University of Macau / Institute of Chinese Medical Sciences

本文以La Porta 等人（1999）「最終控制權」的概念，來衡量控制股東之控制權與現金流量權的偏離情形，並以董監事持股質押比率來衡量董監事介入股市的程度，將之融入於Ohlson(1995)及Feltham and Ohlson(1995)動態線性資訊評價模式中，作為該評價模式之其他資訊項目，以探討除了超額盈餘、帳面價值等會計資訊外，公司治理因素在台灣是否具有評價攸關性。實證結果發現前後期超額盈餘相關且有持續性及預測相關性；超額盈餘及帳面價值等會計資訊能夠反應公司價值，是公司重要評價資訊；控制權與現金流量請求權偏離值與公司價值呈顯著負相關。亦即兩者偏離值越小，即控制權與現金流量請求權之偏離程度越大，公司價值越大，研究獲得與過去相關文獻研究中不同之異常現象；另外，在董監事介入股市方面，顯示董監事持股質押比率與股價兩者成負相關，但迴歸分析的結果並不顯著。整體來看，對台灣上市公司而言，本研究公司治理因素可為公司評價的重要增額資訊。 / Based on Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) valuation models, this study examines the effects of corporate governance, in addition to abcdrmal earnings and book value, on firm value. The results indicate that the abcdrmal earnings have persistent and forecast relevance. Both abcdrmal earnings and equity book values are significantly relevant to firm value. Contrary to the literature, the corporate governance has negative effects on firm value.

證期會於2002年開始實施「自結損益制度」，要求已公開財務預測的上市公司，應於年度終了後1個月內公告上年度財務預測達成情形相關資訊，以期藉由強制揭露改善資訊空窗期現象，並讓投資人提早得知公司上年度的營運成果。 故本研究的樣本為從2001年已公開財務預測的公司開始探討。後來「公開財測處理準則」於2004年12月修正，改採自願公開財務預測。雖然公布財務預測之公司應於年度終了後一個月內公布自結盈餘之規定並未更改，然財務預測由強制性改為自願性，使得研究基礎不一致，所以將研究期間分割為兩段，第一段為2001年1月至2004年12月，第二段為2005年1月至2005年12月。 本研究的主題分為三個部分，主要在探討股權結構對公司自結盈餘行為之影響。實證結果發現，控制權與現金流量權之數值愈小，即偏離程度愈大，公司更新財務預測之幅度愈大。控制股東之股份控制權與公司公布自結盈餘時間早晚呈正相關，即股份控制權愈高的公司，愈晚發布自結盈餘；從董監事質押比例觀之，2001年到2004年之間，董監事質押比例愈高的公司，發布自結盈餘的時間點愈晚，但依照2005年之資料顯示，董監事質押比例愈高的公司，發布自結盈餘的時間愈早，由於董監事質押比例在不同研究期間呈相反的結果，因此該變數對對公司公布自結盈餘的時間早晚之影響尚無定論。董監事質押比率愈大，其公布的自結損益準確性愈差，與公告盈餘之差異愈大。 / In November 2002, the Securities and Futures Commission announced a new measure requiring listed companies that have made their financial forecast to the public to release within a month after the year end their income statements (hereafter called “self-assessed earnings”) and explain the discrepancy from the forecasted earnings. This new measure requires that the above listed companies release their earnings information earlier than the deadline for filing audited financial statements (hereafter called “audited earnings”) by three months, aiming to ask the listed companies to provide more timely information to investors. The sample consists of firms releasing their financial forecasts from 2001 to 2005. According the time the rules changed, the sample is divided into two groups. This study aims to examine how the corporate ownership structure affects the way a company release its self-assessed income. The empirical results find that the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights of the largest ultimate owner is lower, and the company updates its financial forecasts greatly. The voting rights level of the largest ultimate owner is related positively with the time making self-assessed income to the public. Moreover, directors and controls mortgage ratio is larger, and the accuracy of the self-assessed income is lower.

我國財務會計準則委員會於2004年7月1日發佈財務會計準則第35號公報《資產減損之會計處理準則》，此號公報允許公司可選擇於2004年提前認列資產減損，且公司擁有認列資產減損金額之裁量權。當公司擁有認列資產減損時點與金額的裁量權時，資產減損之認列可能成為一項新的盈餘管理工具。由於我國公司的代理問題是起因於控制股東剝削外部股東之財富，故本研究擬探討控制股東之股權結構與公司提前認列資產減損之關聯性。 / 本研究以2004年年報與2005年第一季季報宣告資產減損的上市櫃公司為研究對象。研究目的有三，首先探討控制股東之控制權偏離現金流量權引發的代理問題，是否會影響公司提前認列資產減損的可能性與金額。其次探討公司的控制股東持股質押的現象，是否會加深公司的代理問題，因而影響公司提前認列資產減損的可能性與認列減損的金額。最後本研究將探討市場對於宣告資產減損資訊的反應，是否會受到公司治理結構不同所影響。 / 研究結果發現，控制股東之控制權偏離現金流量權幅度愈大的公司，提前認列資產減損的可能性愈大，但是與提前認列資產減損的金額無顯著的關聯性。其次，控制股東有持股質押的公司，提前認列資產減損的可能性與金額皆愈大。最後，本研究並未發現股票市場對於不同公司治理結構的公司宣告資產減損的訊息有不同的反應。 / Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No.35 “Accounting for Assets Impairments” was released on July first of 2004. The provision of this Statement should be effective for quarterly financial statements ending on or after first quarter of 2005, but earlier application on the forth quarter of 2004 is encouraged. In Taiwan, the agency problem arises from the divergence between controlling owner’ voting right and cash flow right. Thus the regulation on the early adoption provides controlling owner with stronger incentive to manage reported earnings by manipulating the recognition timing and amount of write-off of impaired assets. / The primary objective of this paper is examine the association ownership structures, measured as the control divergence and the percentage of collateralized stock by controlling owners, and the likelihood of the early adoption of SFAS No. 35 and amount of assets impairments. Second, we further examine whether market valuation on assets impairment systematically varies depending on the agency problem level. / The results show that, as predicted, firms with greater control divergence and greater percentage of collateralized stock by controlling owners are more likely to early recognize impartment of assts. In addition, we find that the amount of asset impairment is associated with the percentage of collateralized stock by controlling owners, as predicted, but is not related to the control divergence. Finally, contrary to our prediction, we find no evidence that the market reaction to the announcement of asset impairments is significantly associated with the corporate governance structures.

本研究藉由金融控股公司之大股東、董事、監察人持股集中度、持股設質狀況及股權結構型態等因素，以固定效果模型進行實證分析，探討該等變數對金融控股公司之公司價值，包括Tobin’s Q、每股盈餘（EPS）及市價淨值比（Market-to-Book Ratio）之影響。 本研究係以95年底14家金融控股公司作為研究對象，並以92年至95年之四個年度資料作為分析基礎，除設計影響全體金控公司價值（VALUE）之相關變數外，另針對「具最終控制者」型態為「家族集團」或「政府機構」設計不同的迴歸方程式，探討「家族金融控股公司」及「公股金融控股公司」型態對公司價值之影響。 本研究實證結果發現：金融控股公司之「股權集中度」愈高，無論對於「全體金融控股公司」或針對「家族金融控股公司」之公司價值均呈現顯著性，且呈正向效果；「董監事持股比率」對「全體金融控股公司」及「公股金融控股公司」之公司價值具顯著性，並呈現負相關；「董監事規模」對「全體金融控股公司」及「家族金融控股公司」之公司價值具顯著性，並呈現負相關；「董監事設質比率」對「全體金融控股公司」及「家族金融控股公司」之公司價值呈現顯著的負相關。另實證結果顯示，金融控股公司之最終控制者如為「家族集團」，則該控制型態與公司價值呈現顯著水準。

家族企業約佔我國上市公司的80.63％，其管理權與經營權多掌握在同一家族中，家族對企業有很大的影響力。本研究探討家族企業與非家族企業多角化程度與董監質押比例之高低跟盈餘管理之關聯性。 本研究以我國1997年至2006年底之上市公司為樣本，實證結果發現：(1)家族企業較非家族企業從事盈餘管理的可能性為高；(2)當公司多角化經營程度越高時，公司有較大之誘因進行盈餘管理之行為，然而當公司為家族企業且其多角化程度越高時，反而會降低家族企業盈餘管理可能性；(3)家族企業樣本中，多角化經營程度高低，與家族企業是否從事盈餘管理並無顯著之關係；(4)公司非相關多角化經營之高低，與家族企業是否從事盈餘管理，並無顯著之關係；(5)公司董監事質押比率之高低，與家族企業是否從事盈餘管理，並無顯著之關係。 / Family firms take about 81% of the listed firms in Taiwan. This study investigates the relation between business diversification and earnings management and that between stock pledge of directors and earnings management under the family-firms/non-family -firms setting. Based on the sample of firms listed in Taiwan during 1997-2006, the empirical results show that the family companies are more apt to manipulate earnings than the non-family companies. The higher the degree of diversification, the more the companies are apt to manipulate the earnings. However, neither unrelated diversification nor stock pledge of directors is related to earning management. Contrast to non-families, well-diversified family companies may decrease the possibility of earnings management, but taking family companies as a sample, diversification is not associated with earnings management.

隨著科技的進步、無形資產佔公司企業比重日益漸增，逐漸取代傳統有形資產主導地位，並成為企業最具競爭力及影響力的資產。從總體角度來看，越來越多的國家將無形資產視為衡量國際競爭力的重要指標，但由於無形資產的特殊性，從開發到經營保護皆須有技術與財務審查且離不開大量的資金投入，但在傳統融資方式加上無形資產交易成本高、價值不易評估等特性下，較不易通過銀行業融資渠道獲取足夠資金。因此本研究探討無形資產在具備哪些條件下，有可能借鏡有形資產典當之模式獲取資金，並解決中小企業以及新興產業的融資問題。 本研究藉由對當鋪、上海擔保公司、上海個案企業這三方面的訪談與分析，一方面使本研究在無形資產質押典當模式上更加透析，另一方面也提供給相關研究領域文獻資料，同時也了解大陸在無形資產融資質押過程中會考慮哪些因素，又如何採取適當的管道方式妥善解決。 / With the progress of science and technology, intangible assets have been playing a more important role in business sector, competing the significance with tangible assets and becoming one of the most powerful assets of companies. From a macro perspective, more and more countries have referred intangible assets to an index of evaluating global competitiveness. However, it takes huge investment from developing to managing intangible assets. Since their high transaction costs as well as difficulties of evaluation, it is not easy to get enough capital through current banking system. Therefore, this thesis is discussing about under what conditions companies could finance for intangible assets via similar pathways as pawning tangible assets. The study has conducted interviews and analysis of pawnshops, two case companies and one guarantee company in Shanghai. On one hand, this study gives a clearer picture on the model of intangible asset pledge; on the other hand, it provides a better understanding about the required factors, process, and solutions of intangible asset pledge in China for further related studying.

本研究旨在探討台灣十四家金融控股上市(櫃)公司，其公司治理機制為董監事持股、持股質押、控制權與現金流量偏離度、機構投資人的持股比率，本文並加入考慮質押影響的董監事淨持股比率、調整後控制權與現金流量偏離度及合理的控制權與現金流量偏離度。針對2001年至2006年9月進行研究，為得出公司治理對績效影響與最適的公司治理使績效達最佳狀態。 吾人採用迴歸分析實證發現：董監事持股質押與公司經營績效具顯著關聯性，且得出使公司績效達最佳之最適持股質押比率為不超過56.50%之結果；董監事持股比率與公司經營績效具顯著正向關係，且其支持利益收斂推測；而在考慮董監事持股質押後之董監事淨持股比率，其亦支持利益收斂推測，但考慮了質押後的董監事淨持股對報酬率增加的幅度較小；機構投資人持股比率與公司績效多呈正向關係，但結果並不顯著；控制權與現金流量偏離度、考慮控制股東之持股質押後的調整後及合理的控制權與現金流量偏離度，其與公司經營績效多呈負向顯著關係，且辦理股票質押確實會使股權更加的偏離，並對於公司績效產生較負面的影響。

本文以Dittmar and Mart-Smith (2007)所使用的模型為基礎，研究公司治理對公司價值、現金持有價值以及股利的影響。以市值對淨資產比、資產報酬率(以同產業的平均ROA調整後)為衡量公司價值的變數。而以內部人的行為和公司監督機制2項指標來衡量公司治理。其中，公司內部人行為指標包括：董監質押比、盈餘股份比、關係人融資比。公司監督治理機制指標包括：法人持股比、大股東持股比、獨立董監席次比、外部董監席次比、外部持股比。 以民國85-95年上市櫃公司為研究對象，以panel data之fix effect方式進行分析，實證結果顯示(一)對公司價值影響方面：盈餘股份比和法人持股比與公司價值呈現顯著正向關係；而董監質押比、獨立董監席次比、外部董監席次比與公司價值呈負向關係。(二)在現金持有價值影響方面：內部人行為中，董監質押比、關係人融資比對現金持有價值影響為顯著負向，並無發現監督機制對現金持有價值有正向影響。(三)在股利影響方面：內部人行為中，董監質押比、關係人融資比對股利的影響為顯著正向，並無發現監督機制對股利有負向影響。整體來看，公司治理對公司價值確有影響，但對現金持有價值和股利的影響方面，並沒有發現如Pinkowitz et al. (2006)之實證結果。 / Based on Dittmar and Mart-Smith (2007) valuation models, I investigate how the corporate governance affects the contribution of cash holdings and dividends to firm value. Firm value was measured by market value to book value ratio and the adjusted return on assets. We use two major categories of corporate governance measures including the degree of insider acting and the presence of shareholder monitoring. The degree of insider acting includes the ratio of directors' and supervisors' shares pledged (dsip) , the ratio of controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights to voting rights(ehb), and the ratio of relation party loaning to equity(rplp). The shareholder monitoring includes institutional holding(ihp), large shareholder holding(mhp), the ratio of independent directors and supervisors(idsp), the ratio of outside directors and supervisors(ocp), the ratio of outside directors and supervisors holding(ohp). Firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC during 1995-2006 are selected as the sample. The empirical results indicate that the ratio of controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights to voting rights(ehb), and institutional holding(ihp) are significantly and positively related to market value and return on assets. Second, the ratio of directors' and supervisors' shares pledged(dsip), and the ratio of relation party loaning to equity(rplp) are significantly and negatively related to the value of cash holding. We didn’t find the shareholder monitoring significantly increase the cash holding value. Finally, only the ratio of directors' and supervisors' shares pledged(dsip) and the ratio of relation party loaning to equity(rplp) are significantly related to dividends value. The conclusion is that although corporate government affects firm value, corporate government doesn’t significantly determines the value of cash holding and dividends. That empirical result is not consistent with the one of Pinkowitz et al. (2006).