This research explores the political debates surrounding changes in the law regulating citizenship revocation in Canada and how they reflect the tensions in the meaning of citizenship for dual national citizens. Borrowing from citizenship studies and critical criminology, the main argument in this thesis is that Bill C-24 seems to be an attempt on part of the Conservative Party to recalibrate the meaning of citizenship from a more liberal understanding (based on civic rights) to one that is more republican (based on civic duty). This research also demonstrates how this recalibration in the conception of citizenship from a more liberal notion to a more republican one parallels the shift in crime control policies of the state that were geared more toward prioritizing the welfare and equality of all citizens under the law in the 1960s-70s to ones that are presently oriented toward punishment, control and management of “dangerous groups”. The scholarly literature suggests that the modern conception of citizenship tends to draw from the republican and liberal traditions that are complementary but are also in tension, and the recent political discussions surrounding citizenship involves arguing for the best balance between rights and responsibilities of citizens. The analysis of the parliamentary debates surrounding Bill C-24 reveals that, in light of Canada’s current political landscape that is heavily influenced by penal-populist notions of punishing the offender populations and making “responsibilized” citizens, the pendulum of citizenship is generally being tilted toward the republican model (based on restoration of civic duties of citizens to the state and their fellow citizens) more so than the liberal model (based on preserving the welfare, liberty and equality of all citizens under the law).

In his seminal work Strangers in Our Midst (2016a.), David Miller develops his version of liberal nationalism, where he argues for liberal states being justified in requiring immigrants to integrate themselves culturally before giving them access to formal citizenship equal to native citizens. Elsewhere, Miller (2016b.) has also expressed that there are instances when states are justified in revoking citizenships for national security reasons. This paper argues that these positions held by Miller are inconsistent with each other. To make the case against Miller for why this is, three arguments are presented. Firstly, the strict immigration policy suggested in liberal nationalism is permissible because once it is successfully completed, the naturalised citizen gains equal standing in citizenship to native born citizens. If denationalisation is applied in conjunction, but only to some, then their citizenship statis is not equal, and thus the justification for liberal nationalist immigration policy is undermined. Secondly, while it might otherwise be plausible that this injustice is permissible by viewing dual citizens secondary citizenship as a protective privilege, the necessary integration in liberal nationalism makes this response less believable. Finally, one of the most important objectives in liberal nationalism is to promote trust between members. If dual citizens are the only ones who can have their citizenship revoked, and the only reason for this is on suspicion of terrorism, then this risk promoting mistrust against these individuals, making the combination of liberal nationalism and denationalisation self-defeating.