證期會於2002年開始實施「自結損益制度」，要求已公開財務預測的上市公司，應於年度終了後1個月內公告上年度財務預測達成情形相關資訊，以期藉由強制揭露改善資訊空窗期現象，並讓投資人提早得知公司上年度的營運成果。 故本研究的樣本為從2001年已公開財務預測的公司開始探討。後來「公開財測處理準則」於2004年12月修正，改採自願公開財務預測。雖然公布財務預測之公司應於年度終了後一個月內公布自結盈餘之規定並未更改，然財務預測由強制性改為自願性，使得研究基礎不一致，所以將研究期間分割為兩段，第一段為2001年1月至2004年12月，第二段為2005年1月至2005年12月。 本研究的主題分為三個部分，主要在探討股權結構對公司自結盈餘行為之影響。實證結果發現，控制權與現金流量權之數值愈小，即偏離程度愈大，公司更新財務預測之幅度愈大。控制股東之股份控制權與公司公布自結盈餘時間早晚呈正相關，即股份控制權愈高的公司，愈晚發布自結盈餘；從董監事質押比例觀之，2001年到2004年之間，董監事質押比例愈高的公司，發布自結盈餘的時間點愈晚，但依照2005年之資料顯示，董監事質押比例愈高的公司，發布自結盈餘的時間愈早，由於董監事質押比例在不同研究期間呈相反的結果，因此該變數對對公司公布自結盈餘的時間早晚之影響尚無定論。董監事質押比率愈大，其公布的自結損益準確性愈差，與公告盈餘之差異愈大。 / In November 2002, the Securities and Futures Commission announced a new measure requiring listed companies that have made their financial forecast to the public to release within a month after the year end their income statements (hereafter called “self-assessed earnings”) and explain the discrepancy from the forecasted earnings. This new measure requires that the above listed companies release their earnings information earlier than the deadline for filing audited financial statements (hereafter called “audited earnings”) by three months, aiming to ask the listed companies to provide more timely information to investors. The sample consists of firms releasing their financial forecasts from 2001 to 2005. According the time the rules changed, the sample is divided into two groups. This study aims to examine how the corporate ownership structure affects the way a company release its self-assessed income. The empirical results find that the ratio of cash flow rights over voting rights of the largest ultimate owner is lower, and the company updates its financial forecasts greatly. The voting rights level of the largest ultimate owner is related positively with the time making self-assessed income to the public. Moreover, directors and controls mortgage ratio is larger, and the accuracy of the self-assessed income is lower.

家族企業約佔我國上市公司的80.63％，其管理權與經營權多掌握在同一家族中，家族對企業有很大的影響力。本研究探討家族企業與非家族企業多角化程度與董監質押比例之高低跟盈餘管理之關聯性。 本研究以我國1997年至2006年底之上市公司為樣本，實證結果發現：(1)家族企業較非家族企業從事盈餘管理的可能性為高；(2)當公司多角化經營程度越高時，公司有較大之誘因進行盈餘管理之行為，然而當公司為家族企業且其多角化程度越高時，反而會降低家族企業盈餘管理可能性；(3)家族企業樣本中，多角化經營程度高低，與家族企業是否從事盈餘管理並無顯著之關係；(4)公司非相關多角化經營之高低，與家族企業是否從事盈餘管理，並無顯著之關係；(5)公司董監事質押比率之高低，與家族企業是否從事盈餘管理，並無顯著之關係。 / Family firms take about 81% of the listed firms in Taiwan. This study investigates the relation between business diversification and earnings management and that between stock pledge of directors and earnings management under the family-firms/non-family -firms setting. Based on the sample of firms listed in Taiwan during 1997-2006, the empirical results show that the family companies are more apt to manipulate earnings than the non-family companies. The higher the degree of diversification, the more the companies are apt to manipulate the earnings. However, neither unrelated diversification nor stock pledge of directors is related to earning management. Contrast to non-families, well-diversified family companies may decrease the possibility of earnings management, but taking family companies as a sample, diversification is not associated with earnings management.

本文以Dittmar and Mart-Smith (2007)所使用的模型為基礎，研究公司治理對公司價值、現金持有價值以及股利的影響。以市值對淨資產比、資產報酬率(以同產業的平均ROA調整後)為衡量公司價值的變數。而以內部人的行為和公司監督機制2項指標來衡量公司治理。其中，公司內部人行為指標包括：董監質押比、盈餘股份比、關係人融資比。公司監督治理機制指標包括：法人持股比、大股東持股比、獨立董監席次比、外部董監席次比、外部持股比。 以民國85-95年上市櫃公司為研究對象，以panel data之fix effect方式進行分析，實證結果顯示(一)對公司價值影響方面：盈餘股份比和法人持股比與公司價值呈現顯著正向關係；而董監質押比、獨立董監席次比、外部董監席次比與公司價值呈負向關係。(二)在現金持有價值影響方面：內部人行為中，董監質押比、關係人融資比對現金持有價值影響為顯著負向，並無發現監督機制對現金持有價值有正向影響。(三)在股利影響方面：內部人行為中，董監質押比、關係人融資比對股利的影響為顯著正向，並無發現監督機制對股利有負向影響。整體來看，公司治理對公司價值確有影響，但對現金持有價值和股利的影響方面，並沒有發現如Pinkowitz et al. (2006)之實證結果。 / Based on Dittmar and Mart-Smith (2007) valuation models, I investigate how the corporate governance affects the contribution of cash holdings and dividends to firm value. Firm value was measured by market value to book value ratio and the adjusted return on assets. We use two major categories of corporate governance measures including the degree of insider acting and the presence of shareholder monitoring. The degree of insider acting includes the ratio of directors' and supervisors' shares pledged (dsip) , the ratio of controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights to voting rights(ehb), and the ratio of relation party loaning to equity(rplp). The shareholder monitoring includes institutional holding(ihp), large shareholder holding(mhp), the ratio of independent directors and supervisors(idsp), the ratio of outside directors and supervisors(ocp), the ratio of outside directors and supervisors holding(ohp). Firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC during 1995-2006 are selected as the sample. The empirical results indicate that the ratio of controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights to voting rights(ehb), and institutional holding(ihp) are significantly and positively related to market value and return on assets. Second, the ratio of directors' and supervisors' shares pledged(dsip), and the ratio of relation party loaning to equity(rplp) are significantly and negatively related to the value of cash holding. We didn’t find the shareholder monitoring significantly increase the cash holding value. Finally, only the ratio of directors' and supervisors' shares pledged(dsip) and the ratio of relation party loaning to equity(rplp) are significantly related to dividends value. The conclusion is that although corporate government affects firm value, corporate government doesn’t significantly determines the value of cash holding and dividends. That empirical result is not consistent with the one of Pinkowitz et al. (2006).