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The central focus of this study is cognitive information utilisation. Research in information utilisation to date has largely focused on the organisational outcomes of the take up of scientific and professional information in the context of social practice, and the related political, cultural and economic factors affecting this. Conceptualising information utilisation as a type of organisational change or end-state has tended to mask the complex cognitive exchanges that occur. While there has been increasing acknowledgement that information utilisation is a more holistic interactive change process involving cognitive strategies and transformations, very little research has focused on the cognitive dimension of information utilisation. Bertram Brookes claimed that the theoretical pursuit of information science should be the cognitive interaction between people and information. He explicated this as the Fundamental Equation of information science, most commonly expressed in his writings as K[S] + ∆I = K[S + ∆S]. By this equation, Brookes was stating that in the process of doing something with information, a person's existing knowledge structure K[S] is changed by an increment of information ∆I, and this modification has some effect, a changed knowledge structure K[S + ∆S] where ∆S indicates the effect of the modification. This equation is posited as an expression of cognitive information utilisation. The specific purpose of this study is to further understanding of cognitive information utilisation, employing Brookes' Fundamental Equation as a general framework for establishing research questions, operational rationalisations and procedures. With a group of four girls in their final year of secondary education, the study sought to: (a) establish the effects ∆S of exposure to information perceived by the girls; (b) establish how the perceived effects are associated with changes to their knowledge structures K[S]; and (c) establish the patterns, if any, within and between the girls in relation to changes in knowledge structures and perceived effects (K[S + ∆S]). The study employed a quasi-experimental repeated phase approach. The girls' existing knowledge structures about the drug heroin were mapped, and knowledge structures after each of three exposures to different information on heroin were also mapped. Eliciting the girls' knowledge about heroin was based on written discourse and question / answer protocols, and this knowledge was represented as conceptual graph structures, based on an analytical procedure developed by Graesser & Clark (1985). The data were analysed qualitatively to establish indicators and conceptualisations of the perceived effects, and to identify and conceptualise the changed knowledge structures. The study found that the exposures to information and the deliberate consideration of this information had effects for all the girls. Five types of effects were perceived, these being: get a complete picture, get a changed picture, get a clearer picture, get a verified picture, and get a position in a picture. These effects are presented as types of cognitive information utilisation. The knowledge structures after each exposure were shown to change by cognitive strategies of appending, inserting and deleting. The analysis of the knowledge structures associated with these five effects showed that there was coherence between the effects and how these effects were manifested in changes to the girls' knowledge structures. A number of distinct patterns were evident, for example, get a complete picture was associated with revised knowledge structures that were more inclusive, elaborative and integrative. The study raises important implications for information practice, including data base design, information interviews, provision of information in media campaigns, and instructional design. The study also addresses methodological issues and identifies area for further research.

This work explores human consciousness, using a framework of the Structure of Feelings and Experience developed from the work of Raymond Williams and Bernard Smith. It then examines aspects of the consciousness of the Mentally Ill, the Intellectually Disabled, Addicted and Indigenous people, with three aims: 1/. To identify a model of consciousness which reflects the major indicators arising from the structure of feelings and experience, and those arising from consideration of the four subject groups, representing the plurality of human consciousness. 2/. To explore some of the lessons for mainstream citizens, arising from alternative aspects of consciousness, both positive and negative, which these groups exhibit. 3/. To suggest ways the model of consciousness can be used to empower those with mental illness, or intellectual disability, by acknowledging and strengthening their opportunities to take responsibility for their lives. By engaging them more in active roles in the planning and delivery of their health, rehabilitation and community services. And to illustrate some examples of practical applications of person-valuing and spirit-engaging healing and empowering processes, used in groups in Australia and overseas, which point to ways of improving health and rehabilitation policy and practice in Australia / Master of Arts (Hons)

<p>Simply recalling a memory has very different consequences than retelling it. Accuracy is often emphasized when events are recalled; however, retelling an event in a conversational manner may compromise accuracy in order to make the story more entertaining (e.g., Dudukovic, Marsh, & Tversky, 2004), or to support a specific argument (e.g., Tversky & Marsh, 2000). I will focus on the memorial consequences and underlying mechanisms of retellings. </p><p>First, I will review research that shows the inaccuracies of retellings. In reviewing this research, I will identify possible underlying mechanisms that change memory through retellings, such as the following: schema-guided reconstruction, interference, transfer inappropriate processing, and retrieval-induced-forgetting. </p><p>Second, I will experimentally investigate possible cognitive mechanisms underlying these memorial changes. In the first experiment, I show that the elaborative nature of storytelling does not influence memory more so than simply selectively rehearsing that information. In the second and third experiments, I investigate how retelling autobiographical events influences qualitative aspects of memory. These two experiments suggest that retrieving autobiographical events influences memory quality, although the specific nature in which they are retold has no effect. I close by connecting these three experiments to the broader literature.</p> / Dissertation

Technology is currently extremely integrated with everyday life. Popular media has made bold claims that the internet is making us “dumber” and people struggle to remember information more now than they ever have in the past. Scientific research on the effect of internet search on cognition and memory is still in its infancy. This research will analyze the literature and theories discussing memory and the internet. Based on an original experiment by Sparrow, Liu, and Wegner. 20 participants (10 young adults and 10 older adults) performed a typing task with twenty trivia statements, followed by a recall and recognition memory test to look for the effects of directed forgetting and transactive memory. This experiment did not replicate the effect found in the original experiment. It calls to question if the effect of transactive memory is applicable to social relationships that only include a person and a computer.

A relatively new phenomenon in learning research called highlighting occurs when participants show a seemingly irrational preference to attribute a stronger cue-outcome association to a later presented perfect predictor when it is paired with an imperfect predictor than that of an earlier presented perfect predictor paired with the same imperfect predictor (Kruschke, 1996). Current research suggests that the highlighting effect depends on the ability to learn to shift attention away from an irrelevant cue toward a more relevant cue in order to reduce errors in causal judgment and preserve an earlier formed association (Kruschke, 2003). Much research has suggested that older adults have difficulty disengaging attention from irrelevant information, which could be problematic in the highlighting procedure (Cohn, Dustman, & Bradford, 1984; Tipper, 1991; Mutter, Naylor, & Patterson, 2005). However, the results of the current experiment suggest that older adults can learn attentional shifts in order to guide associative learning and reduce errors in causal judgments. These data prove to be a problem for many models of associative learning (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994), but support a model proposed by Kruschke (2006).

Recent research has documented that we tend to use the face to express some emotions, but use the body to express other emotions. To understand the contributions of the body to non-verbal emotional communication, we compared the performance of able-bodied participants who were allowed to express emotions naturally (standing) to able-bodied participants who were confined to a wheelchair. Theories of embodied emotion would predict that restraining the use of the body should change emotion production and communication confidence, especially for body-related emotions. Participants expressed six different emotions in three conditions: 1) naturally, 2) face only, and 3) body only. After each trial, they indicated their confidence that they effectively communicated the emotion. Results indicated that for emotion production, both groups used primarily the face to express happiness and disgust. We predicted that participants in the wheelchair group would use the face more to express body-related emotions, but our findings show that the extinction of body occurs with specific emotions. Like the standing group, wheelchair participants used their bodies to express submissive emotions of embarrassment and fear. In contrast, they showed a distinct lack of body use for emotional displays expressing higher status or dominant emotions--pride and anger. Nonetheless, confidence in communication did not differ across groups despite production differences. These findings suggest that current body states affect how emotions are expressed. In terms of embodied emotion theory, body restrictions may make a person feel less pride or anger. From an evolutionary standpoint, it might be that displaying pride or anger when one is less physically able reduces one’s chance for survival.

The central question of my thesis is how different positive emotions affect inhibition. Katzir, Eyal, Meiran, and Kessler (2010) addressed this question using an antisaccade task and found that happiness decreased inhibition compared to pride, which they attribute to the links between pride and long-term goals and happiness and short-term goals. I attempted to generalize their results to a color-naming Stroop task and predicted that their results would not generalize because their study had little supporting research and their method had several limitations. I tested 45 students of the Claremont Colleges and found partial support for Katzir et al. Participants in the pride condition showed better inhibitory function than participants in the neutral condition, but I was unable to find differences in inhibitory function between participants in the pride and happiness or happiness and neutral conditions. The results suggest that pride improved inhibitory function compared to neutral emotion, but happiness had no effect. I conclude that further research is needed to confirm the supposed distinction between pride and happiness, the strength of the links between happiness, pride, and different goals, and the motivational role of emotion in inhibition.

While there are studies linking positive psychological outcomes with exercise, few have focused on choice as a moderating factor. The research that has examined choice as a moderator yielded mixed results. Currently no research has looked at the impact of choice of exercise intensity on the psychological benefits of acute exercise; specifically, affective and cognitive gains. According to Landers (2008), acute exercise refers to a single bout of exercise usually lasting a short duration, whereas chronic exercise refers to long term repeated bouts of exercise (e.g., weeks, months, or years). Participants in this study consisted of 117 collegiate psychology students. The study consisted of two trials. The first trial was used to establish a baseline. Next, students were randomly assigned to one of four conditions for the second trial. Everything stayed consistent from the first trial to the second trial, except the extent of choice given with regard to exercise intensity. Affect and cognition measures were given to all participants on both days. For trial two, group 1 was given full choice, e.g., they were able to exercise at their own pace. Group 2 had to exercise at the average pace from their first session, group 3 exercised at a pace equivalent to two rate of perceived exertion (RPE) levels above their average pace from the first session, and group 4 exercised at a pace two RPE levels below their average pace from the first session. A mixed model MANOVA was used to analyze the participants’ cognitive and affective data. Although the outcomes of the study were limited, Group 1 (choice) performed better on two of the executive function measures (Trail Making Test, Letter Number Sequence) for the second trial than the other experimental groups.

<p>There is a long-standing claim that humans and nonhuman primates share an evolutionarily ancient system of nonverbal number representation. By and large, the focus in the field has been on providing existence proofs of numerical competence in wide-ranging taxa or using individual species as models for comparisons with humans. Recent findings in numerical cognition have suggested that evidence for approximate numerical abilities in nonhuman species may indicate that humans and animals share a cognitive system for representing numerosities nonverbally. To date, little is known about the contextual and quantitative limits of that system, or how those limits differ between species. The studies presented here take a comparative, behavioral approach to characterizing species differences and similarities in the approximate number system, and the contexts that affect that system. Collectively, this set of studies provides evidence that the approximate number system evolved in primates as a malleable system in which numerical representations are accessed spontaneously and improved through training. Despite the sensitivity of the system to experience and context individual differences in sensitivity are greater than species differences suggesting that the selective pressures that constrained its evolution were early and general and that species variation in social group size and diet have less influence on the ANS. Finally my studies indicate that the ANS supports approximate arithmetic and is consistent with the idea that ANS representations evolved to allow animals to calculate the world around them.</p> / Dissertation