The object of this research is to study how unions and firms divide the surplus or rents available to them. Many instruments are used in practice to make this division, but standard micro data only includes two: wages and employment. I use a new approach to study wage and employment contracts as I consider them equilibrium points in a noncooperative bargaining game. This work is an extension of wage-employment determination models, the extension being the incorporation of a bargaining model, specifically, a Rubinstein bargaining game. Given the objective functions of the two players, the wage and employment equations are specified by the equilibrium conditions for the game. Also, additional determinants of the contracts are identified. One of the characteristics of the model is that the wage and employment contracts are affected by the relative strike costs of the two negotiating parties even in the absence of strikes. The data involve the B.C. wood products industry and the IWA, a powerful union believed to have been successful at capturing rents. The data include input and output quantities and prices and equations representing input demands and output supply are estimated simultaneously with the negotiated wage and employment equations. Four estimation models are derived corresponding to two bargaining frameworks and two sets of assumptions on the firms' technology. The two bargaining frameworks correspond to two polar cases that have been assumed in the wage-employment determination literature: in one case, the wage is set through bargaining while the employment level is chosen by the firm, in the second case, both the wage and employment level are negotiated. In one pair of models, output is treated as exogenous to the bargaining while in the second set of models, output is endogenous and capital is exogenous. The bargaining game is successfully implemented in the sense that technology and union utility parameters are generally reasonable and comparable to previous estimates. Also, the determinants of relative strike costs enter significantly in the estimation. The union is seen to care about employment as well as the wage with slightly more weight being placed on the employment level. Rent maximization is always rejected. Bargaining powers are calculated at each data point and results indicate that the 1980's recession increased the relative power of the union. The hypotheses of equal bargaining powers and complete union bargaining power are tested and rejected. Also, the proportion of rents captured by the firm is found to be a poor indicator of its bargaining power. Although the qualitative results mentioned above are robust across the four models, parameter values are generally sensitive to both the technology assumptions and the bargaining framework. Ignoring the simultaneity of wages, employment and other variables chosen by the firm can be very misleading. Finally, the model in which both wages and employment are negotiated consistently performs better than the framework in which employment is unilaterally set by the firm. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

New Zealand presently operates a "free market" system of employment and labour relations in which there are no prescribed or mandatory bargaining procedures. When this system was introduced by the Employment Contracts Act 1991 (the "ECA" ) it represented a dramatic departure from the previous system of state regulated collective bargaining, conciliation and arbitration: a system that had existed in New Zealand for almost a century. Although this change in approach was supported by free market advocates, it also generated considerable international and domestic criticism. In response to that criticism, a number of New Zealand politicians stated in 1996 that they would consider imposing on employers and employees a statutory duty to bargain in good faith. However, since the end of 1996, very little has occurred in respect of this issue. Indeed, it now appears that the current New Zealand Government may have abandoned this proposal altogether. If this is, in fact, the Government's decision, it ought to be viewed with concern, for it has been made without the benefit of informed debate. Little, if any, substantive consideration has been given to whether such a duty ought to be introduced, and if so, the form it might take and impact it might have. If an informed decision is to be made to enact a duty of this nature, or not, as the case may be, its merits must be the subject of further debate. This thesis will endeavour to contribute to that debate by examining how one approach to the duty to bargain in good faith, that which applies in British Columbia, Canada, might operate in New Zealand. This examination will consist of six chapters. The first will contextualise the New Zealand arguments on whether a duty of this nature ought to be introduced into the ECA. Chapter two will then examine the duty to bargain in good faith as it applies in British Columbia industrial relations. Chapter three will take that duty, and examine the extent to which it is currently replicated in New Zealand. It will be concluded that little of the substance of this duty is to be found in the law which presently governs the New Zealand labour market. Chapter four will assess the costs of introducing a duty of this nature into the ECA, particularly in terms of reduced efficiency and freedom. Chapter five will identify a number of specific issues that will require resolution if the duty is to operate effectively in New Zealand, and the terms of a suggested statutory amendment will be proffered. It will be concluded in chapter six that introducing a duty to bargain in good faith, akin to that which applies in British Columbia, would benefit New Zealand employers, employees and society as a whole. Further, it will be argued that such a duty must be introduced if labour bargaining in New Zealand is to occur in any meaningful way for most employees. And finally, it will be suggested that if this duty is to be introduced effectively, legislative amendment will be required. For these reasons, it will be asserted that the New Zealand Government ought to revisit the issue of introducing into the ECA a statutory duty to bargain in good faith. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

The topic of this dissertation is the fact-finding stage of Oregon's public sector impasse resolution procedure. The use of fact-finding has dramatically increased because of the recent and rapid growth in public sector collective bargaining, and the resulting increase in public sector strikes. Beginning in 1962 with John F. Kennedy's Executive Order 10988, a series of federal and state laws were passed granting and expanding collective bargaining rights to public employees. Many of the state laws resemble the private sector model provided under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley); however, the use of the strike as a weapon to enforce bargaining in good faith and resolution of conflict has been limited for public employees because of the potential threat of disruption of public services and interference with the sovereignty of the government. Such anti-strike legislation, however, has not prevented public employee strikes. The purpose of this study is to analyze the purpose, nature, and effectiveness of Oregon's fact-finding phase of impasse resolution. Because of the impact the home rule issue has had on the use of Oregon's impasse procedures, this study will focus on those sectors where use of fact-finding has been extensive, consistent and unaffected by the home rule issue. This analysis of fact-finding represents the first comprehensive and systematic assessment of the impasse procedure to be undertaken in the state since the 1973 law was passed. Such analysis will identify the significant variables in the efficacy of fact-finding and will bring together practitioners' views on the viability of the process. This latter dimension is critical in that the opinions of these participants in the labor relations field will likely affect and shape future legislation on fact-finding.

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