Submitted by Layla Santos Mendes (laylasmendes@gmail.com) on 2016-12-10T22:28:40Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertation_FINAL.pdf: 980823 bytes, checksum: c3f245c9416229a577ba56879ee0af54 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by ÁUREA CORRÊA DA FONSECA CORRÊA DA FONSECA (aurea.fonseca@fgv.br) on 2016-12-15T14:19:09Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertation_FINAL.pdf: 980823 bytes, checksum: c3f245c9416229a577ba56879ee0af54 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-20T12:54:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertation_FINAL.pdf: 980823 bytes, checksum: c3f245c9416229a577ba56879ee0af54 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-12-06 / The objective of this thesis is to improve the understanding of the determinants of CoCo bond issuance and their effects in a financial distress scenario. The results suggest that the propensity of banks to issue CoCo bonds is different when comparing developed and emerging countries. The banks in the BRICS and other emerging countries that issued CoCo bonds are typically large and have high leverage, aiming to meet the Basel III rules and replace debt with equity funding. I also propose a model that simulates the capital shortfall that each bank needs in a future crisis using the CoCo bond trigger. As results, the issuance of CoCo bonds could avoid 12 bankruptcies when using the market value measures in a sample of 40 banks in the world. In complement, the regulatory requirement is fixed at 8% for minimum total capital by Basel III, but the model suggests an optimal value exists for each bank. In the end, I find that issuing CoCo bonds is an important and possible tool for banks to restructure their debt levels and protect against future crises.