本文以La Porta 等人（1999）「最終控制權」的概念，來衡量控制股東之控制權與現金流量權的偏離情形，並以董監事持股質押比率來衡量董監事介入股市的程度，將之融入於Ohlson(1995)及Feltham and Ohlson(1995)動態線性資訊評價模式中，作為該評價模式之其他資訊項目，以探討除了超額盈餘、帳面價值等會計資訊外，公司治理因素在台灣是否具有評價攸關性。實證結果發現前後期超額盈餘相關且有持續性及預測相關性；超額盈餘及帳面價值等會計資訊能夠反應公司價值，是公司重要評價資訊；控制權與現金流量請求權偏離值與公司價值呈顯著負相關。亦即兩者偏離值越小，即控制權與現金流量請求權之偏離程度越大，公司價值越大，研究獲得與過去相關文獻研究中不同之異常現象；另外，在董監事介入股市方面，顯示董監事持股質押比率與股價兩者成負相關，但迴歸分析的結果並不顯著。整體來看，對台灣上市公司而言，本研究公司治理因素可為公司評價的重要增額資訊。 / Based on Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995) valuation models, this study examines the effects of corporate governance, in addition to abcdrmal earnings and book value, on firm value. The results indicate that the abcdrmal earnings have persistent and forecast relevance. Both abcdrmal earnings and equity book values are significantly relevant to firm value. Contrary to the literature, the corporate governance has negative effects on firm value.

證期會於2002年開始實施「自結損益制度」，要求已公開財務預測的上市公司，應於年度終了後1個月內公告上年度財務預測達成情形相關資訊，以期藉由強制揭露改善資訊空窗期現象，並讓投資人提早得知公司上年度的營運成果。 故本研究的樣本為從2001年已公開財務預測的公司開始探討。後來「公開財測處理準則」於2004年12月修正，改採自願公開財務預測。雖然公布財務預測之公司應於年度終了後一個月內公布自結盈餘之規定並未更改，然財務預測由強制性改為自願性，使得研究基礎不一致，所以將研究期間分割為兩段，第一段為2001年1月至2004年12月，第二段為2005年1月至2005年12月。 本研究的主題分為三個部分，主要在探討股權結構對公司自結盈餘行為之影響。實證結果發現，控制權與現金流量權之數值愈小，即偏離程度愈大，公司更新財務預測之幅度愈大。控制股東之股份控制權與公司公布自結盈餘時間早晚呈正相關，即股份控制權愈高的公司，愈晚發布自結盈餘；從董監事質押比例觀之，2001年到2004年之間，董監事質押比例愈高的公司，發布自結盈餘的時間點愈晚，但依照2005年之資料顯示，董監事質押比例愈高的公司，發布自結盈餘的時間愈早，由於董監事質押比例在不同研究期間呈相反的結果，因此該變數對對公司公布自結盈餘的時間早晚之影響尚無定論。董監事質押比率愈大，其公布的自結損益準確性愈差，與公告盈餘之差異愈大。 / In November 2002, the Securities and Futures Commission announced a new measure requiring listed companies that have made their financial forecast to the public to release within a month after the year end their income statements (hereafter called “self-assessed earnings”) and explain the discrepancy from the forecasted earnings. This new measure requires that the above listed companies release their earnings information earlier than the deadline for filing audited financial statements (hereafter called “audited earnings”) by three months, aiming to ask the listed companies to provide more timely information to investors. The sample consists of firms releasing their financial forecasts from 2001 to 2005. According the time the rules changed, the sample is divided into two groups. This study aims to examine how the corporate ownership structure affects the way a company release its self-assessed income. The empirical results find that the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights of the largest ultimate owner is lower, and the company updates its financial forecasts greatly. The voting rights level of the largest ultimate owner is related positively with the time making self-assessed income to the public. Moreover, directors and controls mortgage ratio is larger, and the accuracy of the self-assessed income is lower.

本文以Dittmar and Mart-Smith (2007)所使用的模型為基礎，研究公司治理對公司價值、現金持有價值以及股利的影響。以市值對淨資產比、資產報酬率(以同產業的平均ROA調整後)為衡量公司價值的變數。而以內部人的行為和公司監督機制2項指標來衡量公司治理。其中，公司內部人行為指標包括：董監質押比、盈餘股份比、關係人融資比。公司監督治理機制指標包括：法人持股比、大股東持股比、獨立董監席次比、外部董監席次比、外部持股比。 以民國85-95年上市櫃公司為研究對象，以panel data之fix effect方式進行分析，實證結果顯示(一)對公司價值影響方面：盈餘股份比和法人持股比與公司價值呈現顯著正向關係；而董監質押比、獨立董監席次比、外部董監席次比與公司價值呈負向關係。(二)在現金持有價值影響方面：內部人行為中，董監質押比、關係人融資比對現金持有價值影響為顯著負向，並無發現監督機制對現金持有價值有正向影響。(三)在股利影響方面：內部人行為中，董監質押比、關係人融資比對股利的影響為顯著正向，並無發現監督機制對股利有負向影響。整體來看，公司治理對公司價值確有影響，但對現金持有價值和股利的影響方面，並沒有發現如Pinkowitz et al. (2006)之實證結果。 / Based on Dittmar and Mart-Smith (2007) valuation models, I investigate how the corporate governance affects the contribution of cash holdings and dividends to firm value. Firm value was measured by market value to book value ratio and the adjusted return on assets. We use two major categories of corporate governance measures including the degree of insider acting and the presence of shareholder monitoring. The degree of insider acting includes the ratio of directors' and supervisors' shares pledged (dsip) , the ratio of controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights to voting rights(ehb), and the ratio of relation party loaning to equity(rplp). The shareholder monitoring includes institutional holding(ihp), large shareholder holding(mhp), the ratio of independent directors and supervisors(idsp), the ratio of outside directors and supervisors(ocp), the ratio of outside directors and supervisors holding(ohp). Firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC during 1995-2006 are selected as the sample. The empirical results indicate that the ratio of controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights to voting rights(ehb), and institutional holding(ihp) are significantly and positively related to market value and return on assets. Second, the ratio of directors' and supervisors' shares pledged(dsip), and the ratio of relation party loaning to equity(rplp) are significantly and negatively related to the value of cash holding. We didn’t find the shareholder monitoring significantly increase the cash holding value. Finally, only the ratio of directors' and supervisors' shares pledged(dsip) and the ratio of relation party loaning to equity(rplp) are significantly related to dividends value. The conclusion is that although corporate government affects firm value, corporate government doesn’t significantly determines the value of cash holding and dividends. That empirical result is not consistent with the one of Pinkowitz et al. (2006).