abstract: Social-ecological systems (SES) are replete with hard and soft human-made components (or infrastructures) that are consciously-designed to perform specific functions valued by humans. How these infrastructures mediate human-environment interactions is thus a key determinant of many sustainability problems in present-day SES. This dissertation examines the question of how some of the designed aspects of physical and social infrastructures influence the robustness of SES under global change. Due to the fragility of rural livelihood systems, locally-managed common-pool resource systems that depend on infrastructure, such as irrigated agriculture and community forestry, are of particular importance to address this sustainability question. This dissertation presents three studies that explored the robustness of communal irrigation and forestry systems to economic or environmental shocks. The first study examined how the design of irrigation infrastructure affects the robustness of system performance to an economic shock. Using a stylized dynamic model of an irrigation system as a testing ground, this study shows that changes in infrastructure design can induce fundamental changes in qualitative system behavior (i.e., regime shifts) as well as altered robustness characteristics. The second study explored how connectedness among social units (a kind of social infrastructure) influenced the post-failure transformations of large-N forest commons under economic globalization. Using inferential statistics, the second study argues that some attributes of the social connectedness that helped system robustness in the past made the system more vulnerable to undesirable transformations in the current era. The third study explored the question of how to guide adaptive management of SES for more robustness under uncertainty. This study used an existing laboratory behavioral experiment in which human-subjects tackle a decision problem on collective management of an irrigation system under environmental uncertainty. The contents of group communication and the decisions of individuals were analyzed to understand how configurations of learning-by-doing and other adaptability-related conditions may be causally linked to robustness under environmental uncertainty. The results show that robust systems are characterized by two conditions: active learning-by-doing through outer-loop processes, i.e., frequent updating of shared assumptions or goals that underlie specific group strategies, and frequent monitoring and reflection of past outcomes. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Sustainability 2015

abstract: My research is motivated by a rule of thumb that no matter how well a system is designed, some actors fail to fulfill the behavior which is needed to sustain the system. Examples of misbehavior are shirking, rule infraction, and free riding. With a focus on social-ecological systems, this thesis explored the effectiveness of social feedback mechanisms driven by the two available individual options: the exit option is defined as any response to escape from an objectionable state of affairs; and the voice option as any attempt to stay put and improve the state. Using a stylized dynamic model, the first study investigates how the coexistence of participatory and groundwater market institutions affects government-managed irrigation systems. My findings suggest that patterns of bureaucratic reactions to exit (using private tubewells) and voice (putting pressure on irrigation bureaus) are critical to shaping system dynamics. I also found that the silence option – neither exit nor voice – can impede a further improvement in public infrastructure, but in some cases, can improve public infrastructure dramatically. Using a qualitative comparative analysis of 30 self-governing fishing groups in South Korea, the second study examines how resource mobility, group size, and Ostrom’s Design Principles for rule enforcement can co-determine the effectiveness of the voice option in self-controlling rule infractions. Results suggest that the informal mechanism for conflict resolution is a necessary condition for successful self-governance of local fisheries and that even if rules for monitoring and graduated sanctions are not in use, groups can be successful when they harvest only stationary resources. Using an agent-based model of public good provision, the third study explores under what socioeconomic conditions the exit option – neither producing nor consuming collective benefits – can work effectively to enhance levels of cooperation. The model results suggest that the exit option contributes to the spread of cooperators in mid- and large-size groups at the moderate level of exit payoff, given that group interaction occurs to increase the number of cooperators. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Environmental Social Science 2020

Over the last decade, a confluence of strategic and security concerns has threatened the European Union’s survival both within and beyond its political dimension. As a result, security and defence have risen to the top of the EU’s political agenda, culminating in the approval of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in 2016. The EUGS represented a watershed moment in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy: the EU agreed on ambitious levels of security and defence. The new policy is based on supporting capacity building among member states through instruments such as PESCO. Nonetheless, these instruments have caused variations in patterns of member state behaviour that have enhanced defense integration. This research aims to understand what was the PESCO institutional effect on Member States' preferences and how it has affected the European security and defense goals. The research highlights the role of European agencies and how they contributed to solve collective action problem through a ‘forum effect' on participants, using pro-actively the task of assessing co-operative projects proposals. As a result, PESCO’s institutional effect led to cooperative outcomes between nations that allowed them to overcome coordination dilemmas, namely uncertainty about the willingness to contribute to a common project, which is typical of defense cooperation. Here, we used Rational Choice Institutionalism theory to investigate the PESCO project structure and its interaction with the European Defence policy. Cooperation between participating member states is presented within a cooperative game action, as part of a theoretical approach to game theory. It explains formally how PESCO entails elements to overcome collective action problem among participating member states, while emphasising the institutional design that promoted the European interests, and how this has led to more Europeanised security and defence. Findings are interpreted under the Differentiated integration concept.