Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1994. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 782-816).

This dissertation challenges the theories of new political historians, who argue that nineteenth-century American politics was little influenced by ideology. Instead, by treating the public careers of self-identified conservatives in Abraham Lincoln's cabinet--Edward Bates, Montgomery Blair, Salmon P. Chase, and Gideon Welles--as exemplars of nineteenth-century political thought, this study examines the formation of American conservatism in the Civil War era from an anthropological perspective, treating it as a tribal identification shared by American lawmakers. Nineteenth-century conservatives identified themselves according to their subscription to certain common principles of governance, the ideals of which were first expressed in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Applying these principles to the nineteenth century, American conservatives thus greatly influenced public policy initiatives from civil service reform to anti-slavery reform and from public finance to presidential war powers. Although the conservative ideals espoused by these politicians--exemplified in their management of issues during the Civil War--had receded to a minority opinion among lawmakers by 1865, they were ultimately resurrected during the later years of Reconstruction, and helped to shape future political discourses surrounding public policy in the Gilded Age.

No description available.

This Project is an investigation to determine the position that a 17th Century musket ball was fired from a musket, when given the position it was found on the battlefield. Prior to this research the main concerns with making predictions were considered to be associated with the deformed shape of the musket balls affecting their drag coefficient and therefore, their distance to ground impact. The distance they would continue after impact due to bounce and roll was unknown. Previous research has been used and built upon to recreate the conditions of the English Civil War as accurately as possible. It was found that the average distance to ground impacts were in good agreement with predictions using the drag coefficient for a sphere showing that the distorted shape resulting from the firing process of the musket ball made little difference to its drag coefficient in the majority of cases. However, the distance travelled after the first ground impact greatly exceeded expectations, with the musket balls almost doubling the total average distance to their final resting positions - an increase of 81%. From these findings the initial factors thought to have had high relevance to the final resting position of the musket ball (velocity variation and drag co-efficient) become less significant and factors such as ground hardness become more prominent. The knowledge gained during this investigation will re-establish more accurate information to be obtained on the firing positions of opposing forces during conflicts in the English Civil War.

Does a relationship exist between leadership decapitation and the abuse of civilians during a civil war? This project creates a new data set in combination with existing data on leadership change and civil war termination to determine whether leadership decapitation in rebel groups that use terrorist strategies affects the likelihood of civilian abuse. A study is done on 44 cases of decapitation where the leader of a rebel group was arrested, killed, or replaced during the course of their respective nation’s civil war. This project also conducted a case study on the behavior of a rebel group in the country of Algeria during their civil war. The results show that most groups utilize the same strategies before and after the decapitation of their leader and also attack the same targets. Looking at the short term after the date of decapitation, groups are more likely to utilize the same attack method and attack the same targets. The results also indicate that leadership decapitation does not alter the tactic utilized by a group during a civil war after the date of decapitation. Leadership decapitation also does not increase the likelihood of civilian abuse within one, two, or three months after the date of decapitation. If a group was abusing civilians before the death, arrest, or replacement of their leader, then they will continue to abuse civilians after the date of decapitation. Ultimately, understanding the causes behind the violent methods used by terrorist and rebel groups will help promote conflict resolution and prevent the use of violent means against civilians.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a surge in post-war stabilisation, reconstruction and development operations around the world. Externally driven efforts have been shaped by the liberal peace framework, which assumes that a rapid transmission or imposition of neo-liberal norms and values, combined with Western-style governance institutions, would create conditions for lasting peace and prosperity. Only in a few instances countries have attempted internally driven post-war reconstruction and development; in most cases, these efforts were either ignored or suppressed by international analysts, experts, academics and organisations. Despite all the expertise and funding spent since the early 1990s, externally driven operations have not led to lasting peace and stability, establishment of functioning institutions, eradication of poverty, livelihood improvements and economic reconstruction and development in war-torn countries. All too often, programmes, policies and „solutions‟ were designed and imposed by external actors either because they worked elsewhere or because they were influenced by geopolitical, economic and/or security interests of powerful countries. Furthermore, external actors have tended to assume that generic approaches based on the liberal peace framework can work in all places, while ignoring local actors, contexts and knowledge. Focusing on Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Sudan and Somaliland, this exploratory qualitative study critically explores and assesses both externally and internally driven post-war reconstruction and development practices and operations in order to understand the strengths and shortcomings of both approaches and offer recommendations for future improvements. This is important since socio-economic recovery and economic development are crucial for lasting stability and peace in post-war countries.

No description available.

The purpose of this study is to determine Caesar's strategy in the Civil War of Rome, 49 B, C. to 45 B. C. The Civil War with all its political intrigues has received less attention than the Gallic War but it is in many mays more interesting. Roman is pitted against Roman with an empire as the prize for the victor. Caesar is struggling for his life against forces in Italy and other parts of Europe who do not wish to see Rome ruled by a Dictator. The Civil War rings the death knell of the Republic and heralds the birth of the Empire. The basic works for this study are the three books of the Civil War (De Bello Civili) written by Caesar himself, the Alexandrine War (De Bello Alexandrino), the African War (De Bello Africo) and the Spanish War (De Bello Hispanienal), all of doubtful origin but nevertheless important and of great value to the student of military strategy. I have referred often to the Letters of Cicero, which reveal much information about the military scene at the time of Caesar's march through Italy. Cicero's work is the only contemporary account of Caesar's activities available to the scholar, but I have supplemented this by a study of later historians of Rome. Such writers as Cassius Dio and Appian provide the military historian with data on many of Caesar's movements and clarify his strategy. I have augmented the ancient accounts of Caesar's campaigns in the Civil War by modern studies, as is evident from the Bibliography. The analysis of all the campaigns of the Civil War produces a definite strategic pattern. The elements of surprise, manoeuvre, anticipation, and a general understanding of an enemy's mind, which are displayed by all skilful military leaders, were also part of Caesar's strategic equipment. Most often through skill but sometimes by luck he applied the above techniques where they were needed and, in all the major conflicts, these elements of strategy provided him with victory. Though tactics and strategy are closely linked on the battle field, no attempt has been made in this study to give much detail to tactics except where such information is necessary in explaining the strategic movement concerned. The field of tactics is beyond the scope of my study. Throughout the history of man, certain principles of war have been followed by great military leaders. Caesar was no exception. When Caesar is compared with generals today and his conditions of warfare with those that exist now he displays certain common principles: the selection and maintenance of the aim, the maintenance of morale, concentration of force, flexibility and offensive action. Caesar, in combining the principles of war with sound strategic methods, created for himself a name respected and feared in the annals of history. / Arts, Faculty of / Classical, Near Eastern and Religious Studies, Department of / Graduate

Problem and Thesis: This thesis concerns itself with the role of cavalry as it emerged in western campaigns in the American Civil War from April 1862 to June 1863. The concepts of the role of cavalry that existed prior to the War, both in Europe and the United States are surveyed. This, like the historiographical scrutiny of cavalry studies, sets up a frame of reference for the reader to avoid the impression that the situation in the American Civil War existed in isolation. The main problem was to separate role from the topics of tactical evolutions, styles of fighting, the effects of weaponry, the influence of terrain, and actual tactical employment in battle. It is the author's contention that these more obvious points have really only obscured the true nature of the role of mounted troops in the American Civil War. These problems are important, but entirely separate from role, or the duties and responsibilities of an arm of the service in war. The roles of the several arms have not altered significantly although sophistication has allowed greater refinement in approach and greater efficiency in execution. Thus it is the main argument of this thesis that the role of cavalry remained much the same during the American Civil War in spite of surface alterations in approach and efficiency in the waging of war. Approach: The Western Theatre was chosen as the area for study because it has been relatively neglected in Civil War Historiography and it was there that the genuinely decisive battles were fought. The fate of the South was really sealed in the Mississippi Valley and not in the East in the stalemate which was the general character of the war in that theatre. The study starts at the Battle of Shiloh, which was the first real test of combat in the West, and traces Braxton Bragg’s Invasion of Kentucky. The failure of that and the Confederate repulse at Corinth assured eventual Federal control of the West. Once the campaigns had been selected, a familiarity with the studies done on cavalry was undertaken and it was immediately obvious that the problem of the role of mounted troops had never really been undertaken. The bulk of the research for reconstructing the role of cavalry in the campaigns fell on the Official Records, the mainstay of any Civil War research. This was buttressed by other government sources, diaries, reminiscences, memoirs, letters and relevant secondary material. The role of the cavalry on both sides emerged fairly clearly from this research. It had a dual character, on the one hand being a shield oriented to the protection of the army at large and on the other hand being a dagger aimed for lightning-like thrusts at vulnerable points in the enemy’s side. This analogy successfully explains the role of cavalry that emerged from the campaigns studied. As a shield cavalry was defensive, subordinate, and tactical. The role of cavalry as a dagger was usually secondary to that as a shield, but it was nonetheless distinct and real. Then it was offensive, independent, and often strategical. Conclusions: A role for cavalry had emerged from the classic studies of Baron De Jomini, based on analysis of the Napoleonic Wars and written thirty years before. The role that emerged in the study was remarkably like that suggested by Jomini, although Jomini’s influence is not the subject of this inquiry. It seems, that in this manner at least, the American Civil War, although it exhibited dramatic changes in many ways, was in others quite orthodox. The war did not see a significant alteration in the role of cavalry although it saw shifts in emphasis and approach to that role as well as increased efficiency, in many cases, in its fulfilment. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

Words matter. America was founded with a five-word mission statement: "All men are created equal." The nation's most successful politicians have understood the power of words. Theodore Roosevelt claimed the nation's chief executive could lay out his agenda from the "bully pulpit," while Franklin Delano Roosevelt calmed the public's fears throughout his term in office during regular fireside chats. Similarly, John F. Kennedy challenged the nation with his rhetoric to look beyond "what your country can do for you" and ask instead "what you can do for your country," while Barack Obama's speech at the Democratic National Convention in 2004 propelled him onto the national stage. Abraham Lincoln not only understood the power of words, but he knew how to use them to his advantage. Words were the secret to his success; indeed, they continue to serve his legacy well. While scholarly studies of Lincoln's rhetoric have steadily increased over the last fifteen years, the historiography remains consumed with his presidency. However, by beginning the story of Lincoln's eloquence in the White House, scholars have neglected his painfully revealing personal and literary evolution. Despite the thousands of books written about the sixteenth president, there has never been a full-length study devoted to his poetry. His intensely autobiographical poetry remains one of the last great untapped reservoirs for scholars. Not only does Lincoln's poetry reveal that he was engaged in a lifelong struggle to come to terms with loss, but his private poetry also found its way into his public speeches. In the process, he helped a nation find meaning in the confusion and tragedy of civil war.