Patients with both depression and anxiety show an increased tendency to deploy attention towards negative information. Cognitive models of the illnesses predict that these negative attentional biases are causally related to the symptoms of the disorders. Consistent with this, modifying attentional bias using either antidepressant medication or simple, computer based training tasks has previously been associated with altered symptomatology in both non-clinical and clinical populations. The current thesis aimed to investigate the mechanisms by which attentional bias training tasks alter attention. The investigations were conducted within an experimental neuroscience framework which has previously been successfully deployed in studies of antidepressant medication. The thesis then sought to use these initial results to improve the basic understanding of attentional control processes and, ultimately, guide the development of novel treatment strategies. The initial studies of the thesis characterised the behavioural and neural effects of attentional bias training. Behaviourally, a high degree of generalisation of the training effect was found across a range of emotional stimuli. Neurally, training was found to alter activity in a network of prefrontal regions known to be involved in the control of attention. Further analysis, utilising a computational learning model, suggested that the attentional control systems identified in this study could be understood in terms of expectation based processes. These studies therefore indicated that, in contrast to the predominately limbic effects of antidepressant medication, training initially altered the response of frontal control circuitry. The later studies of the thesis investigated possible strategies for extending the use of attentional bias training. Firstly, combining training with antidepressant medication was found to produce an interference effect on emotional memory suggesting that administering both interventions concurrently is likely to erode their cognitive impact. Lastly, attentional bias training was found not to alter attention in patients with bipolar disorder, with the results of the study indicating that standard assessments of attentional bias in this clinical population are likely to be unreliable. Overall, these studies indicate that attentional bias training may be used to alter the top-down control of attention to emotional information and suggest that such effects may interfere with the bottom-up effects of antidepressant drugs. More generally the work demonstrates the utility of using a cognitive-neuroscientific framework to explore the mechanisms and impact of novel therapeutic strategies.

There is a growing interest in brief, low-cost workplace health promotion interventions for wellbeing, which target increasing resilience, mindfulness and positive appraisal. One such health promotion intervention is Positive Mental Training. Three linked studies set out to investigate the efficacy of Positive Mental Training in the workplace. Study 1 used a double blind, randomised control trial design, with healthy volunteer employees randomised to intervention or control conditions. Validated questionnaires measured wellbeing, resilience, mindfulness, burnout and emotional distress at 4 time intervals, over a 6 month period. Multi-level linear modelling showed significant effects of the intervention on wellbeing and depression. ANCOVA analysis revealed these benefits were not sustained at follow up (26 weeks). Study 2 expanded on study 1, with qualitative interviews of purposefully selected participants of study 1. A grounded theory approach was used to explore individual motivations, benefits and limitations of the programme. Study 3 adopted a component research design to investigate one possible underlying aspect of this multi-component health promotion intervention (positive appraisal suggestion) in a student population and examined whether relaxation increased this effect. Positive appraisal suggestions given with or without relaxation were both able to significantly increase levels of positive affect and self-esteem compared to a control. Positive cognitive bias was found to increase in both the active conditions and the control suggesting differential cognitive and emotional processes, in that an increase in positive CB was not associated with an increase in mood. Overall these studies indicated evidence for the efficacy of Positive Mental Training in workplace health promotion, explored experience of participants undertaking the study and investigated the underlying mechanisms of an active component of Positive Mental Training. Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed.

The present research examined whether the innominate acted as contextual information which resulted in a skewed scoring of skull morphological sex traits and pairs overall (both innominate and skull). Survey participants first assessed the sex of an innominate, then assessed the sex of a skull, using methods standard in the field. The sex of ten skulls and associated innominates, which served as contextual elements to introduce bias, were assessed in two surveys by 22 participants total. Male and female innominates and skulls were mixed and matched to test bias, though it was implied to participants that the paired elements were from the same individual. No significant bias was seen on the level of the skull. However, significant shifts in scores were seen on the level of the overall pair in three out of the five studied, indicating that the sex of the innominate was privileged over that of the skull. This is considered standard procedure in the field as the innominate is more reliable for sex estimation; thus, the findings of the present study are inconsistent with cognitive bias. However, the present study raises questions about the utility of the skull in the estimation of sex in human skeletal remains. While the innominate may be more reliable in sex estimation when both elements are present, this may lead to inattention to valuable information presented by the skull in particular contexts such as commingled burials.

Purpose: The tendency to prioritize negative or threatening social information, a cognitive process known as cognitive bias, has been linked to the development of social anxiety. Given the increased risk for social anxiety among adolescents who stutter (aWS), this project extended the research on cognitive bias to aWS to inform our understanding of the psychosocial factors associated with stuttering in adolescence – the period of development when social anxiety typically emerges. The purpose of this two-part study was to examine group and individual differences in two forms of cognitive bias among aWS and typically fluent controls (TFC) – attentional and interpretation biases. Methods: A sample of 102 adolescents (49 aWS and 53 TFC; 13- to 19-years-old) completed a self-report measure of social anxiety, a computerized attentional bias task, and a computerized interpretation bias task. To assess attentional bias, neutral-negative face pairs were presented in a modified dot-probe paradigm in which response times to engaging and disengaging from neutral, fearful, and angry expressions were measured. To assess interpretation bias, ambiguous verbal and nonverbal social scenarios were presented in a vignette-based recognition task, after which participants endorsed possible negative and positive interpretations of those scenarios. Results: The aWS and TFC reported comparable degrees of social anxiety, although female aWS reported higher levels than male aWS. For the attentional bias task, aWS were faster to engage with fearful faces than to maintain attention on neutral faces, and they were also faster to disengage from fearful and angry faces than to maintain attention on those negative faces. TFC did not demonstrate an attentional preference for any particular face type. For the interpretation bias task, while aWS and TFC rated negative and positive interpretations of verbal and nonverbal scenarios similarly, social anxiety moderated the effect of interpretation characteristics on endorsement of those interpretations; participants with greater social anxiety endorsed negative interpretations of verbal scenarios to a greater degree than those with lower social anxiety, and participants with lower social anxiety endorsed positive interpretations of verbal and nonverbal scenarios to a greater degree than those with higher social anxiety. Conclusions: This study contributes to the existing literature in several meaningful ways. First, this sample of aWS and TFC demonstrated comparable rates of social anxiety, which counters many other reports of group differences in social anxiety in this population. Second, it supports previous preliminary accounts of attentional bias among individuals who stutter. The present findings are novel in that aWS’ rapid engagement with and rapid disengagement from negative faces were observed in the absence of group differences in social anxiety. Third, the results challenge the speculation that stuttering is associated with negative interpretation bias – a relationship that has been proposed in the literature but never empirically investigated. Taken together, these findings provide the groundwork for continued investigation into the role of social information processing on psychosocial outcomes for aWS.

Humans have now amassed a sizable knowledge of widespread, nonconscious cognitive biases which affect our behavior, especially in social and economic contexts. I contend that a democratic government is uniquely justified in using knowledge of cognitive biases to promote pro-democratic behavior, conditionally justified in using it to accomplish ends traditionally within the scope of government authority, and unjustified in using it for any other purpose. I also contend that the government ought to redesign institutional infrastructure to avoid triggering cognitive biases where it is not permitted intentionally to manipulate such biases and to optimize the effects of such biases where permissible. I shall use the United States of America as an example throughout, but my conclusions apply equally to any democracy which values the political autonomy of its populace.

Previous studies examining memory biases for threatening faces in social anxiety (SA) have yielded inconclusive results. In the present study, memory and expectancy biases were tested within the context of a novel face recognition paradigm that was designed to offset some of the methodological challenges that have hampered previous research. Undergraduates with high (n = 40) and low (n = 40) levels of SA viewed a series of neutral faces randomly paired with phrases that communicated positive or negative social feedback. Participants’ recognition memory was tested for previously encountered faces, and for their categorization of each encoded face as having been associated with negative (mean) or positive (nice) interpersonal statements. For new faces, participants were asked whether the person seemed mean or nice. Results provided no evidence in support of a general memory bias for threatening (mean) faces among high SA individuals, but instead suggested that high SA individuals lack a positive expectancy bias to appraise new social partners as being nice. Implications are considered for cognitive behavioral and interpersonal models of SA.

Public policy efforts to curb obesity often adhere to a rational actor model of human behavior, asserting that consumer behavior will change provided proper economic incentives, nutritional information, and health education. However, rigorous academic research related to such questions remains limited in scope and appears inconclusive as to the success of such economic and cognitive interventions. In contrast, research in social psychology and behavioral economics suggests that decision making is partially based on heuristics, or rules of thumb, and susceptible to powerful cognitive biases. External cues can subtly influence decision making in powerful ways. In this paper, after discussing existing policy efforts and their limitations, we use concepts from behavioral decision theory to design interventions related to different psychological domains in hopes of providing a more complete understanding of consumer dietary decision making. We move beyond traditional cognitive methods, namely the provision of nutritional information and economic incentives, to suggest the value of other cognitive, affective, social, and environmental influences in shaping food choices. Over a 21-month period, we tested 9 interventions in a point-of-purchase field study at a hospital cafeteria, focusing on the healthfulness of beverage purchases and chip purchases. Information, in the form of novel, reinforcing health messages, had the most consistently beneficial effect on the healthfulness of purchases. Traffic light colored-nutritional labeling, affect-based cues (smiley faces and frowny faces), and environmental changes including grouping items together based on level of healthfulness ("grouping by healthfulness") and pairing an unhealthy item with a healthier alternative ("healthy substitute pairing") also affected choices. Messages related to social norms had no effect on purchases. Our work adds to existing consumer behavior research and helps to inform health policy of additional cognitive factors and biases that must be taken into account when designing interventions and which can, indeed, be leveraged to influence dietary behavior. This is the first study of which we know to test the relative effects of this number and variety (economic, cognitive, affective, social, and environmental) of theory-based behavioral nudges on food choice in one setting.

Cognitive bias and thought suppression are two maladaptive patterns of thinking that have been associated with borderline personality disorder (BPD). Negative cognitive biases related to BPD include thoughts that they are bad, powerless, or vulnerable and that the world is dangerous. Thought suppression is a maladaptive emotion regulation strategy where unwanted thoughts are intentionally pushed out of one’s consciousness. However, previous research has connected thought suppression and cognitive biases to BPD only via self-report measures. The present study examined whether a laboratory task meant to measure cognitive bias and thought suppression (Scrambled Sentences Test) would predict BPD features over and above self report measures of cognitive bias and thought suppression. A sample of 153 undergraduates completed self-report measures of BPD features, thought suppression, and negative cognitive biases, as well as the Scrambled Sentences Test (SST). Results showed that while the SST was a good predictor of cognitive biases, it did not predict thought suppression when self report measures were included. Recognizing the importance of negative cognitive bias in BPD may be useful in continued treatment development. Further research into other ways of measuring thought suppression and cognitive biases in the lab may be warranted.

There is a growing body of research on the ways in which people process and organize political information. However, these studies have focused almost exclusively on textual analysis at a time when people are turning to more visually oriented media in increasing numbers. While researchers have failed to account for this trend, political organizations have quickly adapted and begun to use visual media to their advantage for political messaging. This study examines people’s ability to perceive bias in visual representations of political information. Through a series of surveys and one-on-one interviews, I found that participants exhibited significant confirmation bias in their assessments of visual information. This effect was particularly strong in participants’ initial assessment of each example. The results reveal two potential paths to increasing awareness of bias in visual information. First, basic training in visual design could encourage more thorough examination of new information and result in increased awareness of bias. Second, illustrating the effects of confirmation bias could encourage viewers to pause and reassess their initial reaction to information, again resulting in increased awareness of bias. With these two hypotheses in mind, I have created an interactive guide that teaches basic elements of visual design, such as size and color, and then illustrates the effects of cognitive biases on assessment of information.

Previous studies examining memory biases for threatening faces in social anxiety (SA) have yielded inconclusive results. In the present study, memory and expectancy biases were tested within the context of a novel face recognition paradigm that was designed to offset some of the methodological challenges that have hampered previous research. Undergraduates with high (n = 40) and low (n = 40) levels of SA viewed a series of neutral faces randomly paired with phrases that communicated positive or negative social feedback. Participants’ recognition memory was tested for previously encountered faces, and for their categorization of each encoded face as having been associated with negative (mean) or positive (nice) interpersonal statements. For new faces, participants were asked whether the person seemed mean or nice. Results provided no evidence in support of a general memory bias for threatening (mean) faces among high SA individuals, but instead suggested that high SA individuals lack a positive expectancy bias to appraise new social partners as being nice. Implications are considered for cognitive behavioral and interpersonal models of SA.