Motivational changes due to individual differences and situational variations in ingroup identification can influence accessibility of memories of ingroup violence, victimization and glories. In Study 1, high identifiers recalled fewer incidents of ingroup violence and hatred than of ingroup suffering. As well, they recalled fewer incidents of ingroup violence and hatred than did low identifiers. In Study 2, a manipulation of ingroup identity produced shifts in memory. Relative to those in the low identity condition, participants in the high identity condition recalled fewer incidents of violence and hatred and more good deeds by members of their group. Participants in a control condition recalled more positive than negative group actions; this bias was exaggerated in the high identity condition and eliminated in the low identity condition. With respect to memories of ingroup tragedies, Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that experimental reminders of ingroup suffering enhanced participants' sense of connectedness to the ingroup. The findings suggest that memories of ingroup aggressions threaten ingroup identity whereas memories of ingroup suffering enhance ingroup identity. Societal implications of the findings are discussed. The present research informs the literature on reconstructive memory by extending previous findings on the flexibility of personal memories to historical memory.

Motivational changes due to individual differences and situational variations in ingroup identification can influence accessibility of memories of ingroup violence, victimization and glories. In Study 1, high identifiers recalled fewer incidents of ingroup violence and hatred than of ingroup suffering. As well, they recalled fewer incidents of ingroup violence and hatred than did low identifiers. In Study 2, a manipulation of ingroup identity produced shifts in memory. Relative to those in the low identity condition, participants in the high identity condition recalled fewer incidents of violence and hatred and more good deeds by members of their group. Participants in a control condition recalled more positive than negative group actions; this bias was exaggerated in the high identity condition and eliminated in the low identity condition. With respect to memories of ingroup tragedies, Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that experimental reminders of ingroup suffering enhanced participants' sense of connectedness to the ingroup. The findings suggest that memories of ingroup aggressions threaten ingroup identity whereas memories of ingroup suffering enhance ingroup identity. Societal implications of the findings are discussed. The present research informs the literature on reconstructive memory by extending previous findings on the flexibility of personal memories to historical memory.

Previous studies examining memory biases for threatening faces in social anxiety (SA) have yielded inconclusive results. In the present study, memory and expectancy biases were tested within the context of a novel face recognition paradigm that was designed to offset some of the methodological challenges that have hampered previous research. Undergraduates with high (n = 40) and low (n = 40) levels of SA viewed a series of neutral faces randomly paired with phrases that communicated positive or negative social feedback. Participants’ recognition memory was tested for previously encountered faces, and for their categorization of each encoded face as having been associated with negative (mean) or positive (nice) interpersonal statements. For new faces, participants were asked whether the person seemed mean or nice. Results provided no evidence in support of a general memory bias for threatening (mean) faces among high SA individuals, but instead suggested that high SA individuals lack a positive expectancy bias to appraise new social partners as being nice. Implications are considered for cognitive behavioral and interpersonal models of SA.

Previous studies examining memory biases for threatening faces in social anxiety (SA) have yielded inconclusive results. In the present study, memory and expectancy biases were tested within the context of a novel face recognition paradigm that was designed to offset some of the methodological challenges that have hampered previous research. Undergraduates with high (n = 40) and low (n = 40) levels of SA viewed a series of neutral faces randomly paired with phrases that communicated positive or negative social feedback. Participants’ recognition memory was tested for previously encountered faces, and for their categorization of each encoded face as having been associated with negative (mean) or positive (nice) interpersonal statements. For new faces, participants were asked whether the person seemed mean or nice. Results provided no evidence in support of a general memory bias for threatening (mean) faces among high SA individuals, but instead suggested that high SA individuals lack a positive expectancy bias to appraise new social partners as being nice. Implications are considered for cognitive behavioral and interpersonal models of SA.

Cognitive theories of depression, including Beck’s Cognitive Theory, suggest that depressed individuals hold negative schemas about themselves and their environment. These negative schemas may influence the extent to which depressed individuals process positivity. Reward Devaluation Theory posits that depressed individuals avoid and devalue positivity. This suggests that depressed individuals may be less likely to hold positive schemas, or may be more likely to associate positivity with negativity. Previous meta-analytic reviews suggest that this is potentially the case, but have not assessed for self-referential stimuli. Self-referential encoding and recall tasks assess for self-schemas and may give further insight into how depressed individuals process self-referential positivity. The aim of this systematic review and meta-analysis was to examine the extent to which depressed individuals differ in processing self-referential positivity and negativity. Results indicate that depressed individuals recalled fewer positive words than negative words, with severely depressed individuals also endorsing fewer positive words than negative words, in line with Reward Devaluation Theory. In addition, depressed individuals endorsed fewer positive words and more negative words as self-referential than other-referential. In comparison to nondepressed individuals, depressed individuals demonstrated endorsed and recalled fewer positive words and more negative words. These findings suggest that treatments targeting both reduced positive biases and increased negative biases may be most beneficial for depressed individuals, particularly those exhibiting more severe symptoms of depression

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本研究主要目的在於運用指示遺忘作業探討高社交焦慮者是否有記憶偏誤現象。高社交焦慮組24人與低社交焦慮組20人參與正式實驗，受試者被要求依據指示記住或忘記三種類型刺激詞（社交威脅、中性、社交正向）。作業結果未發現任何顯著之組間差異，但進一步分析發現，在指示記住項目的回憶上，所有受試者皆回憶出較多的社交正向詞（相對於中性詞以及社交威脅詞），顯示記憶的正向偏誤，然而，在指示忘記項目的回憶上，正向偏誤的現象僅出現在低社交焦慮組，不見於高社交焦慮組。此外，相關分析顯示，高社交焦慮組的FNE量表（Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale）得分與指示記住的社交正向詞回憶量成正相關，與指示忘記的社交威脅詞回憶量成負相關；低社交焦慮組的FNE量表得分與指示記住的社交正向詞回憶量成負相關。這些結果顯示高社交焦慮者可能缺乏正向偏誤的保護機制，較一般人更容易遺忘正向評價訊息，因而更容易受到負面評價的影響，於是他們傾向抑制負向評價訊息的回憶，將注意力投注在非威脅訊息，並努力記住正向評價，換言之，他們透過逃避負面評價的方式來維持良好的自我形象。 / The purpose of the present study was to utilize the directed forgetting task to investigate the memory bias in socially anxious individuals. Performance on a directed forgetting task was assessed in socially anxious (n=24) and nonanxious (n=20) individuals. Participants were presented with three types of words (negative social, neutral, positive social) and were cued to either remember or forget each word as it was presented. There were no between-groups differences on a free recall task for words in both remember and forget conditions. Follow-up analyses demonstrated that all subjects recalled more positive social words than either neutral words or negative social words in the remember condition, revealing the positive memory bias. However, only nonanxious individuals showed such positive memory bias in the forget condition, while high-social-anxiety individuals did not. Moreover, in the social anxiety group, the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE) scores were positively related to the recall of positive social “to-be-remembered” words, and negatively related to the recall of negative social “to-be-forgotten” words. In the control group, FNE scores were negatively related to the recall of positive social “to-be-remembered” words. These results suggest that the protective positive bias was absent in socially anxious individuals. Thus, they were more likely than nonanxious individuals to forget positive evaluative information; therefore, they were vulnerable to negative evaluation. Furthermore, people with excessive social anxiety might try hard to inhibit the recall of negative evaluation and to remember positive evaluation. In other words, they made an effort to maintain a good impression by avoiding negative evaluative information.

本研究的主要目的在於運用自傳式記憶的作業探討高社交焦慮者是否有記憶偏誤的現象。根據Clark和Wells（1995）的模型，高社交焦慮者在社交焦慮情境中容易把大部分的注意力集中在自身相關（self-related）的訊息上，因而造成對自身相關訊息的記憶優於外界環境訊息的現象；然而根據Repee和Heimberg（1997）的模型則假設高社交焦慮者在社交情境中會關注與負向自我評價有關的訊息，而不論該訊息是來自自身或外界環境。本研究企圖同時檢測上述兩個模型。 本研究篩選出六十四名大學生分為高社交焦慮與低社交焦慮兩組，所有受試者皆須分別回憶一件社交焦慮事件及一件中性事件，受試者被要求先在腦海中形成對該事件的影像，然後寫下有關回憶事件的詳細描述並完成記憶清晰度的評估。 研究結果得出高社交焦慮者在進行社交焦慮事件的回憶時，傾向回憶出比低社交焦慮組更多的自身相關訊息；且高社交焦慮組在回憶社交焦慮事件時比低社交焦慮組更傾向評估自身相關訊息的記憶清晰度高於外界環境訊息，研究結果較支持Clark和Well（1995）的說法。 / The purpose of the present study was to utilize the autobiographical memory task to investigate the memory bias in socially anxious individuals. According to Clark and Wells’ (1995) view, socially anxious individuals were hypothesized to preferentially allocate almost attentional resources to self-related information and remember self-related information better than external information on entering an anxiety-provoking social situation. However, according to Repee and Heimberg’ s (1997) model, they supposed that socially anxious individuals tend to focus on negative self-evaluated information regardless of it were self-related or external information. The present study tried to examine the two models simultaneously. Sixty-four undergraduate students were assigned to either high or low social-anxiety group. All subjects were asked to recall one anxiety-provoking social situation about public-speaking and another neutral situation. They were requested to form an image of the event and write a detailed description about it. They then completed rating of memory vividness for each situation. The results revealed that high social anxiety group showed to retrieve more self-related information than low social anxiety group and displayed more preferential to rate the vividness of self-related information higher than external environmental information than low social anxiety group did when recalling anxiety-provoking social situation. The result supported Clark and Wells’ s model.

L’effet des émotions sur la mémoire (EEM) est un effet largement documenté dans la littérature, en ce qui concerne les participants sains jeunes et âgés. Cette mise en évidence de meilleures performances mnésiques à partir de stimuli émotionnels par rapport à des stimuli neutres semblerait reposer sur l’existence de relations étroites entre les régions cérébrales primordiales dans les processus mnésiques et émotionnels ; soit respectivement l’hippocampe et l’amygdale. Ces deux structures étant parmi les premières touchées au cours de la maladie d’Alzheimer (MA), leur altération pourrait sous-tendre la défaillance de l’EEM chez ces patients. Toutefois, les résultats des études ayant exploré l’EEM chez les patients MA sont assez contradictoires. Cette divergence entre les résultats concernerait notamment les études ayant exploré l’EEM avec des intervalles courts entre l’encodage et la récupération. L’objectif de cette thèse est ainsi d’étudier les facteurs susceptibles d’être responsables de ces résultats hétérogènes. L’analyse de la littérature a suggéré que l’un de ces facteurs pourrait être lié aux conditions très variables d’encodage utilisées dans différentes recherches. Ainsi, notre première étude comportementale a apporté des arguments robustes quant à la dépendance de l’EEM, et en particulier de l’effet de positivité en mémoire, de l’intentionnalité et de la quantité de ressources cognitives allouées à l’encodage ; mais ceci chez les participants âgés sains seulement. En effet, dans cette première étude, l’EEM n’a pas être observé dans le groupe de patients MA étudié. L’analyse détaillée de ces résultats a soulevé diverses interrogations, chacune d’entre elles faisant l’objet d’une nouvelle étude expérimentale. Ainsi, dans les études suivantes, l’influence de quatre facteurs pouvant influer sur l’EEM dans la MA fut au centre de nos recherches; soit respectivement le degré d’atrophie des régions médio-temporales, la profondeur du traitement, la disponibilité des ressources attentionnelles pendant l’encodage, et la familiarité ressentie envers les stimuli. L’ensemble des résultats de ces quatre dernières études convergerait vers l’idée que l’EEM, et notamment l’effet de positivité en mémoire, serait préservé chez les patients MA quand certaines conditions sont remplies. Ainsi, cet effet semble relativement préservé chez les patients MA ne présentant pas de degrés d’atrophie des régions amygdaliennes et hippocampiques trop importants. Par ailleurs, comme chez les participants âgés sains, l’effet de positivité en mémoire semblerait se manifester chez les patients MA en dehors et au-delà du sentiment de familiarité ressenti envers les stimuli positifs, notamment lors de l’utilisation de tâches d’encodage permettant le traitement profond des stimuli, et lors de tâches de mémoire de travail simples. De même, les stimuli émotionnels négatifs très intenses sembleraient moduler les stratégies de réponse employées par les patients MA dans les tâches de reconnaissance, mais aussi les performances mnésiques de ces patients dans des tâches de mémoire de travail. / The emotional enhancement of memory (EEM) – better memory performances for emotional stimuli than for neutral ones – was frequently described in healthy young and older participants. The EEM seems to rely on the relationship between the amygdala and the hippocampus, the central cerebral structures responsible for the emotional and memory processes, respectively. These two cerebral structures are among the first to be affected in Alzheimer’s disease (AD), which might suggest the alteration of the EEM in these patients. Nevertheless, the results of the studies investigating the EEM in these patients are rather debatable. This discrepancy concerns especially the studies investigating the EEM by using short intervals between encoding and retrieval.Thus, the main goal of this doctoral work was to study the factors susceptible to be responsible of these contradictory results. The analysis of the literature suggested that one of these factors might be related to the extremely variable encoding conditions used among different studies. We explored the influence of this factor in our first behavioral study, which provided strong evidence that the EEM, and especially the positivity memory bias, relies on the intention to encode and on the quantity of cognitive resources allocated at encoding only in healthy older participants. Indeed, the EEM was not observed in AD patients participating in our first study. The detailed analysis of these results raised several hypotheses concerning the factors that might be responsible for the absence of the EEM in the AD patients participating in the first study. Each of these hypotheses was tested in a new experimental study. Thus, in the following studies we explored the influence of four factors on the EEM in AD, namely: the degree of atrophy of medial temporal regions, the depth of encoding, the availability of attention resources during encoding, and the sense of familiarity towards emotional stimuli. The results of these four studies seem to converge on the idea that the EEM, especially the positivity memory bias, is preserved in AD when certain conditions are reunited. Thus, the EEM seems to be intact in AD patients in which the degrees of atrophy of the amygdala and of the hippocampus are not too large. Moreover, just like in healthy older participants, the positivity memory bias seems to manifest itself in AD patients beyond and above the feeling of familiarity towards positive stimuli, especially in situations permitting the deep and rich encoding of information and in working memory tasks that are not too difficult. Similarly, the highly arousing negative stimuli seem to modulate the response strategies used by AD patients and healthy older participants in recognition tasks, but also the performance of AD patients in working memory tasks.

Evidence from self-reports and laboratory studies suggests that recall of nontrauma autobiographical memories may be disturbed in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but investigations in everyday life are sparse. This study investigated unintentional nontrauma and trauma memories in trauma survivors with and without PTSD (N = 52), who kept an autobiographical memory diary for a week. We investigated whether unintentional nontrauma memories show an overgeneral memory bias and further memory abnormalities in people with PTSD, and whether unintentional trauma memories show distinct features. Compared to the no-PTSD group, the PTSD group recorded fewer nontrauma memories, which were more overgeneral, more often from before the trauma or related to the trauma, were perceived as distant, and led to greater dwelling. Trauma memories were more vivid, recurrent, and present and led to greater suppression and dwelling. Within the PTSD group, the same features distinguished trauma and nontrauma memories. Results are discussed regarding theories of autobiographical memory and PTSD.