我國財務會計準則委員會於2004年7月1日發佈財務會計準則第35號公報《資產減損之會計處理準則》，此號公報允許公司可選擇於2004年提前認列資產減損，且公司擁有認列資產減損金額之裁量權。當公司擁有認列資產減損時點與金額的裁量權時，資產減損之認列可能成為一項新的盈餘管理工具。由於我國公司的代理問題是起因於控制股東剝削外部股東之財富，故本研究擬探討控制股東之股權結構與公司提前認列資產減損之關聯性。 / 本研究以2004年年報與2005年第一季季報宣告資產減損的上市櫃公司為研究對象。研究目的有三，首先探討控制股東之控制權偏離現金流量權引發的代理問題，是否會影響公司提前認列資產減損的可能性與金額。其次探討公司的控制股東持股質押的現象，是否會加深公司的代理問題，因而影響公司提前認列資產減損的可能性與認列減損的金額。最後本研究將探討市場對於宣告資產減損資訊的反應，是否會受到公司治理結構不同所影響。 / 研究結果發現，控制股東之控制權偏離現金流量權幅度愈大的公司，提前認列資產減損的可能性愈大，但是與提前認列資產減損的金額無顯著的關聯性。其次，控制股東有持股質押的公司，提前認列資產減損的可能性與金額皆愈大。最後，本研究並未發現股票市場對於不同公司治理結構的公司宣告資產減損的訊息有不同的反應。 / Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No.35 “Accounting for Assets Impairments” was released on July first of 2004. The provision of this Statement should be effective for quarterly financial statements ending on or after first quarter of 2005, but earlier application on the forth quarter of 2004 is encouraged. In Taiwan, the agency problem arises from the divergence between controlling owner’ voting right and cash flow right. Thus the regulation on the early adoption provides controlling owner with stronger incentive to manage reported earnings by manipulating the recognition timing and amount of write-off of impaired assets. / The primary objective of this paper is examine the association ownership structures, measured as the control divergence and the percentage of collateralized stock by controlling owners, and the likelihood of the early adoption of SFAS No. 35 and amount of assets impairments. Second, we further examine whether market valuation on assets impairment systematically varies depending on the agency problem level. / The results show that, as predicted, firms with greater control divergence and greater percentage of collateralized stock by controlling owners are more likely to early recognize impartment of assts. In addition, we find that the amount of asset impairment is associated with the percentage of collateralized stock by controlling owners, as predicted, but is not related to the control divergence. Finally, contrary to our prediction, we find no evidence that the market reaction to the announcement of asset impairments is significantly associated with the corporate governance structures.