate to Christian theology and ethics, and is she consistent in her theology? I argue that Day's writing reveals a harmonious and proper integration of these four dimensions of love, and that she does so properly within the framework of Christian theology. I will do so in the following steps: I will begin by examining Day's understanding of God's love for humanity (Part I), our love for God (Part II), proper love for neighbor (Part III), and proper love for self (Part IV). I will then present a counter-argument (Part VI), and will conclude with an explanation of Day's integration of the four dimensions of love (Part V). / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2003. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology. / Discipline: College Honors Program.

The purpose of this thesis will be a contrast of the Buddhist and the Christian responses to this-worldly suffering. Many scholars have proposed that the best way to create a better world with less suffering is to make Christianity more like Buddhism, so that an interfaith synthesis between the two religions results. These scholars’ proposals are described in Chapter 2. However, what these scholars desire (i.e. less this-worldly suffering) will not logically result from the solution they suggest (i.e. Buddhicizing Christianity). For to make Christianity more like Buddhism in its essentials would render Christianity less potent to oppose this-worldly suffering. The thesis will thus contrast Buddhism with Christianity in five crucial areas, namely, their viewpoints on ultimate reality, ultimate attachments, ultimate aversions, ultimate example, and ultimate purpose. These five areas provide the content to accurately define Buddhist compassion and Christian love. Chapter 3 describes Buddhism’s struggle to ground love of neighbor ontologically, whether by the ontological givens of dependent co-arising or nirvana. Buddhism struggles to ground not only whether we should love our neighbors, but also whether we can do so. Christianity, on the other hand, proves entirely capable of grounding love of neighbor—whether should or can—given its theistic ontology. Chapter 4 describes the Buddhist and Christian responses to suffering when it comes to attachments. Buddhism asks us to let go of rigid attachments to persons, truth and goodness. Meanwhile, Christians are to cling to God, and as a result of loving God, they are to love people, hunger and thirst for the good, and rejoice in the truth. These ultimate attachments to persons, truth, and goodness help overcome this-worldly suffering. According to Chapter 5, Buddhism and Christianity differ sharply when it comes to aversion to and grief over sin. Buddhists cultivate equanimity toward the sin, reasoning that the problem is not actually the person’s fault and, furthermore, that the problem is not really a problem. Christians, however, are to love people enough that they hate the sin which destroys them. In hating evil and restoring people, Christianity undermines immense worldly suffering. Chapter 6 contrasts Gautama and Jesus as examples of combatting suffering. At each juncture, Jesus offered more to actually fight against suffering than did Gautama. Incredibly, the interfaith scholar who would Buddhicize Christianity’s ultimate example would mar the portrait of the paradigm who exemplifies the very qualities the interfaith scholar wants to emulate. Chapter 7 examines the Buddhist emphasis on “thusness” and the Christian emphasis on purposefulness. Insofar as the interfaith scholar would Buddhicize Christianity’s ultimate purpose, the robust purposefulness that gives one’s life meaning and motivation would erode into a purposelessness which, however emancipating, leaves one comparatively impotent in the face of this-worldly suffering. In light of these five contrasts, Christian love and Buddhist compassion are able to be defined and contrasted. The logical conclusion drawn is that to Buddhicize Christianity’s ultimacy would be to truncate Christianity’s efficacy, a result which should motivate these interfaith scholars to reconsider their proposals. / PhD, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015

The purpose of this thesis will be a contrast of the Buddhist and the Christian responses to this-worldly suffering. Many scholars have proposed that the best way to create a better world with less suffering is to make Christianity more like Buddhism, so that an interfaith synthesis between the two religions results. These scholars’ proposals are described in Chapter 2. However, what these scholars desire (i.e. less this-worldly suffering) will not logically result from the solution they suggest (i.e. Buddhicizing Christianity). For to make Christianity more like Buddhism in its essentials would render Christianity less potent to oppose this-worldly suffering. The thesis will thus contrast Buddhism with Christianity in five crucial areas, namely, their viewpoints on ultimate reality, ultimate attachments, ultimate aversions, ultimate example, and ultimate purpose. These five areas provide the content to accurately define Buddhist compassion and Christian love. Chapter 3 describes Buddhism’s struggle to ground love of neighbor ontologically, whether by the ontological givens of dependent co-arising or nirvana. Buddhism struggles to ground not only whether we should love our neighbors, but also whether we can do so. Christianity, on the other hand, proves entirely capable of grounding love of neighbor—whether should or can—given its theistic ontology. Chapter 4 describes the Buddhist and Christian responses to suffering when it comes to attachments. Buddhism asks us to let go of rigid attachments to persons, truth and goodness. Meanwhile, Christians are to cling to God, and as a result of loving God, they are to love people, hunger and thirst for the good, and rejoice in the truth. These ultimate attachments to persons, truth, and goodness help overcome this-worldly suffering. According to Chapter 5, Buddhism and Christianity differ sharply when it comes to aversion to and grief over sin. Buddhists cultivate equanimity toward the sin, reasoning that the problem is not actually the person’s fault and, furthermore, that the problem is not really a problem. Christians, however, are to love people enough that they hate the sin which destroys them. In hating evil and restoring people, Christianity undermines immense worldly suffering. Chapter 6 contrasts Gautama and Jesus as examples of combatting suffering. At each juncture, Jesus offered more to actually fight against suffering than did Gautama. Incredibly, the interfaith scholar who would Buddhicize Christianity’s ultimate example would mar the portrait of the paradigm who exemplifies the very qualities the interfaith scholar wants to emulate. Chapter 7 examines the Buddhist emphasis on “thusness” and the Christian emphasis on purposefulness. Insofar as the interfaith scholar would Buddhicize Christianity’s ultimate purpose, the robust purposefulness that gives one’s life meaning and motivation would erode into a purposelessness which, however emancipating, leaves one comparatively impotent in the face of this-worldly suffering. In light of these five contrasts, Christian love and Buddhist compassion are able to be defined and contrasted. The logical conclusion drawn is that to Buddhicize Christianity’s ultimacy would be to truncate Christianity’s efficacy, a result which should motivate these interfaith scholars to reconsider their proposals. / PhD, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2015

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2017-03-22T19:39:48Z No. of bitstreams: 1 carolinadetonimarquesvieira.pdf: 817647 bytes, checksum: 086531d3dd69abd781951d4c12b89302 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2017-03-24T11:59:17Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 carolinadetonimarquesvieira.pdf: 817647 bytes, checksum: 086531d3dd69abd781951d4c12b89302 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-24T11:59:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 carolinadetonimarquesvieira.pdf: 817647 bytes, checksum: 086531d3dd69abd781951d4c12b89302 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-03-03 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Este trabalho tem por objetivo abordar as duas faces do amor em Dostoiévski: ágape, o amor altruísta, pela humanidade, regido pela religiosidade cristã; e eros, o amor erótico, regido pelo desejo meramente humano. Ou seja, propõe-se tratar do amor como a representação máxima do sobrenatural ou a própria degradação no excesso de natureza humana e, de uma face a outra, percorrer não só a sua trajetória na obra dostoievskiana, como também os temas com os quais ele se articula. O Idiota apresenta-se, neste estudo, em lugar de destaque por sua relevância para o tema, especialmente, devido à própria divisão de seu protagonista, o Príncipe Mychkin, percebido, aqui, como a representação da tensão trágica entre o humano e o divino, vivenciada através do amor. Além desta obra, outros grandes romances de Dostoiévski também participam da discussão. / This work aims to broach the two faces of love in Dostoevsky: agape, the altruist love, the love for humanity, which is conducted by Christian religiosity; and eros, the erotic love, which is leaded by the simply human desire. In other words, it intends to deal with the love as the greatest performance of divine or as the typical degradation in the excess of human nature and, from one face to the other, to search not only throug its course on Dostoevsky’s work but also the subjects which it is connected with. In this study, The Idiot presents itself in a highlighted position because of its importance to the subject mainly due to the selfsame division of its protagonist, Prince Mychkin, who is understood here as a performance of a tragic tension between human and divine, that is lived throughout love. Beyond this work, other great romances of Dostoevsky, also take part in the discussion.

The work deals with the specifics of interactions between mentally disabled clients in the residential facilities providing institutional care, in particular with the relations between clients and social workers/carers. It analyses the role of interpersonal relations for individual´s inherent dignity, describes cultural and religious sources which recognise dignity of the mentally disabled in the contemporary society. It also strives to explain healthy ways of communication as an important and integral part of social interactions and how such methods can help to prevent conflicts in residential facilities. There is identification of risks of asymmetric relations between clients and carers due to the organisational hierarchy and the relevant changes brought about in the course of the deinstitutionalisation process. It provides various aspects of the relationship between employees and clients in traditional and alternative forms of residential facilities which in this particular case are represented by the Arch and Camphill communities. The Conclusions provide a summary of risks and benefits resulting from friendly attitude to mentally disabled clients and risks posed by the unequal and unnatural relations in residential facilities.

The work deals with the life and work of Přemysl Pitter, major Czech Christian humanist, representativ of the social learning, education and journalism in the 20th - 70s of the twentieth century. Introductory chapters are devoted to his childhood and youth, especially his personal reflection of the suffering experienced at the frontline on the 1st World War, which influenced his future life guidance and practical activities. Other parts of the document is characterized Pitter{\crq}s destiny and social work for others - the poor, downtrodden, necessary - in the context of the radical social and political changes in the last century. Here is a somewhat more comprehensive text on the history of the fight to save children from a concentration camps and detention camps, after World War II, ie between 1945 - 1947. The last section describes the life and operation of Přemysl Pitter after retirement emigration in 1951, when the World Council of Churches delegated the duty of pastoral and social services for refugees in the camp Valka in Nuremberg in Germany until its repeal in 1962. The final chapter describes the staying and creative activity Pitter{\crq}s exile in Switzerland in the 60s and 70s. The work includes a brief summary of the contents of archival material and archives of Přemysl Pitter and Olga Fierzová in PMJAK in Prague.