Thesis (S.T.D.)--Catholic University of America, 1939. / At head of title: The Catholic university of America. S. Facultas theologica, 1938-39. no. 56. Bibliography: p. 42-54.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Delaware, 2005. / Principal faculty advisor: Lawrence H. Cohen, Dept. of Psychology. Includes bibliographical references.

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A great deal of research has been conducted in the last three decades to find the determinants of technology usage and adoption. Numerous models have been developed in the United States and other developed countries to enhance the understanding of this issue. However, two main questions remain as to what extent these models and conclusions based on their past usage can be applied to other countries, particularly less developed nations, and to what degree social influence affects consumers' decisions across cultures. Recently, Kulviwat et al. (2007) proposed a new model - Consumer Acceptance of Technology (CAT) - that was shown to significantly improve the prediction of intentions to adopt high-tech products compared to the immensely popular Technology Acceptance Model (TAM; Davis 1989) by integrating cognitive and affective factors. This study extends the CAT model by adding social constructs in order to account for the effects from others rather than from one's own thoughts and feelings. Because of the addition of social influences, this modified model was named CATS. The objectives of this dissertation were threefold. The first objective was to investigate the impact of social influence on adoption of technological innovations by including three social constructs: social influence, susceptibility to normative influence, and susceptibility to informational influence. The second objective was to examine cognitive, affective, and social influence in three countries (The United States, State of Kuwait, and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) in order to determine if their relative roles in predicting attitudes and intentions are stable or if they vary in some predictable way. The third objective was to examine the effect of an extremely important cultural dimension, individualism/collectivism, on the relationships in the model. In general, the results provided empirical support for CATS across cultures by using structural equation modeling and path analysis. More specifically, the findings confirm what was found in previous studies about the important roles of cognition (percieved usefulness) and affect (pleasure, arousal, and dominance). Additionally, this research showed that social (social influence) also has a significant, direct, and positive effect on attitude toward adopting technology innovations. Also, as expected from previous studies, attitude had a significant, positive, and direct effect on adoption intention. Finally, the role of a culture's individualism/collectivism on the relationships in the model was surprising. The only factors that were significantly moderated by individualism/collectivism were related to affect: pleasure and dominance. This new finding suggests that consumers in individualistic cultures are more likely than consumers in collectivistic cultures to have their attitudes shaped by how enjoyable an innovation is and how much more "in control" it makes them feel. Overall, the analysis showed that the CATS model fit the data best. This means the incorporation of cognition, affect, and social into a model fit the data better than cognition (TAM) or cognition and affect (CAT) alone. These findings have valuable implications for marketing theory, methodology, and practice.

The United States' (U.S.) workforce is more diverse than in previous decades in terms of race, gender, and native language (Fay, 2001). Such demographic shifts have changed how organizations attract applicants and how they motivate, reward, and retain employees (McAdams, 2001). Furthermore, organizations benefit from diversity by: (a) attracting the best talent available in the workforce (Cox, 1993), (b) increasing their product marketability to customers (Deshpande, Hoyer, & Donthu, 1986; Redding, 1982), and (c) fostering creativity, innovation, problem solving, and decision making in employees (Thomas, 1999; Thomas, Ravlin, & Wallace, 1996; Watson, Kumar, & Michaelsen, 1993). Given such benefits, organizations should attend to initiatives that facilitate the attraction of applicants from diverse backgrounds. Research has demonstrated that applicants use information about human resource systems, such as rewards, to form judgments about the perceived fit between them and the organization (Bretz & Judge, 1994; Schneider, 1987). For instance, organizations with policies accommodating work and family issues attract applicants preferring such benefits. Because reward systems influence applicants' opinions about the relative attractiveness of organizations (Lawler, 2000), it is important to determine the factors that influence such preferences. Motivation theories, such as the Theory of Reasoned Action, suggest that preferences toward reward systems are guided by individuals' values (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Vroom, 1964). Such values, in turn, cause differences in reward preferences and organizational attraction. The purpose of this study was to investigate the relation of individuals' cultural values to the attraction of organizations offering different kinds of reward systems. More specifically, it sought to test three hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 predicted that there would be a two-way interaction between collectivism and the type of organization on organizational attraction. Hypothesis 2 predicted that there would be a two-way interaction between individualism and the type of organization on organizational attraction. Hypothesis 3 predicted that there would be a positive relation between collectivism and subjective norms used in organizational attraction. To test the three hypotheses, data from 228 participants were analyzed to evaluate their level of attractiveness to two different types of organizations (i.e., career-oriented vs. family-oriented). Findings for the test of Hypothesis 1 indicated that there was a joint effect between collectivism and the type of organization on organizational attraction. The slopes of the regression lines for each type of organization (i.e., family-oriented and career-oriented) differed as a function of collectivism. The slope of the regression line for the family-oriented organization was steeper than the slope of the regression line for the career-oriented organization. Results for the test of Hypothesis 2 indicated a joint effect between individualism and the type of organization on organizational attraction. The slopes of the regression lines for each type of organization (i.e., family-oriented and career-oriented) differed as a function of individualism. The slope of the regression line for the career-oriented organization was steeper than the slope of the regression line for the family-oriented organization. Findings for the test of Hypothesis 3 showed that collectivism was related to subjective norms. Results indicated that the more collective the individual, the higher the subjective norms. In addition, supplementary analysis showed that individualism was not related to subjective norms. Taken together, results from the tests of the three hypotheses support components of the Theory of Reasoned Action, and the premise that values are a factor related to an individual's attraction to a particular organization. The current study showed that the cross-cultural values of individualism and collectivism help predict organizational attraction. Based on these results, practical implications, contributions to theory, study limitations, and future research are discussed for designing organizational attraction strategies for a culturally diverse workforce.

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No / This article explores the importance of class and collectivism to personal identity, and the role this played during a period of personal and collective crisis created by mass redundancy in the Welsh steel industry. The research findings demonstrate the importance of occupational identity to individual and collective identity formation. The apparent desire to maintain this collective identity acted as a form of resistance to the increased individualization of the post-redundancy experience, but rather than leading to excessive particularism, it served as a mechanism through which class-based thinking and class identity were articulated. It is argued that the continued concern for class identity reflected efforts to avoid submergence in an existence akin to Beck¿s (1992) vision of a class-free `individualized society of employees¿.These findings therefore challenge the notion of the pervasiveness of individualism and the dismissal of class and collective orientations as important influences on identity formation.

Yes / This study explores how British South Asian parents perceive their children’s technology consumption through their collectivist lenses and interdependent values. The findings for this qualitative study indicate that second and third generation South Asian parents acknowledge the benefits of children’s technology use; but largely perceive technology as a disruptive agent, whereby children are becoming isolated and increasingly independent within the household. The analysis aims to understand how parents view their children’s relationship with others as a result of technology consumption. Accordingly, this paper proposes an extension of the Construal of self conceptualisation and contributes a Techno-construal matrix that establishes a dyadic connection between technology consumption and cultural values. Overall, the study reveals that children display less inter-reliance and conformance typically associated with collectivist cultures, resulting from their technology use. Consequently, parents interpret their children’s shift from interdependence to more independence as a disruptive and unsettling phenomenon within the household.

The capability approach to justice, made popular by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, has been a stalwart of the human development literature for the last 30 years, and its core ideals underwrite the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals. This dissertation offers a new version of the approach, rejecting many of its ideological commitments to liberal-democratic humanism and replacing them with more distinctly collectivist and communitarian ones. It contends that the capability approach, when used as a theoretical framework for global development, need not contain almost any ethical normativity with regard to a definition of justice, and indeed it is much more functional when it endorses a moderate ethical relativism. The argument proceeds in four steps. First, it shows that all existing versions of the capability approach are ideologically committed to a specific kind of liberal humanism, which its proponents consider universalist but that is actually quite provincial. Second, it argues that collectivist critiques from prominent capability theorists in the last decade have been misunderstood and their recommendations unheeded, a fact that this dissertation attempts to rectify. Third, it offers a properly collectivist account of group capabilities and group self-determination, which can do all the normative work that individual capabilities and agency perform in the approach's original versions. Finally, it introduces the notion of public objective capabilities, which justifies a higher deference to collective self-determination at the expense of some individual freedom and equitable participation in democratic polity. The overall goal of this new collectivist version of the approach is not to reject the worth of capability as a metric of global justice, but rather to reinforce it. A collectivist capabilitarianism shows that capability is so well suited to global development work that it can function across diverse political realities, without the ideological constraints of a liberal humanism that is widely accepted in the Global North but whose cross-cultural appeal has been far overstated by its proponents. / Ph. D.

Philosophiae Doctor - PhD / This thesis is concerned with the definition of an inclusive democratic educational theory and practice which mediates the assumed tension between individualism and collectivism, difference and equality, and liberty and equality. In Part 1, I set out the elements of an inclusive theory of democracy and then proceed in Part 2 to examine various aspects of educational practice in the light of this. My main claim is that these assumed tensions can be mediated through the conceptualising of our composite identity in terms of the notion of dual social ontology. This refers to our two-fold identities as universal, common human beings and our multiple subjective positions as particular, different individuating beings. Together, these two aspects of our identity constitute the basis for conceptualising our simultaneous commonality and difference and for an inclusive notion of democracy. I argue further that the key to understanding the intersection of commonality and difference in social relations and institutional practices is the concept of the spheres of social relations and their constitutive meanings. The latter provide the criterion by which we can judge the appropriateness of difference or equality in that sphere or in practices which relate to it. In the light of these concepts, I trace the ideological contestation at the heart of democratic theory between liberalism and socialism. My claim is that the mutual limitations of these theories preclude constructing an inclusive theory of democracy which incorporates collective equality and individual liberty in a non-polarised way. I argue that the tension between individualism and collectivism can be mediated by analysing these cluster concepts into non-polarised simpler elements. My main contention is that only self-interested individualism, which assumes individuals as atomistic self-seekers, is necessarily in conceptual conflict with collectivism. The other two elements of individualism which I identify, namely, individuality, our universal common identity as bearers of rights, and individuation, the process of self-development through the expression of the unique difference, are shown to be compatible with collective concerns and the social view of human identity. Together, I suggest, individuality and individuation constitute our dual social ontology and the foundation for moral regard and an inclusive theory of democracy which accommodates difference and commonality. During the discussion, I draw from several theorists who provide inclusive frameworks in terms of the social, dialogical view of human nature and identity formation and who combine contemporary concerns for pluralism and critical social transformation. I examine the conceptual link between education and democracy through the educative notion of democracy and education for democracy. Critical educational theory is explored as an exemplar of an inclusive democratic educational practice incorporating individual and collective dimensions. The dynamics of commonality and difference are traced in key aspects of the educational process, namely, moral development, learning and the relationship between authority and freedom, and with regard to the democratisation of schooling, the appropriate boundary between the spheres of education and of politics, distributive justice in education and the curriculum. I argue throughout that the discursive tool of dual social ontology, along with the concept of the spheres of social relations and their constitutive meanings, provides the conceptual framework by which these tensions can be mediated and incorporated in an inclusive democratic educational theory and practice.